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Abstract 
 
This thesis consists of three chapters that explore sell-side analysts’ attribute, the 
new regulation on them, and the research service provided by them on the capital 
market. 
Chapter 1 (co-authored with Peter Pope and Ane Tamayo) studies the impact on 
sell-side analysts and the stock market of separating research payments from dealing 
commissions. We exploit an exogenous shock to sell-side analysts’ research income 
in Sweden, caused by several of Sweden’s largest asset managers’ adoption of the 
unbundling model (the RPA model) to pay for the equity research purchased from the 
sell-side. Using a hand-collected dataset revealing analyst location, we find that the 
introduction of the RPA model coincides with a reduction in the supply of sell-side 
research services. The RPA model is associated with a reduction in analysts’ coverage 
lists, with some firms losing analyst coverage. This reduction is greater for firms with 
lower institutional ownership and with lower market value of equity, as well as firms 
that are not in the Benchmark index. Moreover, we find that, after controlling for 
changes in analyst coverage, the adoption of the RPA model is associated with an 
overall improvement in analysts’ research quality, as evidenced by superior earnings 
forecast ability in the post adoption period. Lastly, we find that the market reacts more 
strongly to forecast revisions in the post RPA adoption. Overall, our results suggest 
that unbundling research payment is associated with an improvement in the 
information environment for firms with analyst coverage, but some firms suffer a loss 
of analyst coverage. 
In Chapter 2 (co-authored with Peter Pope and Ane Tamayo), we investigate the 
effects of broker-hosted credit conferences on the corporate bond market. We find that 
firms with a greater probability of financial distress, more public debt, and lower time-
to-maturity of bonds are more likely to attend credit conferences. Next, we find that 
the bond market mainly reacts to credit conferences, rather than non-credit 
conferences. In addition, we document a greater market reaction to credit conferences 
when bonds have speculative grade credit rating and short time-to-maturity. 
Furthermore, we find that firms attending credit conferences experience a reduction in 
the cost of debt in the subsequent months. Lastly, we document an increase in 
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institutional investor ownership of bonds after the credit conference participation; this 
increase is mainly attributable to mutual fund investors. None of these results hold for 
non-credit conferences. 
Finally, in Chapter 3 (solo-authored), I investigate the role of analysts’ educational 
backgrounds in the analysis of R&D intensive firms within the chemical 
manufacturing industry. Firms’ technological complexity has a negative impact upon 
analysts’ behavior. Using R&D intensity as a proxy of technological complexity, and 
hand-collected data of analysts’ educational degrees, I find that analysts with a 
matching technological degree cover less industries, and firms’ analyst following by 
analysts with (without) a matching degree is positively (negatively) associated with 
firms’ R&D intensity. Furthermore, I find that a matching technological degree that 
an analyst holds ameliorates the negative impact of the R&D intensity on analysts’ 
forecast accuracy. Next, I find that the market reactions to upward recommendations 
revised by matching analysts are greater than that revised by non-matching analysts. 
Lastly, when restricting the sample to the group of pharmaceutical firms, I find a 
negative association between analysts’ boldness and firms’ R&D intensity; but when 
analysts have matching technological degrees this alleviates the negative association.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
5 
 
Contents 
 
Declaration ................................................................................................................... 1 
Acknowledgements ...................................................................................................... 2 
Abstract ........................................................................................................................ 3 
List of figures ............................................................................................................... 8 
List of tables ................................................................................................................. 9 
1      The impact of separating research payment from dealing commissions: Evidence 
from Sweden .............................................................................................................. 10 
1.1 Introduction ................................................................................................. 10 
1.2 Background, literature review, and hypothesis development ...................... 14 
1.3 Research design ........................................................................................... 26 
1.4 Data Collection ............................................................................................ 32 
1.5 Empirical results .......................................................................................... 35 
1.6 Conclusion ................................................................................................... 40 
1.7 Appendix: Definition of variables ............................................................... 42 
1.8 Appendix: The full Article 17 in the Commission Delegated Directive (EU) 
2017/593 ................................................................................................................. 44 
6 
 
1.9 Appendix: Swedish Code of Conduct for fund management companies .... 46 
1.10 Appendix: An excerpt from the Information Brochure of Handelsbanken 
Fund AB ................................................................................................................. 47 
2     Broker-hosted credit investor conferences: Evidence from the corporate bond 
market ......................................................................................................................... 73 
2.1 Introduction ................................................................................................. 73 
2.2 Data collection and general sample description .......................................... 77 
2.3 Determinants of firms attending non-credit and credit conferences ........... 78 
2.4 Using abnormal return as the measure of the bond market reaction ........... 83 
2.5 Using trading volume as the measure of the bond market reaction ............ 89 
2.6 The change in the yield spread on the secondary market ............................ 93 
2.7 Bond institutional investor ownership ......................................................... 96 
2.8 Conclusion ................................................................................................... 99 
2.9 Appendix: Definition of variables ............................................................. 101 
3     The interactive effect of firms’ R&D intensity and analysts’ educational 
background on analysts’ behavior: Evidence from the chemical manufacturing 
industry ..................................................................................................................... 134 
3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................... 134 
3.2 Literature review and hypotheses .............................................................. 138 
3.3 Research Design ........................................................................................ 146 
3.4 Data and sample ........................................................................................ 150 
3.5 Empirical results ........................................................................................ 152 
7 
 
3.6 Conclusion ................................................................................................. 157 
3.7 Appendix: The name of each 4-digit SIC industries. ................................ 159 
3.8 Appendix: Definition of variables ............................................................. 160 
References ................................................................................................................ 182 
 
8 
 
List of figures 
 
Figure 1.1: The Bundled Model, Research Payment Account (RPA), and Commission 
Sharing Agreement (CSA) .................................................................................. 48 
Figure 1.2: The identification of the treatment group and the control group ............. 51 
Figure 1.3: Firm coverage of analysts in treatment group and control group ............ 52 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
9 
 
List of tables 
 
Table 1.1: The identification of analysts’ location..................................................... 53 
Table 1.2: The number of firms on analysts’ coverage list ........................................ 56 
Table 1.3: General description of Nasdaq OMX Stockholm ..................................... 58 
Table 1.4: Selective reduction in firms’ analyst following ........................................ 59 
Table 1.5: Analysts’ research quality ......................................................................... 64 
Table 1.6: The test of the likelihood of analysts dropping firms in the post-RPA period
 ............................................................................................................................ 69 
Table 1.7: Market reaction to forecast revisions ........................................................ 72 
Table 2.1: Data collection ........................................................................................ 107 
Table 2.2: Determinants of firms attending credit and non-credit conferences ....... 109 
Table 2.3: The abnormal return test ......................................................................... 115 
Table 2.4: The trading volume test .......................................................................... 124 
Table 2.5: The change in the yield spread on the secondary market ....................... 129 
Table 2.6: The change in bond institutional ownership ........................................... 131 
Table 3.1: Data collection and general description of the sample ........................... 162 
Table 3.2: Analysts’ industry coverage .................................................................... 164 
Table 3.3: Firms’ analysts following ....................................................................... 166 
Table 3.4: Forecast accuracy .................................................................................... 168 
Table 3.5: Market reaction to recommendation revisions ........................................ 172 
Table 3.6: Boldness .................................................................................................. 175 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
10 
 
Chapter 1  
The impact of separating research payment from 
dealing commissions: Evidence from Sweden 
 
1.1 Introduction 
In January 2018, the European Union issued a new directive changing how asset 
managers pay for the research services provided by sell-side analysts. Previously, 
brokers bundled payments for research services with trade execution fees. However, 
due to the perceived inefficiencies that the bundled model creates, the new Directive 
states that payments for research and trading execution should be separate. In this 
paper, we study a new research payment regime in Sweden – the earliest implementer 
of the new payment method – to test the potential impact of brokerage fee unbundling. 
Specifically, we study the impact of the change to brokerage fee payments on the 
information environment, in the form of sell-side analysts’ coverage and forecast 
accuracy.  
The extant literature examining sell-side analysts’ incentives when choosing firms 
to cover and when forecasting earnings and other outcomes concentrates on two 
sources of compensation for their research services: (1) subsidies from the investment 
banking department; and (2) the sharing of dealing commissions with brokerage 
houses’ trading operations. One stream of the literature conjectures that a significant 
portion of analysts’ research income is subsidized by the investment banking function 
within a brokerage house (Lin and McNichols 1998; O’Brien et al. 2005; Michaely 
and Womack 1999; Dechow et al. 2000). Another stream of papers investigates the 
impact of analysts’ research income coming from dealing commissions when the 
brokerage house handles investors’ trades (Hayes 1998; Irvine 2000; Irvine 2004; 
Jackson 2005; Cowen et al. 2006). When a brokerage house pays for services (or other 
perquisites) consumed by asset managers as a result of dealing commissions generated 
by the brokerage arrangement, this has become known as a “soft dollar” arrangement. 
Hence, providing “free” (or subsidized) research developed within the brokerage 
house and consumed by the asset manager is a form of soft dollar arrangement.  
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Soft dollar arrangements are potentially inefficient because they encourage over-
consumption by asset managers at asset owners’ expense as dealing commissions are 
higher than they need be. On the supply side, when they are not held accountable for 
the profitability of their own decisions, analysts have incentives to offer a “waterfront 
coverage” of firms, i.e., to cover as many firms as possible to solicit asset managers 
(Edison Investment Research 2013). Sell-side research is effectively an “advertising 
tool” to attract asset managers. Moreover, as analysts’ research income is directly 
linked to the value (and the volume) of trades executed by brokerage houses under the 
bundled model, a higher amount of trading volume will generate higher dealing 
commissions (hence research income) to analysts, creating incentives for analysts to 
issue optimistically biased forecasts and recommendations. Profit-maximizing brokers 
required to charge asset managers for the supply of research services will have 
incentives to better control the supply of research, adjust supply in response to asset 
managers’ demand and allowing the reduction of dealing commissions to the benefit 
of asset owners. 
There is a paucity of empirical evidence on the role of sell-side research in 
determining dealing commissions, primarily due to lack of data on dealing 
commission components and the lack of time series variation in commission 
arrangements. In one of the handful of papers, Maber et al. (2014) use proprietary data 
to study ‘broker votes’, an important mechanism to allocate the research income 
among analysts. They find that brokerage houses use broker votes to indirectly reward 
analysts for the contribution they make to generating dealing commissions. We do not 
consider the compensation of individual analysts in this paper, but seek instead to 
exploit a rare change in the research payments system from the dealing commission to 
study how a change in compensation for research influences the supply of brokerage 
research services, with a focus on analysts’ coverage decisions and the quality of their 
research.  
Regulators have recently taken an interest in the possible inefficiencies of the 
bundled research payments system. The European Commission proposed in the 
Markets in Financial Instrument Directives II (MiFID II) that asset managers be 
required to establish a separate research payment account (RPA) to handle payments 
for research. Under the RPA approach, brokerage houses charge asset managers 
separately for dealing commissions and research payments. Asset managers have to 
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decide whether to bear the costs of research on their own account or pass on the 
charges to asset owners. Either way, asset managers have incentives to consider 
carefully the amount they spend on sell-side research service. Hence, the RPA model 
can mitigate overspending on research services by asset managers. From sell-side 
analysts’ viewpoint, the RPA model breaks the link between the trading volume and 
research payments. This renders a “waterfront coverage” style – covering a large 
number of firms – and potentially biased forecasts, unprofitable. As a result, analysts 
may reduce their coverage lists and provide higher quality research in an attempt to 
secure their share of research payments. 
The European Union implemented MiFID II as recently as 3 January 2018, 
meaning that EU wide data to test implementation effects unavailable.1 However, at 
the beginning of 2015, several of the largest and most influential Swedish asset 
managers announced that they had decided unilaterally to separate sell-side research 
payments from the dealing commission as an endorsement of the debate regarding the 
proposal to unbundle the research payment in MiFID II. The preemptive voluntary 
adoption of the RPA approach in Sweden provides an interesting setting to generate 
early insights into how the supply and quality of analysts’ research changes in response 
to the research payment structure.   
We predict that the implementation of the RPA payment model creates incentives 
for Swedish analysts to reduce coverage of firms where the demand for research is low 
and to improve the quality of the research they continue to perform. We use a 
difference-in-differences research design to study the supply of sell-side research by 
Swedish analysts, where the introduction of RPA in Sweden is likely to have greatest 
impact. As our starting point, we predict that the number of firms on analysts’ 
coverage list falls with the adoption of RPA in Sweden. We hand-collect the 
geographical location of analysts covering firms listed on Swedish stock markets. We 
identify 1,582 analysts, including 223 Swedish analysts. After discarding four 
Swedish analysts who relocated internationally, we classify 219 Swedish analysts as 
the treated analysts, and 1,359 non-Swedish analysts as the control group to test the 
hypothesis within a difference-in-difference design.  We find that Swedish analysts, 
compared to non-Swedish analysts, drop 0.62 firms after the adoption of the RPA 
                                                          
1 Available at: https://www.esma.europa.eu/policy-rules/mifid-ii-and-mifir. [Accessed: 20 August 
2017] 
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model. Secondly, we use firms that are listed on the largest Swedish stock market – 
Nasdaq OMX Stockholm as the sample, hypothesize and find that Swedish analysts 
primarily reduce coverage of firms with low institutional investor ownership and low 
market capitalization, as well as firms that are not included in the Benchmark index.2 
More precisely, after the adoption of RPA in Sweden, firms with low institutional 
investor holdings suffer a reduction of 0.22 analysts, compared to firms with high 
institutional investor holdings. In addition, the reduction in analyst coverage among 
small firms is 0.65 relative to large firms, equivalent to a 72% reduction in the mean 
of the number analysts following small firms. With regard to the firms that are not 
included in the Benchmark index, they experience 0.46 more analysts’ reduction 
relative to the Benchmark index firms. Thirdly, we use analysts’ forecast accuracy as 
the proxy of research quality to test the change in the research quality after the Swedish 
RPA adoption. Results show that analysts’ forecast errors decrease by 0.33% after the 
introduction of the RPA model. We further find that the decrease in analysts’ forecast 
error is due to the improvement in analysts’ forecast ability, rather than the elimination 
of supply of forecast by lower quality analysts. Lastly, we find that the market reaction 
to analysts’ forecast revisions increases by 40% with the RPA adoption. 
Our paper makes the following contributions. Firstly, it makes the first 
contribution in the literature on the role of payments for research when bundled with 
dealing commissions. When studying the effect of the trading volume on analysts’ 
behavior, the extant literature builds the research on the premise of a positive 
association between analysts’ research income and the trading volume. We use a novel 
setting and study the change of analysts’ coverage decision and research quality when 
this association disappears. Secondly, our paper contributes to the indirect effect of 
analysts’ on the stock market. The change in the research payment structure has a 
direct impact on analyst coverage, with a reduction in the supply of research for firms 
with low institutional investor holdings and low market capitalization. Thirdly, we 
provide early empirical evidence to the newly implemented regulation in MiFID II in 
terms of the potential unintended consequences of separating research payments from 
dealing commissions. 
                                                          
2 The Benchmark index refers to Nasdaq OMX Stockholm Benchmark index, which is the major index 
in Sweden. The Benchmark index only consists of the largest and the most liquid stocks. 
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The remainder of this study is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide 
a brief background for the research payment method, discuss the related literature, and 
develop the hypotheses. In Section 1.3, we outline the research design. Section 1.4 
presents the various sources of data and gives a general description of the Swedish 
market. Section 1.5 reports the primary results and findings. Section 1.6 concludes. 
1.2 Background, literature review, and hypothesis development 
 Background 
Asset managers’ payment for the sell-side research service is bundled with the 
trading execution fees under the head of dealing commissions. In the US, the “Safe 
Harbor” in the Section 28(e) of the Securities Exchange Act (SEA) of 1934 permits 
asset managers to pay a premium to brokers for additional services in the dealing 
commission when seeking brokerage services. The additional services may include 
software, hardware, database access and research reports issued by brokers’ research 
departments. Although the Section 28(e) of SEA requires asset managers to disclose 
such arrangement, the disclosure can be opaque. Asset managers must disclose the 
total amount of dealing commissions and the existence of the soft dollar arrangement, 
but they do not necessarily report the exact amount of the payment for a research 
service. The reason that the SEC introduced Safe Harbor in the SEA is to protect asset 
managers from the potential breach of fiduciary duty. Without Safe Harbor, asset 
managers, in an attempt to avoid litigation by asset owners for breaching fiduciary 
duty, may be more likely to select brokerage services with the lowest commission fees, 
regardless of the quality of the service. However, use of soft dollar arrangements and 
the bundled research payments model is controversial. Advocates argue that soft 
dollars are an innovative and efficient form of economic organization that benefits 
investors (Johnsen 2009). Brennan and Chordia (1993) suggest that trading volume 
could be a proxy for information quality, and asset managers obtaining high quality 
information may achieve better gross performance. In contrast, the opponents of fee 
bundling argue that asset managers may abuse the opacity of soft dollars to unjustly 
enrich themselves (over-spending), leading to inefficient use of asset owners’ 
resources  (Blume 1993, Bolge 2009, Erzurumlu and Kotomin 2016).  
The brokerage service industry in the EU is similar to the US. Payments for 
research service are bundled with trading execution fees, and charged to the investors 
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as a whole package under dealing commission. The EU, endorsing the unjust 
enrichment argument that asset managers overspend on the sell-side research service 
by using investors’ money, took the first step to unbundle research payments from 
dealing commissions in the recent implementation of the Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive II.3 
 The Bundled Model 
Figure 1.1 Panel (A) illustrates the bundled model graphically. Asset managers 
pay for the research service bundled together with the trading execution service under 
the head of dealing commissions, and then send the invoice for dealing commissions 
to their clients. The dealing commission is calculated as the trading value multiplied 
by a fixed rate negotiated between asset managers and brokers ex ante. Having 
received the dealing commission, brokerage houses split and distribute the 
commission in a fixed proportion to the research department where sell-side analysts 
work and the trading department.4  
Academics, practitioners and regulators have discussed over years the merits and 
demerits of the bundled model and the so-called soft dollar arrangements, although a 
negative view seems to prevail. On the one hand, advocates of the bundled model 
argue that this payment regime is an innovative and efficient form of economic 
organization, which benefits investors as soft dollars efficiently subsidize asset 
managers’ search for profitable trades (Horan and Johnsen 2000; Johnsen 2009). To 
the extent that sell-side analysts provide research insights to asset managers in advance 
of trading, the bundled payment model acts as an ex-ante effective bond that enhances 
the quality of research and brokerage execution services. As such, the bundled model 
mitigates agency problems inherent in delegated portfolio management. On the other 
hand, detractors of the bundled model maintain that the opaqueness of this method of 
payment may induce asset managers to unjustly enrich themselves at expense of asset 
owners, without bringing extra return for the fund (Bogle 2009; Blume 1993; Edelen 
et al. 2012; Erzurumlu and Kotomin 2016). Specifically, under the bundled model, 
                                                          
3 Commission Delegated Directive (EU) 2017/593. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32017L0593&from=EN. [Accessed: January 20, 2017] Appendix 
1.2 provides more details. 
4 The anecdotal evidence from one of the largest brokerage houses in London suggests that the 
percentages of the commission split are 55% to the research department and 45% to the trading 
department.  
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asset managers may treat sell-side research services as a “free good” because they do 
not bear the cost of consuming such service. Brokerage houses, in turn, may use their 
research services as an “advertising” tool to solicit business from asset managers. 
Given that the exact amount spent on research is unknown to investors, asset managers 
may prioritize this research service in the selection of trading execution services 
provided by brokerage houses (Myners 2001).5  
Empirical evidence on this matter is relatively scarce. A few studies have 
examined whether soft dollar arrangements deliver superior returns to investors.  In a 
recent paper using actual amounts of soft dollar research payments and total brokerage 
commissions carefully collected for a large number of funds, Erzurumlu and Kotomin 
(2016) show that higher soft dollar and total brokerage commissions are associated 
with higher advisory fees but not with higher risk-adjusted fund returns. In the same 
spirit, Edelen et al. (2012) compare the return performance in funds where the 
distribution cost is either bundled with brokerage commissions (relatively opaque) or 
expensed from funds’ income statement (relatively transparent). They find that the 
impact of the opaque distribution cost on fund return is significantly more negative 
than that of the transparent distribution cost. Although Edelen et al. (2012) focus on 
the distribution cost, rather than research payments, the opaqueness of brokerage 
commissions is associated with the poorer performance.  
Additionally, the bundled model directly links analysts’ compensation to the 
trading value (or volume), which lays the cornerstone of the literature on analysts’ 
optimism and the trading commission. (Jackson 2005; Cowen et al. 2006; Ljungqvist 
et al. 2007). The value of trades executed determines analysts’ research income so that 
analysts issuing optimistic forecasts or recommendations could generate more trading 
commissions, and then more research income. 
Around 2006, several countries started to modify the bundled model by suggesting 
alternative ways to distribute research payments among different brokers. In the US, 
SEC released guidance regarding the use of Client Commission Arrangement (CCA), 
whilst in the UK, Financial Service Authority (FSA, the predecessor of the current UK 
                                                          
5 Anecdotal evidence shows that asset managers are bombarded by research reports. Only a tiny 
portion of those reports are read by the asset managers. For example, ‘ …[A]sset managers are 
bombarded by 1.5 million report and only 5% may actually be read by their clients…’ Available at:  
http://www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2014/05/regulating-equity-research. [Accessed: April 
20, 2016] 
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financial regulator – Financial Conduct Authority) introduced the Commission 
Sharing Agreement (CSA).6,7 Since CCA and CSA are almost identical, we focus on 
the CSA to describe the modified bundled model, depicted graphically in Panel (B) of 
Figure 1.1.8  
Under the CSA, asset managers enter into an agreement to set up an account with 
their brokers wherein a separate portion of the dealing commission is preserved for 
the research service. The broker manages the account and distributes the research 
service payment through a process called “broker votes” to all sell-side research 
providers who have contributed to the trade. The analyst who has the greatest 
contribution receives the largest number of votes and then is accordingly allocated the 
largest portion of the research payment. Thus the research payment does not entirely 
flow to the broker who provides the trading execution service, which reduces analysts’ 
incentives to provide optimistic opinions (Galanti and Vaubourg 2017). 
CSA does not mitigate, however, the opaqueness of research payments in the 
dealing commission. First, dealing commissions (research payments together with 
trading execution fees) as a whole are determined by the trading volume. Second, asset 
owners would not know the precise amount spent on the research service. The over-
spending of the sell-side research service continue to exist after the implementation of 
CSA.9  
 The Unbundled Model (RPA Model) 
ESMA, the EU regulator imposes a strict separation between research payments 
and execution fees in the recently adopted MiFID II. The Article 13 of the Commission 
Delegated Directive (EU) 2017/593 specifies the following conditions where the sell-
side research service can be provided “…if it is received in return for  
a) direct payment by the investment firm out of its own resources; 
                                                          
6 SEC introduces Client Commission Arrangement on July 24, 2006. Available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2006/34-54165.pdf  [Access August 18, 2018] 
7 UK introduce Commission Sharing Agreement in July 2006. Available at: 
https://www.theinvestmentassociation.org/assets/files/research/2014/20140218-
imadealingcommissionresearch.pdf. [Access October 20, 2015]  
8 One different aspect between CCA and CSA is that the participants in the CCA must be registered 
broker dealers, and cannot be the “introducing broker”. Online available: http://www.integrity-
research.com/ccas-versus-csas-when-is-a-commission-not-a-commission/ [Access August 19, 2018] 
9 According to the FSA (2012) survey, “…too few firms (funds) adequately controlled spending on 
research and execution services…” (Page 7).  
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b) payments from a separate research payment account controlled by the 
investment firm…” 10 
Thus, the precise amount of the research payment in the Research Payment 
Account (RPA), in line with trading execution fees, will be presented separately to 
investors (condition b). Panel (C) of Figure 1.1 illustrates the RPA model. Under the 
RPA model, the concepts of the dealing commission and the soft dollar arrangement 
disappear. The link between research payments and the trading volume does not exist 
anymore. Alternatively, asset managers can always choose to bear the cost of the 
research service themselves (condition a). Either asset managers self-financing or 
using RPA to pay for the research service will radically curb asset managers’ 
overspending of the research service.  
MiFID II has officially been implemented within the EU since January 3rd, 2018. 
However, influenced by the unbundling proposal in the MiFID II regulation in 2014, 
the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority (Finansinspektionen – ‘FI’ hereafter) 
expressed strong preference for the complete separation of research payments from 
the dealing commission. FI had a long discussion with the fund management industry 
about the commission separation in 2014.11 Furthermore, in the revised Swedish Code 
of Conduct for fund management companies issued in 2015 by the Swedish 
Investment Fund Association (SIFA), the SIFA members are required to separate 
research payments from the execution service cost.12 13 If a member does not comply 
with the code, this member must provide an explanation for the deviation.14 Although 
                                                          
10 Commission Delegated Directive (EU) 2017/593. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32017L0593&from=EN. [Accessed: January 20, 2018] More 
details about Article 13 are presented in Appendix 1.2.  
11 Available at: http://www.fi.se/Tillsyn/Skrivelser/Listan/Hantering-av-analyskostnader-i-fonder/. 
This is the letter sent by the FI to the fund management industry about the importance of the rules about 
best execution and inducements which declares that the management company cannot charge extra fees 
unless it is in the customers’ best interest. [Accessed: April 25, 2016] 
12 Swedish Investment Fund Association (Fondbolagens förening, SIFA hereafter) is an association for 
both Swedish investment funds and foreign funds which have Swedish subsidiaries or branches. It has 
collectively 42 members representing the majority of funds in Sweden (http://fondbolagen.se/en/About-
us/).  
13 In the Code of Conduct, page 6, “…[c]osts for investment research may be charged with the fund 
only where the research enhances the quality of the fund management and the unit-holders have been 
duly informed. This requires that the benefit of the research is considered to correspond to the costs. 
The costs for research must be separated from the costs for execution of orders…” Appendix 1.3 
presents more details. Available online: http://fondbolagen.se/en/Regulations/Guidelines/Code-of-
conduct/  
14 In the Code of Conduct, page 2, “…For Swedish fund management companies, however, the intention 
are that deviations shall not be permitted when the word “must” is used. Members of the Swedish 
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the SIFA code does not explicitly specify using RPA to pay for the research service, 
the separation between the research service payment and the execution fee is, in spirit, 
equivalent to RPA. The burden of imposing the research payment separation varies 
across asset management companies. Compared to large asset management 
companies, adopting RPA would be more disadvantageous to small asset management 
companies for the following reasons. First, small asset managers have fewer resources 
of doing research than large asset managers. One way to level the playing field is to 
purchase the sell-side research service. The RPA model decreases the sell-side 
research purchase in general. The marginal impact of the decrease would be greater 
on the small asset managers who have fewer resources than large asset managers that 
possess abundant resources. Second, if asset managers choose to bear the cost of the 
research purchase by themselves, the research payment would have a greater influence 
on the small asset management companies with limited budgets on the research 
purchase. The research payment was previously bundled with the trading execution 
fees in Sweden. In 2015, some of the largest Swedish asset management companies 
announced the research payment separation, including Swedbank Robur, SEB and 
Svenska Handelsbanken.15 These three asset management companies account for a 
50% market share in the Swedish asset management market in terms of Assets under 
Management (AuM).16 Their adoption provides exploitable data and a feasible setting, 
albeit containing noise, to study the impact of the RPA adoption on Swedish sell-side 
analysts and on the Swedish stock market as the early evidence to the newly 
implemented regulation in MiFID II in terms of the influence of separating research 
payments from the dealing commission.17 18  
                                                          
Investment Fund Association must, in their Annual Reports or on their website, clearly state that they 
comply with the Code and must provide an explanation for any deviations.” 
15 For example, Svenska Handelsbanken states the research payment separating on page 8 in the 
Information Brochure – Handelsbanken Fund AB, issued on January 12, 2016: “…As of January 1, 
2015, expenses for external analyses will be charged separately. These expenses were previously 
included in the transaction costs. The expenses for external analyses will be included in the calculation 
of the annual fee…” Appendix 1.4 presents more details. 
16 The Riksbank (2014): The Swedish Financial Market 2014: Page 92, Table 14.  
17 The data is noisy because only three of the largest Swedish asset managers switched to RPA. Small 
asset managers may still use the bundled model. The same sell-side analysts could provide research 
service to both large and small asset managers. Therefore, separating sell-side analysts who are affected 
by the RPA from those who are not affected is less likely to achieve. More explanation will be given in 
the next section. 
18 For simplicity, we use RPA to replace the RPA-equivalent research payment method in the Swedish 
setting. 
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 Identifying the treatment group and the control group. 
As the largest Swedish asset managers have separated research payments from the 
dealing commission, we argue that Swedish brokerage houses and analysts are more 
likely to be affected. Thus we classify Swedish analysts as the treated analysts and 
non-Swedish analysts as the control group. However, both groups under such 
identification contains noise that cannot be removed. On the one hand, we should bear 
in mind that asset managers, rather than sell-side analysts, are subject to the RPA 
model in that the objective of the RPA rule in the MiFID II is to enhance the efficiency 
of asset managers using the research budget, alleviate the concern about the 
inducement, and then mitigate the over-spending of the research service. Therefore, 
even though some of the Swedish asset managers adopt the RPA model, Swedish 
brokerage houses are not restrained from accepting research payments from asset 
managers who do not use RPA (small Swedish asset managers and non-Swedish asset 
managers continue using the old bundled model in 2015). As one analyst can provide 
research services to and her brokerage house can receive payment from asset managers 
either using RPA or bundling it up with the execution service, separating out the 
analysts whose brokerage houses only receive research payments through RPA is less 
likely to achieve. As a result, the treatment group contains noise.  On the other hand, 
the control group may contain noise as well. Swedish asset managers invest globally, 
meaning that Swedish asset managers in theory need the research services of foreign 
firms. Then they may pay foreign brokerage houses through the RPA method when 
they access the international market.19 Figure 1.2 depicts the treatment group, the 
control group and the source of the noise in each group. The three largest RPA-
adopting Swedish asset management companies create an exogenous shock to 
brokerage fees (the top box in the first column). Swedish brokerage houses that receive 
research payments from these three are affected by the RPA adoption, which are in 
the treatment group (Arrow 1). Foreign brokerage houses receiving research payments 
from foreign asset managers are then in the control group (Arrow 5). When foreign 
brokerage houses receive research payments from the three RPA adopting asset 
managers, it becomes the noise to the control group (Arrow 4). In the treatment group, 
the noise comes from foreign institutional investors (Arrow 3) and other Swedish asset 
                                                          
19 In the anecdotal evidence (an email from asset managers in SEB), Swedish asset managers do 
purchase from international brokers but that mainly happens when they need to access the international 
markets. 
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managers that do not adopt the RPA model (Arrow 2). Despite the noise born with the 
identification, we are confident of the power of the setting (the solid arrows). Firstly, 
we believe that sell-side analysts would mainly serve the domestic asset managers 
rather than the foreign analysts.20 Thus, the noise in the treatment group from foreign 
investors (Arrow 3) and the noise in the control group from Swedish asset managers 
(Arrow 4) would be trivial. Secondly, in terms of the noise in the treatment group from 
other Swedish asset management companies that do not adopt RPA (Arrow 2), we 
believe that the noise would be overwhelmed by the significant market power of the 
three RPA adopting asset managers.  
In addition, the heterogeneity of the treated and controlled analysts’ firm coverage 
may pose a threat to the parallel trend assumption. We argue that analysts mainly cover 
their domestic firms. In the treatment group, firms are mainly Swedish firms. In the 
control group, firms have a variety of origins, depending on the location of the analysts 
covering them. In this regard, although there may be a small group of firms covered 
by both Swedish analysts and non-Swedish analysts (the C area in Figure 1.3), the 
majority of firms in the treatment group are different to firms in the control group. 
 Hypotheses development 
We develop our hypotheses with the understanding of the distinctive features 
among different payment models and regulators’ motivation to shift the bundled 
model to RPA. The adoption of RPA leads to the curtailment of asset managers’ 
research payments, creating an exogenous shock to brokerage fees, of which a 
significant portion is distributed to the research department as sell-side analysts’ 
compensation. We expect that the reduced research payments affects analysts’ 
coverage decision and their research quality. 
(A)  Analysts’ coverage decision 
We hypothesize that analysts reduce the number of firms in their coverage list with 
the RPA adoption. Asset managers are obliged to act in the best interests of clients 
when seeking brokers for the trade execution (Baker and Veit 1998; Game and 
Gregoriou 2014).  Most of the brokers provide not only the trade execution service but 
also the research service. Asset managers are supposed to assess the quality of the 
                                                          
20 In the anecdotal evidence (an email from one of the RPA adopting Swedish asset managers), Swedish 
analysts are the main research providers to Swedish asset managers.  
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entire package of the service provided by candidate brokers. Under the bundled model, 
research payments hide behind the mask of the dealing commission, which fends off 
the enquiries from the investors concerning the spending on the purchase of the 
research service. In this regard, the research service may induce asset managers to 
prioritize the research service over the trade execution service. Goldstein et al. (2009) 
find that institutional investors tend to concentrate order flows with a few brokers in 
an attempt to receive extra premium service. On the other hand, sell-side analysts 
would solicit asset managers by providing a wealth of research service that covers a 
wide range of stocks (waterfront coverage). Hence both the supply side and the 
demand side drive the over-production and over-consumption of the research service. 
However, bombarded by a myriad of research reports, asset managers are unlikely to 
use all of them, which leads to, from the stance of regulators, a severe waste of 
investors’ money.21 When switching to the RPA model, the research service will be 
priced independently based on the quality of the research service and the demand from 
the buy-side. Thus, the specific amount of research payments becomes transparent to 
investors. Under the investors’ monitoring, asset managers may not be able to 
consume as much research service as under the bundled model. On this account, with 
the decrease in research consumption analysts will reduce the research cost 
accordingly. One of the feasible ways to cut the cost is to stop covering firms that are 
less likely to bring the research income under the RPA model.  
Hypothesis 1: The adoption of RPA reduces the number of firms in analysts’ 
coverage list. 
(B) The type of firms being dropped 
We expect that analysts under the RPA model selectively remove firms from their 
coverage list. More specifically, we argue that analysts are more likely to drop the 
firms whose research are less likely to attract asset managers to purchase under the 
RPA model. Under the bundled model, sell-side analysts cover a wide range of firms 
in an attempt to use the “quantity” to solicit asset managers. The cost for covering a 
company whose research have little use to asset managers is in a sense subsidized by 
covering other companies’ research that is valuable to asset managers. Turning to the 
                                                          
21 ‘ …[A]sset managers are bombarded by 1.5 million reports and only 5% may actually be read…’ 
Available at: http://www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2014/05/regulating-equity-research. 
[Accessed: August 25, 2015] 
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RPA model, asset managers seek and pay for the research service as well as the trading 
execution service separately. The separation and transparency of research payments 
and trading execution fees would lead to asset managers stopping spending on the 
research of firms that they have little investment intentions towards. Accordingly, sell-
side analysts are more likely to drop the coverage of such firms. To test this hypothesis, 
we firstly use firms’ institutional investor ownership as the directive measure of firms’ 
attractiveness to asset managers. Then we expect that firms with low institutional 
investor holdings are less attractive to asset managers and experience a greater 
reduction in analyst following in the post period of the RPA adoption. Secondly, we 
use the firm size as another proxy of asset managers’ investment intention, as 
institutional investors in general prefer to invest in large firms. In this regard, we 
expect that small firms in the post-RPA adoption period experience a greater reduction 
in analyst following than large firms. Thirdly, we use Nasdaq OMX Stockholm 
Benchmark index (Benchmark index hereafter) composite as the cutoff, and expect 
that firms that are not included in the Benchmark index are losing more analysts than 
firms in the Benchmark index.22 Firms in the Nasdaq OMX Stockholm Benchmark 
index are the largest and the most liquid in the Swedish market, and we argue these 
firms are the more likely to attract to asset managers, which leads to have higher 
demand of analysts’ research. The hypotheses are as follows: 
Hypothesis 2a: After the RPA adoption, the decrease in the number of analysts 
following the firms with low institutional investor ownership is greater than firms with 
high institutional investor ownership. 
Hypothesis 2b: After the RPA adoption, the decrease in the number of analysts 
following small firms is greater than large firms. 
Hypothesis 2c: After the RPA adoption, the decrease in the number of analysts 
following the firms that are not included in Nasdaq OMX Stockholm Benchmark index 
is greater than the firms in the Benchmark index. 
(C) Analysts’ research quality  
                                                          
22 Nasdaq OMX Stockholm Benchmark index “…consists of a selection of the largest and most traded 
stocks, with representation from a majority of the supersectors… especially attractive for use in 
different investment products and as a comparative index for investors…” Available at: 
https://indexes.nasdaqomx.com/Index/Overview/OMXSBGI [Accessed: July 28, 2018] 
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We predict that the adoption of the RPA model improves the sell-side research 
quality on average. Firstly, the RPA model increases competitiveness of analysts’ 
labor market. In light of the regulator’s objective of proposing RPA, brokerage fees 
are expected to decrease, and they flow more efficiently to analysts with ability to 
produce high-quality research. Low-quality research will be forced out of the market 
gradually. The overall sell-side research market will, accordingly, develop to a high 
degree of quality. Secondly, the RPA model breaks the link between analysts’ income 
and trading volume, which in turn ameliorates their trading incentive to issue upward 
biased forecasts and recommendations. Analysts’ incentive for issuing optimistically 
biased opinion has been widely studied. Bradshaw (2011) summarizes six sources that 
may lead to analysts’ upward biased behavior. One of the incentives is trade 
generation.23 Under the bundled model, analysts may issue upward biased forecasts 
and recommendations to inflate trading volume for their brokerage house, thus to 
generate higher research income from the dealing commission (Jackson 2005; Cowen 
et al. 2006; Ljungqvist et al. 2007). As the RPA model changes the way that analysts 
are compensated, analysts will not be rewarded by bringing more trades to their 
brokerage houses because the research service becomes a distinct product rather than 
a by-product that come with the execution service. On this account, analysts are 
compensated by providing high-quality research rather than by offering deliberately 
biased forecasts or recommendations.  
We use forecast accuracy as the proxy to test the improvement in research 
quality.24 The reasons are as follows. Firstly, forecast accuracy affects analysts’ 
employment turnover. Analysts who constantly provide less accurate forecasts are 
more likely to leave the industry, which implies that the equity research market screens 
analysts’ quality by forecast accuracy (Groysberg et al. 2011). Secondly, forecast 
accuracy remains one of the crucial qualities demanded by asset managers. In Brown 
et al. (2015), the authors survey 365 sell-side analysts and find that forecast accuracy 
remains important because analysts’ clients (asset managers) demand it, as well as 
forecasts are the input to the stock recommendations that are highly valued by asset 
                                                          
23 The other five sources in Bradshaw (2011) include boosting investment banking fees, currying favor 
with management, institutional investor relationship, research for hire, and analysts’ cognitive bias. 
24 We use forecast accuracy and forecast error interchangeably. High forecast accuracy means low 
forecast error.  
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managers.25 Therefore, forecast accuracy is appropriate to be a proxy of research 
quality. Our third hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 3: Analysts’ forecast accuracy improves after the adoption of RPA. 
Now we turn to investigate how analysts improve their forecast accuracy in the 
post RPA adoption period. We posit two possible channels. Firstly, within the context 
of the reduced brokerage fees, increased competition in the equity research industry 
and the weakened incentive for issuing biased opinions, analysts that continue 
operating in the industry will make a great effort to improve their research quality to 
secure their jobs. Secondly, analysts may stop covering firms that they are unable to 
provide good forecast research on. Analysts may have the edge in covering certain 
firms but not in others. For example, some analysts may have private connections with 
some firms’ management, which would facilitate high-quality research production 
(Chen and Matsumoto 2006; Brown et al. 2015). As low-quality research becomes a 
pure loss after asset managers switch to the RPA model, the likelihood of ceasing to 
cover firms on which they cannot produce high-quality research will be higher among 
analysts that are influenced by the RPA adoption than unaffected analysts. In this case, 
analysts do not improve their forecasting ability as discussed in the previous channel, 
but drop the firms that are hard to analyze. These possible channels are not mutually 
exclusive. All the forces could drive the quality of the equity research industry to a 
higher level. Our next hypothesis is therefore as follows: 
Hypothesis 4a: The improvement in forecast accuracy in the post-RPA period is 
due to analysts improving their forecast ability. 
Hypothesis 4b: The improvement in forecast accuracy in the post-RPA period is 
due to analysts ceasing to cover the firms for whom they are unable to provide high-
quality research. 
(D) Market reaction to analysts’ forecast revisions 
We hypothesize that the market reaction to analysts’ forecast revisions increases 
with the RPA adoption. First, firms continue to be covered by analysts would 
experience an increase in analysts’ forecast accuracy, as suggested in Hypothesis 3. 
Previous literature has documented a positive association between analysts’ forecast 
                                                          
25 Brown et al. (2015): page 31-34, Table 10. 
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accuracy and the market reaction to the forecast revisions (Abarbanell et al. 1995; 
Stickel 1992; Park and Stice 2000; Gleason and Lee 2003). Therefore, we expect that 
the market may react more strongly to the forecast revisions for firms that continue to 
be followed by analysts.  
  Second, for firms losing analyst coverage, we argue that the market may also 
react more strongly to the forecast revisions in the post period. The reduction in analyst 
following may lead to a deterioration of firms’ information environment. Accordingly, 
investors may rely more on the remaining analysts as they have fewer information 
sources than that in the pre-RPA period. In this case, the market would react more 
strongly to forecasts revised by the remaining analysts. Both arguments support a 
greater market reaction to forecast revisions in the post RPA period. Then our 
hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 5: The market reacts more strongly to analysts’ forecast revisions in 
the post RPA adoption period. 
1.3 Research design 
 Analysts’ coverage list shortening 
We use a difference-in-difference technique to test Hypothesis 1 within the sample 
period from 2013 to 2016. The dependent variable is the number of firms followed by 
each individual analyst within a quarter (NUMCOM). As the three largest Swedish 
asset management companies switched to RPA since 2015, we define an indicator 
variable, RPA, with the value of one for the years of 2015 and 2016, and zero 
otherwise. Furthermore, we define another indicator variable, SW, as the treatment 
variable, one for Swedish analysts and zero for non-Swedish analysts. Thus, the 
interaction term, RPA× SW, captures the change in the number of firms followed by 
Swedish analysts relative to non-Swedish analysts after the RPA adoption in Sweden. 
We include a set of analyst-related control variables. Firstly, we add two control 
variables in line with Clement (1999): analysts’ general experience (GEXP), defined 
as the number of years since the analyst provided her first forecast for any firm; and 
analysts’ industry coverage (NUMIND), defined as the number of industries followed 
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by each analyst.26 We expect positive coefficients for both of these control variables 
because more experienced analysts are expected to follow more firms, and covering 
more industries may suggest more firms need to be added to analysts’ coverage list. 
Secondly, Groysberg et al. (2011) find that analysts’ forecast accuracy is positively 
associated with their employment turnover. In other words, analysts that cannot 
provide accurate forecasts have a higher chance of being fired. This is an extreme case 
of the reduction in the number of firms in analysts’ coverage list. In an attempt to 
control for the ability of analysts’ past accuracy (PACY), we following the method 
from Hong and Kubik (2003), according to which we calculate each individual 
analyst’s average forecast accuracy score for the previous year in the following 
equations: 
 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 = 100 −
𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 − 1
𝐴𝐴𝐹𝑖𝑡−1 − 1
× 100 
(1.1) 
 
𝑃𝐴𝐶𝑌𝑗𝑡 =
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑗𝑡−1
𝑛
𝑖
 
(1.2) 
In the above equations, 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 is the rank of analyst j’s forecast on firm i in 
year t-1 relative to other analysts who also cover firm i.27 𝐴𝐴𝐹𝑖𝑡−1 is the number of 
analysts following firm i in year t-1. 𝑃𝐴𝐶𝑌𝑗𝑡 is the analyst j’s average accuracy scores 
in year t-1. Lastly, we also control for the brokerage house, analyst, and quarter fixed 
effects (FE) in different specifications to account for brokerage houses, analysts, and 
time unobservable invariants.28 The regression is as follows:  
 𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑅𝑃𝐴𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑆𝑊𝑗 + 𝛼3𝑅𝑃𝐴𝑡 × 𝑆𝑊𝑗
+ 𝛼4𝐺𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼6𝑃𝐴𝐶𝑌𝑗𝑡 + 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡 (1.3) 
                                                          
26 We use the first two digits of the SIC code to define industry. When we merge the data from I/B/E/S 
and from Compustat Global, only 75.5% number of firms are matched and have been found their SIC 
codes. Thus the variable NUMIND is underestimated. 
27 This is the only place where we use t as the year subscript. In the rest of this paper, the subscript t 
represents the time of quarters. 
28 We did not use I/B/E/S broker codes (ESTIMID) to create brokerage house dummy variables because 
they change when one brokerage house is acquired by another one. Thus, we obtain information of the 
brokerage houses from analysts’ LinkedIn profiles and Bloomberg.  Furthermore, subsidiaries of the 
same brokerage house in different countries share the same broker code. For example, both US Barclays 
and UK Barclays have the same I/B/E/S broker code “FRCLAYSC”. We should treat US Barclays and 
UK Barclays as two different brokerage houses as analysts work in each firm are less likely to be 
affected by each other. Therefore, the brokerage house fixed effect includes analysts’ location. For 
example, we have a dummy variable to US Barclays and a different dummy variable for UK Barclays. 
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 Selective reduction in firms’ analyst following 
To test whether the reduction in analyst following for firms whose research are 
less demanded is more pronounced, we switch the unit of analysis from analyst-quarter 
(j, t) to firm-quarter (i, t). This firm-quarter unit of data structure allows us to 
incorporate firms’ feature into the regression. We focus only on firms listed on the 
largest Swedish market (Nasdaq OMX Stockholm) and covered by Swedish analysts. 
The reasons are as follows. Firstly, elaborating on Hypothesis 1, Swedish analysts are 
the major influenced party to the RPA adoption, so that we focus on Swedish analyst 
following only. Secondly, firms listed on the other Swedish stock exchanges are too 
small and most of them are not followed by any analysts, so that we only use firms 
listed on the largest Swedish stock exchange, where the RPA adoption effect seem to 
be the greatest.  
We use the Ordinary Least Square regression (OLS) to test Hypotheses 2a, 2b and 
2c. The dependent variable is the number of Swedish analyst following each firm 
(SW_AF). The indicator variable RPA is the variable of interest as defined previously. 
Next, we define three dummy variables (PROXY) as the proxy for firms whose 
research are less demanded. First, we define dummy variable of INSTLOW as the low 
institutional investor ownership, set the value to one if a firm’s institutional investor 
ownership is less than the median value of all firms at end of the last quarter in 2014, 
which is just before the PRA adoption in Sweden, and zero otherwise. In a similar 
vein, we define the dummy variable for small firms (SMALL) with the value of one if 
a firm has the market value of equity less than the median value of all firms before 
RPA was implemented in Sweden. In addition, we define dummy variable NOBENCH 
as the firm that are not included in the Nasdaq OMX Stockholm Benchmark index at 
the end of 2014. Therefore, the vector PROXY contains INSTLOW, SMALL, and 
NOBENCH. We interact PROXY with RPA to test the impact of the RPA adoption on 
the firms whose research are less demanded by asset managers. In line with the 
literature (Bhushan 1989; O’Brien and Bhushan 1990; Lang and Lundholm 1996; Liu 
2011; Frankel et al. 2006; Barth et al. 2001), we include a set of control variables to 
account for factors that are associated with firms’ analyst following: the market value 
of equity in the logarithm form (MV), stock return volatility (RETVOL), correlation 
between the stock return and the market return (RSQ), the market-to-book ratio (MB), 
the percentage of institutional ownership (INST), and total intangible assets scaled by 
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total assets (INTA), as well as firm and quarter fixed effects in different specifications. 
The model is shown as follows: 
 𝑆𝑊_𝐴𝐹𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑅𝑃𝐴𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑷𝑹𝑶𝑿𝒀𝒊𝒕 + 𝛼3𝑅𝑃𝐴𝑡 × 𝑷𝑹𝑶𝑿𝒀𝒊𝒕
+ 𝛼4𝑀𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼6𝑀𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼7𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛼8𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼9𝑅𝑆𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝐹𝐸 +𝜀𝑖𝑡 (1.4) 
where PROXY are INSTLOW, SMALL or NOBENCH 
The concern in this setting is the lack of the treatment/control structure. In an 
attempt to mitigate the endogeneity concern, we did a placebo test by shifting the RPA 
adoption dummy one-year prior to the actual adoption date. Specifically, we create an 
indicator variable – PRE, equal to one for the quarters after 2013Q4, and zero 
otherwise, we include both PRE, RPA and their interaction terms with RPOXY in the 
regressions (1.4), and expect no significance on the interaction terms of PRE ×
 PROXY. 
 𝑆𝑊_𝐴𝐹𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑅𝑃𝐴𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑷𝑹𝑶𝑿𝒀𝒊𝒕 + 𝛼4𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑡
× 𝑷𝑹𝑶𝑿𝒀𝒊𝒕 + 𝛼5𝑅𝑃𝐴𝑡 × 𝑷𝑹𝑶𝑿𝒀𝒊𝒕 + 𝛼6𝑀𝑉𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛼7𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼8𝑀𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼9𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼10𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛼11𝑅𝑆𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝐹𝐸 +𝜀𝑖𝑡 (1.5) 
 Analysts’ research quality  
Turning to the test of analysts’ research quality, we use the difference-in-
difference design again. The dependent variable is forecast error – FORERR, defined 
as the absolute value of the difference between the annual EPS forecast and the actual 
EPS value, deflated by the stock price two days before the forecast is provided. Then 
greater forecast error means lower research quality. The test has three dimensions: 
firm, analyst, and quarter (i, j, t). Two indicator variables, RPA and SW, are as 
previously defined, representing the post-RPA adoption period in Sweden and 
Swedish analysts when the values are equal to one. Then the interaction term RPA ×
 SW captures the difference in the forecast accuracy improvement between Swedish 
analysts and non-Swedish analysts after RPA is adopted in Sweden. We control for a 
set of analyst-related and firm-related variables to alleviate potential omitted variable 
bias. Most of them have been previously defined. Firstly, in line with Clement (1999) 
and Mikhail et al. (1997), we control for firm-specific experience (FEXP) general 
experience (GEXP), the number of firms covered (NUMCOM) and the number of 
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industries followed (NUMIND) by each individual analyst. Secondly, in an attempt to 
measure an individual analyst’s past forecast ability, we use the past accuracy score 
(PACY) again. The last analyst-related control variable is forecast horizon (HOR), 
consistent with the finding in Brown (2001) that forecast accuracy improves with the 
revelation of information as the actual EPS announcement date approaches. We also 
add a range of firm-level variables to the regression, including the market value of 
equity in the logarithm form (MV), the total number of analysts following a firm (AF), 
the percentage of institutional ownership (INST), total intangible assets deflated by 
total assets (INTA), the market-to-book ratio (MB), and return volatility (RETVOL) 
(Alford and Berger, 1999; Brown, 1997; Sinha et al., 1997 etc.). Furthermore, in 
Brown (2001) and Hwang et al. (1996), they find that analysts have larger forecast 
error if firms report losses or have a declined actual EPS compared to the previous 
year. Then we include a dummy variable (LOSS) equal to one when the actual EPS is 
negative, and zero otherwise; as well as another dummy variable (DECL) equal to one 
when the actual EPS is less than that in the previous year, and zero otherwise. Lastly, 
we include firm, quarter and analyst fixed effects (FE) in different specifications to 
control for invariant factors. Based on the above discussion, we have the following 
research design: 
 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑅𝑃𝐴𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑆𝑊𝑗 + 𝛼3𝑅𝑃𝐴𝑡 × 𝑆𝑊𝑗
+ 𝜷𝑪𝑶𝑵𝑻𝑹𝑶𝑳𝑨 + 𝜸𝑪𝑶𝑵𝑻𝑹𝑶𝑳𝑭 + 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 (1.6) 
where 𝑪𝑶𝑵𝑻𝑹𝑶𝑳𝑨 is the analyst-level control variable vector: 
− 𝐺𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑗𝑡, 𝐹𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡, 𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑗𝑡 , 𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗𝑡, 𝑃𝐴𝐶𝑌𝑗𝑡, 𝐻𝑂𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 
𝑪𝑶𝑵𝑻𝑹𝑶𝑳𝑭 is the firm-level control variable vector: 
− 𝑀𝑉𝑖𝑡, 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡, 𝑀𝐵𝑖𝑡, 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡, 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡, 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡, 𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝑖𝑡 
Next, we test which channel drives the increase in analysts’ research quality 
(Hypothesis 4a and 4b). Firstly, to test Hypothesis 4a, we restrict the sample to analyst-
firm pairs appearing both before and after the RPA adoption, and replicate the 
regression with analyst-firm fixed effects within the restricted subsample. Secondly, 
to test Hypothesis 4b, we create an indicator variable – DIS, which equals to one if 
analyst-firm pairs appeared in the pre-RPA period but disappeared in the post-RPA 
period, and zero otherwise. We run a logit model with DIS as the dependent variable 
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in the pre-RPA adoption period. If the Hypothesis 4b is as predicted, we shall observe 
a positively significant on SW × FORERR. The interpretation is that Swedish analysts 
are more likely to remove firms from their coverage list in the post-RPA period if they 
are unable to provide high quality forecasts for the firm, relative to non-Swedish 
analysts. The regression is as follows.  
 Pr (𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 1)
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑆𝑊𝑗 + 𝛼2𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑆𝑊𝑗 × 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡
+ 𝜷𝑪𝑶𝑵𝑻𝑹𝑶𝑳𝑨 + 𝜸𝑪𝑶𝑵𝑻𝑹𝑶𝑳𝑭 + 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡  (1.7) 
 Market reaction to analysts’ forecast revisions 
In this section, we use the size-adjusted absolute abnormal return as the proxy of 
market reaction to test Hypothesis 5. We conduct the analysis on the firm-day level 
for Swedish firms that are followed by at least one analyst. The dependent variable, 
ABS_ABRET, is the size-adjusted absolute abnormal return. To calculate the size-
adjusted absolute abnormal return, we firstly find the quarter-end firm composite in 
the Nasdaq OMX Stockholm large-cap, medium-cap, and small-cap indices from 
Bloomberg, as well as the corresponding index returns. 29 Then we take the absolute 
value of the difference between firms’ daily return and the daily OMX Stockholm 
large-cap index return if the firm is the included in the large-cap index, and convert it 
to the percentage form.30 We replicate this step for the medium-cap firms and the 
small-cap firms respectively. The variables of interest are RPA (as defined previously) 
and ANALYST, which is an indicator variable with the value of one for the two-day [0, 
+1] window when analysts revise their forecasts for firms’ quarter or annual earnings. 
We interact ANALYST with RPA, and expect a positive coefficient on the interaction 
term. Analysts providing forecast revisions are clustered with firms’ earnings 
announcement (Keskek et al. 2014). We control for the confounding effect of the 
earnings announcement by including an indicator variable, EARN, for the two-day 
window [0, +1] when firms announce quarter or annual earnings. We also interact 
                                                          
29 The OMX Stockholm large-cap, medium-cap, and small-cap indices are stock market indices for the 
Nasdaq OMX Stockholm exchange. The large-cap index includes companies with the market value of 
1 billion euros or more. The medium-cap index captures the current status and changes in the Stockholm 
Mid Cap market. The small-cap index consists of companies whose shares have a market value of less 
than 150 million euro. Online available: https://indexes.nasdaqomx.com/Index/Directory/Stockholm. 
[Accessed 25 August 2018] 
30 The large-cap index value are not available before May 21, 2013 on Bloomberg or DataStream. 
Hence, the size-adjusted absolute abnormal return for large-cap firms starts from 22 May, 2013. 
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EARN with RPA to capture the potential impact of RPA on the informativeness of 
earnings announcement. We control for firm, day, and firm times quarter fixed effects 
(FE) in the different specifications.  
 𝐴𝐵𝑆_𝐴𝐵𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐴𝑁𝐴𝐿𝑌𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐴𝑁𝐴𝐿𝑌𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 × 𝑅𝑃𝐴𝑡
+ 𝛼3𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑖𝑡 × 𝑅𝑃𝐴𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑅𝑃𝐴𝑡 + 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (1.8) 
The regression is on the firm-day level and does not the analyst dimension, meaning 
that this setting has the same endogeneity issue like Section 3.2. In an attempt to 
mitigate the endogeneity concern, we did a placebo test similar to Section 3.2. 
Specifically, we create an indicator variable – PRE, equal to one for the quarters after 
2013Q4, and zero otherwise, we include both PRE, RPA and their interaction terms 
with ANALYST or EARN. 
𝐴𝐵𝑆_𝐴𝐵𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐴𝑁𝐴𝐿𝑌𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐴𝑁𝐴𝐿𝑌𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 × 𝑅𝑃𝐴𝑡
+ 𝛼3𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑖𝑡 × 𝑅𝑃𝐴𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑅𝑃𝐴𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐴𝑁𝐴𝐿𝑌𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 × 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑡
+ 𝛼6𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑖𝑡 × 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑡 + 𝛼7𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑡 + 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (1.9) 
1.4 Data Collection   
 Collection of analysts’ biographical information 
The sample period is from 2013 to 2016 and data is collected quarterly. Swedish 
analysts are the variable of interest. However, we do not have a straightforward 
database providing analysts’ biographical and geographical information.31 Therefore 
we hand-collected the data. The steps are as follows and Table 1.1 Panel (A) reports 
the statistics:   
1) We assume that the majority of Swedish analysts would follow firms that are 
listed on Swedish stock markets. Hence, we search on DataStream for all the 
firms whose stock exchanges are labelled with ‘Stockholm’. Then we obtain 
2,892 unique security codes. After deleting 1,868 codes that do not have valid 
I/B/E/S firm tickers, 1,024 I/B/E/S firm tickers remained; 
2) Using these 1,024 I/B/E/S firm tickers as the input, we search, within the 
sample period, the Recommendation file and the Target Price file in I/B/E/S, 
for the record of analysts that appear in these files, in an attempt to obtain their 
                                                          
31 Nelson Investment Research Directory used to provide analysts’ biographical information, such as 
their names, brokerage houses, address etc. But it has stopped being updated since 2008. 
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analyst codes, surnames, initials of their first names and the abbreviations of 
their brokerage houses. Then we obtain 1,879 unique analysts’ codes. The 
I/B/E/S firm tickers reduce from 1,024 to 565; 
3) Then we manually match analysts’ biographical information and their 
coverage lists from I/B/E/S with Bloomberg that provides analysts’ full names 
and coverage portfolio. More importantly, Bloomberg also provides analysts’ 
locations, which enables us to create the treatment group; 
4) At last, we verify analysts’ locations obtained from Bloomberg by searching 
analysts’ full names and their brokerage houses on LinkedIn. In some cases, 
the location on Bloomberg is not the same as that on LinkedIn due to the delay 
in information updating (if the analyst relocates internationally).32 Then we 
search the analyst’s name and her brokerage house online to find her latest 
news, and make a judgment of which location is more likely to be the right 
one. 
We have identified 1,582 distinct analysts with their locations successfully. The 
I/B/E/S firm tickers reduce from 565 to 554.  Table 1.1 Panel (B) reports analysts’ 
geographical distribution.33 The majority of analysts are from the UK (658 UK 
analysts), followed by 223 Swedish analysts, 209 analysts from Norway and 151 US 
analysts. Swedish analysts are the major party influenced by the RPA adoption in 
Sweden so that we use 219 Swedish analysts as the treatment group and 1,359 non-
Swedish analysts as the control group (Panel (C)).34 Panel (D) reports how analysts 
from different countries cover these 554 Stockholm listed firms. Swedish analysts 
cover the most Stockholm listed firms (nearly 80%). Although the number of UK 
analysts is the largest, they cover less than 30% of these Stockholm listed firms. This 
suggests that the UK analyst coverage concentrates on a small group of Stockholm 
listed firms. Norwegian analysts are similar to UK analysts. 209 Norwegian analysts 
are identified but they cover only one third of Stockholm listed firms. Turning to 
analysts from other countries, they only cover a tiny portion of Stockholm listed firms. 
                                                          
32 It could be that analysts have yet updated their LinkedIn profiles, or Bloomberg has yet captured 
analysts’ latest forecasts information from their new employers.  
33 Twenty-one analysts relocated internationally during the sample period. So the total number of 
analysts with the identified location reported in Table 1.1 Panel (B) is 1,603. After subtracting the 
replicated 21 analysts, we have 1,582 distinct analysts. 
34 We deleted four analysts that relocated between Sweden and the other countries during the sample 
period. 
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 Other data collection. 
We collect analysts-related data from I/B/E/S, and accounting fundamentals from 
Bloomberg. Firstly, for the Hypothesis 1, the dependent variable is the number of firms 
followed by each analyst within a quarter (NUMCOM). We construct this variable by 
counting the number of distinct firms to whom analyst j had provided any forms of 
analysts’ opinion in quarter t. Analysts’ opinion includes recommendations, target 
price and all types of forecasts (earning per share, cash flow per share, short-term, long 
term etc). Turning to Hypothesis 2, we switch the unit of analysis from the analyst-
quarter basis to the firm-quarter basis. We measure the dependent variable, Swedish 
analyst following (SW_AF), by counting the number of distinct Swedish analysts that 
issue recommendations, target price or all forms of forecasts for firm i in quarter t. 
The extant literature normally uses the issuance of the one-year-ahead EPS forecast to 
be the proxy of analyst following (Piotroski and Roulstone 2004; Kirk 2011). In this 
paper, as we conduct the tests on a quarterly basis, some analysts may not provide one-
year-ahead EPS forecasts in every quarter. In order to reduce the miscounting of 
NUMCOM and SW_AF, we include all forms of forecasts, together with 
recommendations and target price. With regard to the accounting fundamental 
variables for Hypotheses 2 to 4, we obtain the market value of equity, the market-to-
book ratio, intangible assets, total assets, the stock price, and institutional ownership 
from Bloomberg.35 All variables are on a quarterly basis. 
 General description of Swedish asset management industry and Swedish stock 
markets. 
Swedish asset management companies invest globally. The SIFA report – 
“Outlook about funds 2015” demonstrates the geographical description of Swedish 
funds’ investment. The net assets in the entire asset management industry under the 
heading of “Sweden” and “Sweden and Global” amounts to 40% invested in equity 
investment.36 There are five stock markets in Sweden, including two regulated markets 
– Nasdaq OMX Stockholm and Nordic Growth Market; and three multilateral trading 
facilities – First North Stockholm, Nordic MTF and Aktietorget. Nasdaq OMX 
Stockholm is the largest exchange, where the listed firms have the greatest analyst 
                                                          
35 We use Bloomberg to download accounting fundamentals as Bloomberg can convert different 
currencies to Swedish Krona when downloading them, which reduces the currency error for firms from 
different countries that are listed or cross-listed in Sweden. 
36 Swedish Investment Fund Association (2015): Outlook About Funds, Page 18. 
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following and have an aggregated market value of equity accounting for 99% among 
the five markets at the end of 2013.37 Firms listed on the remaining four markets are 
barely followed by any analyst. In an attempt to ensure the homogeneity of the market 
and increase the test power for Hypotheses 2 and 5, we focus on the firms that are 
listed on the Nasdaq OMX Stockholm only.38  
1.5 Empirical results  
 Results for analysts’ coverage list reduction  
This section presents the results for Hypothesis 1, which is that the RPA adoption 
reduces analysts’ coverage lists. Table 1.2, Panel (A) reports the descriptive statistics. 
Swedish analysts on average follow fewer firms and more industries, compared to the 
non-Swedish analysts. The major difference between Swedish and non-Swedish 
analysts is the dependent variable – the number of firms followed by an analyst. On 
average, Swedish analysts follow 8.11 firms whilst non-Swedish analysts cover 
around 2.76 more firms than Swedish analysts. Panel (C) of Table 1.2 reports the 
results of the regressions with different specifications. The coefficient for the 
interaction term RPA × SW captures the difference of the change between Swedish 
analysts and non-Swedish analysts in terms of the number of firms in their coverage 
list after RPA is adopted in Sweden. All models report negatively significant 
coefficients, ranging from -1.009 to -0.561. 39 In particular, in column (vi), where we 
include analyst and quarter fixed effects, the estimated coefficient on the interaction 
term is -0.623, meaning Swedish analysts on average drop 0.623 more firms relative 
to non-Swedish analysts after RPA is adopted. With respect to other control variables, 
the number of industries NUMIND is positively significant, indicating that analysts 
following more industries cover more companies. Next, we have positively significant 
coefficients on analysts’ general experience (GEXP), which is in line with our 
assumption that analysts with more experience tend to cover more firms. Lastly, the 
score for analysts’ accuracy in the previous year (PACY) has positive coefficients after 
we introduce fix effect structures, consistent with the expectation that analysts with 
                                                          
37 The Riksbank – The Swedish Financial Market Report (2014), page 55-56.  
38 We use Nasdaq OMX Stockholm All-Share index to identify firms listed on Nasdaq OMX 
Stockholm. Nasdaq OMX Stockholm All-share index consists of all the shares listed on the OMX 
Stockholm exchange. We identify the quarterly index composite from Bloomberg. 
39 To avoid the issue of perfect multicollinearity, we drop 𝑅𝑃𝐴𝑡when the model includes quarter fixed 
effect, and 𝑆𝑊𝑗 when the model includes analyst or brokerage house fixed effects.  
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higher past accuracy are more likely to cover more firms. Overall, the results support 
Hypothesis 1. The RPA model adopted by Swedish asset managers reduces in 
analysts’ research income. Accordingly, Swedish analysts, as the heavily influenced 
party, reduce the number of firms on their coverage lists. 
 Results for selective reduction in analyst following 
In this section, we report the results for Hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 2c, which is that 
the reduction in analyst following is greater for firms with lower institutional investor 
holdings, small firms, or firms that are not the Benchmark index composite. We focus 
on Swedish analysts only and firms listed on the Nasdaq OMX Stockholm. During the 
sample period, 324 firms are listed on Nasdaq OMX Stockholm. Most of them are in 
the sectors of Consumer, Industrials, and Financials. Firms with headquarters in 
Sweden amount to 293. The remaining 31 firms are from other countries.40 
Panel (A) of Table 1.4 reports the statistic description. Swedish analyst following 
is positively skewed and more than 25% firms have no Swedish analysts followed. 
Panel (C) presents the results for testing the impact of the RPA adoption on the low 
institutional holding firms, while Panels (D) are for the firms with low market value 
of equity. In addition, Panel (E) are for firms that are not included in the Benchmark 
index. The results are consistent with our expectation. In column (ii) of Panel (C) 
where we control for firm fixed effect, the coefficient of RPA is insignificant, which 
indicates that firms with high institutional holdings are not affected by the RPA 
adoption. In addition, the interaction term RPA × LOWINST is negatively significant 
at 10% level, suggesting that firms with low institutional investor ownership 
experience a greater reduction in Swedish analyst following with the RPA adoption in 
Sweden. The overall effect of the RPA adoption on the low institutional holding firms 
is 0.240, and significant at 1% level. The result does not change even when we control 
for both firm and quarter fixed effects in column (iii). The coefficient on the interaction 
term is 0.215, which amounts to 13% of the mean of the Swedish analyst following 
for firms with low institutional investor holdings.41  
                                                          
40 For simplicity, we use “Swedish firms” to represent “324 firms listed on the Nasdaq OMX 
Stockholm” in the following sections. 
41 The mean of Swedish analysts following the low institutional holding firms is 1.72 (untabulated). 
The coefficient on the interaction term is -0.215, which is 13% of the mean (0.215/1.72=13%) 
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Turning to the test for firms with low market value of equity (small firms) in Panel 
(D), the negatively significant coefficient on RPA × SMALL suggests that the 
reduction in Swedish analyst following is greater among small firms with the RPA 
adoption in Sweden. Specifically, in column (vi) where we control for firm fixed 
effect, we have a coefficient of -0.652 on the interaction term, meaning that small 
firms lose 0.652 more Swedish analysts compared to large firms after RPA was 
adopted, which is 72% of the mean of Swedish analysts following small firms.42 
Moreover, we conduct the test for the total decrease in Swedish analyst following 
among small firms (RPA + RPA × SMALL) and the result in column (vi) suggests that 
small firms lose 0.424 Swedish analysts after Swedish asset managers adopt the RPA 
model. The mean of Swedish analyst following for small firms before the RPA 
adoption is 1.11 (untabulated). The RPA adoption is associated with small firms losing 
more than one third of Swedish analyst following.  
Finally, we present the test results with firms’ index partition in Panel (E), the 
results are similar to the size partition in Panel (D). We find a negatively significant 
coefficient on RPA × NOBENCH, which indicates that firms not included in the 
Nasdaq OMX Stockholm Benchmark index lose more analyst following than the firms 
in the index. 
Next, we did a placebo test for the selective reduction in an attempt to mitigate the 
potential endogeneity concern as we lack a valid control group. We create an indicator 
variable PRE, which takes a value of one if the observation is from 2013 onward, and 
zero otherwise, and we run the regression (1.5). The last columns in Panel (C), Panel 
(D), and Panel (E) report the results. Consistent with our expectation, we only find the 
significant coefficients on the interaction term with RPA, not PRE, indicating that the 
selective reduction in analyst following is associated with the RPA adoption, rather 
than one year prior to the adoption. In sum, we find the evidence that the RPA adoption 
is associated with greater reduction in analyst following among firms with lower 
institutional investor ownership or lower market value of equity, as well as firms that 
are not included in the Benchmark index. 
                                                          
42 The mean of Swedish analysts following small firms is 0.91 (untabulated). The coefficient on the 
interaction term is -0.652, which is 72% of the mean (0.652/0.91=72%) 
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 Results for analysts’ research quality 
This section presents the results for the tests of analysts’ research quality. We firstly 
use analysts’ entire firm coverage to run the regression, which includes firms covered 
by Swedish analysts only (the A area in Figure 1.3), firms covered by non-Swedish 
analysts only (the B area in Figure 1.3), and firms covered by both Swedish analysts 
and non-Swedish analysts (the C area in Figure 1.3). As we argued in Section 2.4 that 
the heterogeneity of firms’ location in the treatment and control group may pose a 
threat to the parallel trend assumption, we further conduct our test with the firms that 
are covered by both Swedish analysts and non-Swedish analysts within the same year 
(the C area only in Figure 1.3). We present both results. Panel (A) of Table 1.5 shows 
the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the regression. The average forecast 
error for Swedish analysts is 1.63%, compared to 1.92% for non-Swedish analysts. In 
addition, firms covered by Swedish analysts are generally smaller, have lower analyst 
following, more intangible assets, higher market-to-book ratio, and less negative EPS 
than firms followed by non-Swedish analysts. Panel (C) of Table 1.5 reports the results 
of regressions with different specifications within the sample contains the entire firm 
coverage (the A, B, and C area in Figure 1.3). With the attrition of the data process, 
we have 3,590 firms, 161 Swedish analysts, and 1,212 non-Swedish analysts in the 
regression. The coefficient on the interactive term captures the result in the difference-
in-difference setting. We obtain negatively significant coefficients on RPA × SW 
across all specifications, suggesting that Swedish analysts experienced a decrease in 
forecast error, relative to non-Swedish analysts after the RPA adoption in Sweden.43 
More precisely, in column (iii), where we control for analyst, firm and quarter fixed 
effects, the coefficient on the interaction term is -0.327, indicating that the forecast 
error of Swedish analysts decreased by 0.327% more than non-Swedish analysts in the 
post period of the RPA adoption in Sweden. The average forecast error of Swedish 
analysts in the pre-adoption period is 1.98% (untabulated). The reduction in Swedish 
analysts’ forecast error amounts to 16.5% of the mean of forecast error, compared to 
non-Swedish analysts.44 Panel (D) in Table 1.5 reports the results within the sample 
that only contains firms covered by both Swedish analysts and non-Swedish analysts. 
We find 223 out of 3,590 firms covered both analysts within the same year. The sample 
                                                          
43 Similar to models for Hypothesis 1, we exclude RPA when the model has quarter fixed effect, and 
drop SW when the model includes analyst fixed effect. 
44 The mean is 1.98%, then 0.327% / 1.98% = 16.5%. 
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size shrinks significantly. The observations drop from 167,468 to 36,505. The results 
are qualitatively unchanged, compared to that in Panel (C). After controlling for firm, 
analyst, and quarter fixed effects, we find that the coefficient on the interaction term 
is -0.262, and significant at 5% level. 
Turning to the channels through which the improvement in analysts’ forecast 
accuracy is achieved, we posit two possible channels: (1) analysts improve their 
forecast ability per se (Hypothesis 4a); and (2) analysts stop issuing forecasts for firms 
that they are unable to provide high-quality forecasts on (Hypothesis 4b). Column (iv) 
of Panel (C) and Panel (D) in Table 1.5 reports the results of testing the first possible 
channel. We restrict the sample to analyst-firm pairs appearing in both pre- and post-
RPA period, and run the regression with the analyst-firm fixed effect. The results are 
very similar to the full sample. Specifically, in Panel (C) forecast error for Swedish 
analysts decreases by 0.379% relative to non-Swedish analysts after the RPA is 
adopted in Sweden. Thus the result is consistent with the Hypothesis 4a where the 
improvement in forecast accuracy is attributable to the improvement in analysts’ 
forecast ability. With respect to the second possible channel that Swedish analysts are 
more likely to drop the firms if they are unable to provide high quality forecasts, we 
do not find any evidence to support this hypothesis. Table 1.6 reports the results. The 
coefficient on the interaction term is not significant at any conventional level, 
indicating that the likelihood of dropping coverage between Swedish analysts and non-
Swedish analysts is not significantly different. 
 Results for the market reaction to analysts’ forecast revisions 
This section reports the results for the test of the market reaction to analysts’ 
forecast revisions. Table 1.7, Pane (B) presents the overall results in different 
specifications, which are consistent with our hypotheses. Specifically, in column (ii) 
where we control for firm times quarter fixed effect and day fixed effect, the estimated 
coefficient on ANALYST is 0.15 and significant at 1% level. This suggests that the 
daily market reaction to analysts’ forecast revisions is on average 0.15% higher than 
that without forecast revisions before the RPA adoption. In addition, we obtain a 
positively significant coefficient of 0.06 on ANALYST × RPA, indicating that the 
market reaction to forecast revisions increases by 40% in the post RPA period, relative 
to that in the pre-RPA period. Turning to the earnings announcement dummy (EARN), 
the estimated coefficient is 1.44 and significant at 1% level. This compares to the mean 
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of the daily absolute abnormal return, 1.43%, as reported in Panel (A). When firms 
announce their earnings, the size-adjusted absolute abnormal return almost doubles. 
However, we do not find any change in the market reaction to earnings announcements 
with the RPA adoption, as the interaction term, EARN × RPA, is not significant at any 
conventional level. Columns (iii) and (iv) of Table 1.7 report the placebo tests. We 
continue finding significant coefficients on the interaction term of ANALYST with 
RPA, but fail to find that with PRE, indicating that the increase in the market reaction 
to analysts’ forecast is associated with the RPA adoption, rather than one year prior to 
the adoption. 
1.6 Conclusion 
This paper examines how sell-side analysts respond to the change in asset 
managers’ research payment method. Several of Sweden’s largest asset managers 
separate research payments from dealing commissions by using the RPA model, 
leading to an overall reduction in analysts’ research income. We firstly find that 
Swedish analysts reduce their coverage lists with the introduction of the separation, 
compared to non-Swedish analysts. Moreover, we find that the reduction in analyst 
coverage is greater for firms with lower institutional investor ownership and with 
lower market value of equity, as well as firms that are not included in the Nasdaq 
OMX Stockholm Benchmark index. Secondly, we find that the overall research 
quality has improved in the post period of the RPA adoption, and the improvement is 
attributable to the improvement in analysts’ forecast ability, rather than the elimination 
of supply of forecast by lower quality analysts. Lastly, we use the size-adjusted 
absolute abnormal return as the proxy of market reaction, and find an increase in 
market reaction to forecast revisions with the RPA adoption.  
A number of caveats apply to this paper. First, the setting was born with noise. 
Swedish analysts are not perfect to serve as the treatment group because they may 
provide research services to asset managers who continue using the bundled model. In 
a similar vein, non-Swedish analysts as the control group may be influenced by the 
RPA adoption in Sweden if those largest Swedish asset managers are also their 
important clients. Second, the way that we collect data may bring noise. Ideally, to 
create a control group, we need to identify analysts that do not provide any service to 
Swedish asset managers. Our control group have non-Swedish analysts that have 
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history covering Swedish firms, so that they may serve Swedish asset managers as 
well. Therefore, the result we obtained is biased towards no result. Third, the causality 
for testing the selective reduction and the increase in market reaction to forecast 
revisions is a concern, as the test does not have the treatment/control structure. 
Although we did placebo tests, we cannot completely address this issue. Fourth, sell-
side analyst research services are more than just issuing forecasts. Other services such 
as corporate access and broker-hosted conferences are also valuable to asset managers 
(Brown et al. 2015). Due to the data limitation, we are unable to measure them easily 
at this stage, which is a fruitful research area in future if data are available.   
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1.7 Appendix: Definition of variables  
Firm-level variables 
Variable Name   Description   Source 
ABS_ABRET 
 
The size-adjusted absolute abnormal return in the 
percentage form, calculated by taking the absolute 
value of the difference between firms’ daily return 
and the daily OMX Stockholm large-cap, medium-
cap, or small-cap index returns, depending on the 
firms’ inclusion of each index. 
 
Bloomberg 
AF_SW   The number of Swedish analysts issuing any form 
of forecasts (EPS, CPS, one-year-ahead, two-year-
ahead etc), recommendations, or target price to a 
firm within a quarter.  
  I/B/E/S 
ANALYST  Dummy variable, with the value of one if any 
analyst provides forecast revisions on the day and 
the next day ([0, +1]), and zero otherwise. 
 I/B/E/S 
DECL   Dummy variable, set equal to one if the firm’s EPS 
is lower than that in the previous year, and zero 
otherwise. 
  I/B/E/S 
EARN  Dummy variable, with the value of one if a firm 
makes an earnings announcement on the day and 
the next day ([0, +1]), and zero otherwise. 
 I/B/E/S 
INST   The percentage of institutional investor ownership.   Bloomberg 
INTA   Intangible assets scaled by total assets.   Bloomberg 
LOSS   Dummy variable, set equal to one when actual EPS 
is negative, and zero otherwise. 
  I/B/E/S 
LOWINST   Dummy variable, set equal to one when the firm has 
the institutional ownership lower than the median of 
all firms at the end of the last quarter in 2014, and 
zero otherwise. 
  Bloomberg 
MB   Market value of equity divided by book value of 
equity. 
  Bloomberg 
MV   The market value of equity in the logarithm form.   Bloomberg 
NOBENCH  Dummy variable, set equal to one if the firm is 
included in the Nasdaq OMX Stockholm 
Benchmark index at the end of the last quarter in 
2014, and zero otherwise. 
 Bloomberg 
RETVOL   Standard deviation of daily stock returns within 
each quarter. 
  Bloomberg 
RPA   Dummy variable. It equals to one when the 
observation is from the period after RPA is adopted 
in Sweden, and zero otherwise. 
    
PRE   Dummy variable. It equals to one when the 
observation is from 2014 onwards, and zero 
otherwise. 
    
RSQ   R-squared from a regression of daily stock return on 
the market return within each quarter. 
  Bloomberg 
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SMALL   Dummy variable, set equal to one when the firm is 
defined as a small firm, and zero otherwise. Small 
firms are defined as the market value of equity of 
the firm is less than median of all firms at the end of 
the last quarter in 2014. 
    
 
Analyst-level variables 
Variable Name   Description   Source 
BROSIZE   The number of analysts employed within a 
brokerage house within a quarter. 
  I/B/E/S 
DIS   Dummy variable, set value of one if the analyst-
firm pairs disappeared in the post RPA adoption 
period, and zero otherwise. 
  I/B/E/S 
FEXP   Firm-specific experience in the logarithm form. 
Firm-specific experience is measured as the 
number of years from the analyst’s first opinion 
on the specific firm to present. 
  I/B/E/S 
FORERR   Analyst forecast error, defined as the absolute 
value of the difference between the one-year 
ahead EPS forecast and the actual EPS, scaled by 
the stock price two days before the issuance of 
the forecast, then times 100. 
  I/B/E/S 
GEXP   General experience in the logarithm form. 
Analysts’ general experience is measured as the 
number of years from the analyst’s first opinion 
on any firm to present. 
  I/B/E/S 
HOR   Forecast horizon in the logarithm form. Forecast 
horizon is the number of days between the date 
when the forecast is issued and the date when the 
actual EPS is announced. 
  I/B/E/S 
NUMCOM   Total number of firms covered by an analyst.   I/B/E/S 
NUMIND   Total number of industries (two-digit SIC codes) 
covered by an analyst.   
  I/B/E/S 
PACY   Analyst relative accuracy score in the previous 
year, which is calculated in line with the method 
in Hong and Kubik (2003). 
  I/B/E/S 
SW   Dummy variable, set equal to one when the 
forecast is issued by an analyst who locates in 
Sweden, and zero otherwise. 
  I/B/E/S,  
LinkedIn 
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1.8 Appendix: The full Article 17 in the Commission Delegated Directive (EU) 
2017/593 
The Research Payment Account related rules in MiFID II below is taken from the Commission 
Delegated Directive (EU) 2017/593. Online available:  
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir_del/2017/593/oj  
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1.9 Appendix: Swedish Code of Conduct for fund management companies 
This graph presents the codes relating to the research payment separation in Sweden, taken 
from the page 6 in Swedish Code of Conduct for fund management companies issued on 26 
March 2015. Online available at: http://fondbolagen.se/en/Regulations/Guidelines/Code-of-
conduct/  
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1.10 Appendix: An excerpt from the Information Brochure of Handelsbanken 
Fund AB 
This graph presents the announcement from one of the Swedish asset management companies, 
Handelsbanken, separating the research payment (expenses for external analyses) from the 
dealing commissions in the Information Brochure (page 8).  
Online available https://www.medirect.be/getdocument.aspx?id=103670455  
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Figure 1.1: The Bundled Model, Research Payment Account (RPA), and Commission Sharing Agreement (CSA) 
Panel (A): The Bundled Model 
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Panel (B): The Modified Bundled Model – Commission Sharing Agreement (CSA) 
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Panel (C): Research Payment Accounting (RPA)  
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Figure 1.2: The identification of the treatment group and the control group 
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Figure 1.3: Firm coverage of analysts in treatment group and control group 
This graph shows the firms covered by analysts in the treatment group and/or in the control 
group. The oval with solid line represents firm covered by Swedish analysts (treatment group). 
The oval with dotted line represents firm covered by non-Swedish analysts (control group). 
The A area are firms covered by Swedish analysts but not by non-Swedish analysts. The B 
area are firms covered by non-Swedish analysts but not by Swedish analysts. The C area are 
firms covered by both Swedish analysts and non-Swedish analysts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A 
B 
C 
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Table 1.1: The identification of analysts’ location  
This table reports the process of identifying analysts’ location, the geographical distribution 
of identified analysts, and the number of firms covered by analysts from each country. The 
data is hand collected from I/B/E/S, Bloomberg and LinkedIn. Panel (A) reports the process 
of identifying analysts’ location. Panel (B) shows the locations of all analysts identified. Panel 
(C) presents the analysts that are chosen in the treatment group and the control group. Panel 
(D) reports the number and the percentage of Stockholm listed firms covered by analysts from 
different countries.  
Panel (A): The process of identifying analysts’ location 
From DataStream Number Number Number 
  Securities/Firms labelled as "Stockholm listed"   2,892   
          Less firms that do not have a valid I/B/E/S tickers 1,868     
  Securities/Firms with I/B/E/S tickers   1,024   
          
Merge these 1,024 tickers with all I/B/E/S files within 2013 
to 2016       
  Firms remained (tickers not found in I/B/E/S are deleted)   565   
  Number of analysts covering these 565 firms    1,879   
          
Manually identifying the location of these 1,879 analysts       
  Number of analysts identified   1,582   
          Number of firms covered by identified analysts     554 
  
Number of I/B/E/S error codes (one code with multiple 
names)   264   
  Number of analysts unidentified   33   
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Panel (B): Geographical distribution of identified analysts 
Location Number of analysts  Percent 
UK 658 41.0% 
Sweden 223 13.9% 
Norway 209 13.0% 
US 151 9.4% 
France 69 4.3% 
Canada 68 4.2% 
Germany 42 2.6% 
Finland 39 2.4% 
Denmark 22 1.4% 
Netherlands 20 1.2% 
Russia 19 1.2% 
Switzerland 18 1.1% 
Lithuania 11 0.7% 
South Africa 8 0.5% 
Italy 7 0.4% 
Poland 6 0.4% 
India 5 0.3% 
Australia 4 0.2% 
Spain 4 0.2% 
Austria 2 0.1% 
Czech Republic 2 0.1% 
HK 2 0.1% 
Korea 2 0.1% 
Portugal 2 0.1% 
Tunisia 2 0.1% 
Brazil 1 0.1% 
Ireland 1 0.1% 
Malaysia 1 0.1% 
Mexico 1 0.1% 
New Zealand 1 0.1% 
Singapore 1 0.1% 
Turkey 1 0.1% 
United Arab Emirates 1 0.1% 
Total 1,603 100% 
      
less analysts relocated 
internationally 21   
Distinct analysts identified 1,582   
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Panel (C): Treatment group and control group 
Treatment Group   
No. of analysts in Sweden 223 
Less no. of analysts used to relocate between Sweden and other 
countries 
4 
No. of analysts in the treatment group 219 
    
Control Group   
No. of non-Swedish analysts in the control group 1,359 
 
Panel (D): Number of Stockholm listed firms covered by analysts from each 
country 
Total number of Stockholm listed firms 
covered by identified analysts 554 (denominator) 
      
Firms covered by analysts from … Number of firms Percent 
Sweden 431 77.8% 
Norway 197 35.6% 
UK 164 29.6% 
US 68 12.3% 
France 64 11.6% 
Finland 56 10.1% 
Denmark 42 7.6% 
Lithuania 32 5.8% 
Netherlands 31 5.6% 
Germany 23 4.2% 
Canada 21 3.8% 
Russia 18 3.2% 
India 9 1.6% 
Italy 8 1.4% 
Spain 8 1.4% 
Switzerland 5 0.9% 
South Africa 5 0.9% 
Tunisia 4 0.7% 
Australia 3 0.5% 
Czech Republic 3 0.5% 
Poland 2 0.4% 
Austria 2 0.4% 
Korea 2 0.4% 
Portugal 2 0.4% 
Brazil 1 0.2% 
HK 1 0.2% 
Ireland 1 0.2% 
Malaysia 1 0.2% 
Mexico 1 0.2% 
New Zealand 1 0.2% 
Singapore 1 0.2% 
Turkey 1 0.2% 
United Arab Emirates 1 0.2% 
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Table 1.2: The number of firms on analysts’ coverage list 
This table reports the descriptive statistics and results for Hypothesis 1 – the adoption of RPA 
reduces the number of firms in the analyst coverage list. The analysis is on the analyst-
quarterly basis. The pre-adoption period is from 2013Q1 to 2014Q4, whilst the post-adoption 
period is from 2015Q1 to 2016Q4. The treatment (control) group has 219 Swedish (1,359 non-
Swedish) analysts during the sample period. In this table, the dependent variable is NUMCOM, 
which is defined as the number of firms followed by each individual analyst within a quarter. 
SW is the indicator variable for the treatment group, equals to one for Swedish analysts, and 
zero for non-Swedish analysts. RPA is the indicator variable, equals to one when the 
observation is from post-RPA period (1 January 2015 onwards), and zero otherwise. GEXP is 
analysts’ general experience in the natural logarithm form. General experience is measured as 
the number of years from when the analyst issued her first analyst’s opinion for any firms to 
present. NUMIND denotes the number of two-digit SIC industries followed by each individual 
analyst. PACY denotes the relative accuracy score of an analyst in the previous year, which is 
calculated in line with Hong and Kubik (2003). Panel (A) presents descriptive statistics for 
variables used in the regression. Panel (B) reports Pearson (below diagonal) and Spearman 
(above diagonal) correlations. The correlations significant at the 5 percent level are shown in 
bold.  Panel (C) outlines the results. All the regressions are clustered at the analyst level and 
the quarter level. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
Panel (A): Descriptive statistics 
Treatment: SW=1  
Variable N Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Median 0.75 Max 
NUMCOM 1,733 8.11 4.47 1 5 8 11 26 
RPA 1,733 0.51 0.50 0 0 1 1 1 
GEXP 1,733 2.29 0.86 0.22 1.56 2.51 3.07 3.42 
NUMIND 1,733 3.39 2.23 1 2 3 4 10 
PACY 1,733 54.47 16.01 14.64 44.29 54.38 64.62 88.08 
                  
Control: SW=0  
Variable N Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Median 0.75 Max 
NUMCOM 14,528 10.87 6.93 1 6 10 14 34 
RPA 14,528 0.49 0.50 0 0 0 1 1 
GEXP 14,528 2.25 0.81 0 1.66 2.3 3 3.43 
NUMIND 14,528 2.81 1.89 1 1 2 4 10 
PACY 14,528 53.49 13.16 14.64 45.54 53.73 61.45 88.08 
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Panel (B): Correlation matrix 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
(1) NUMCOM   0.10 -0.12 0.23 0.41 -0.00 
(2) RPA 0.10   0.01 0.07 0.02 -0.06 
(3) SW -0.12 0.01   0.02 0.08 0.02 
(4) GEXP 0.19 0.07 0.02  0.16  -0.01   
(5) NUMIND 0.42 0.03 0.09 0.15   0.00 
(6) PACY -0.01 -0.07 0.02 -0.02 0.00   
 
Panel (C): Results for testing the reduction in the number of firms on analysts’ 
coverage lists 
Dependent variable: NUMCOM         
Variables i ii iii iv v vi 
RPA 1.183*** 1.125*** 1.216***   0.753**                 
  (0.256) (0.257) (0.273)   (0.289)                 
SW -2.619*** -3.314***                       
  (0.376) (0.319)                       
RPA × SW -1.009*** -0.649** -0.561** -0.605** -0.572* -0.623**  
  (0.333) (0.230) (0.251) (0.249) (0.280) (0.275)    
GEXP   1.267*** 1.311*** 1.277*** 2.929*** 1.702*** 
    (0.166) (0.145) (0.146) (0.462) (0.550)    
NUMIND   1.411*** 1.267*** 1.262*** 2.046*** 2.043*** 
    (0.088) (0.060) (0.060) (0.068) (0.068)    
PACY   -0.001 0.012** 0.012** 0.009** 0.008*   
    (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)    
No. of Ob. 18,127 16,261 16,241 16,241 16,216 16,216 
R-squared 0.027 0.228 0.544 0.549 0.791 0.794 
Broker FE No No Yes Yes No No 
Analyst FE No No No No Yes Yes 
Quarter FE No No No Yes No Yes 
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Table 1.3: General description of Nasdaq OMX Stockholm 
This table reports the distribution of firms listed on the largest stock market in Sweden: Nasdaq 
OMX Stockholm by countries of headquarters in Panel (A) and by industries in Panel (B). 
These firms are used to test the Hypotheses 2a to 2c – the selective reduction in firms’ analyst 
following. 
Panel (A): Countries of headquarters 
Country No. of firms Percent 
Sweden 293 90.43 
Canada 8 2.47 
Finland 6 1.85 
Switzerland 4 1.23 
Belgium 2 0.62 
Denmark 2 0.62 
UK 2 0.62 
Luxembourg 2 0.62 
US 2 0.62 
Russia 1 0.31 
Malta 1 0.31 
Poland 1 0.31 
Total 324 100 
 
Panel (B): The industry distribution  
Industry No. of firms Percent 
Consumer, Non-cyclical 72           22.22  
Industrial 65           20.06  
Consumer, Cyclical 48           14.81  
Financial 48           14.81  
Communications 28             8.64  
Technology 27             8.33  
Basic Materials 20             6.17  
Energy 9             2.78  
Diversified 6             1.85  
Utilities 1             0.31  
Total 324 100 
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Table 1.4: Selective reduction in firms’ analyst following 
This table reports the descriptive statistics and results for Hypotheses 2a, 2b , and 2c – after 
the RPA adoption, the decrease in the number of analyst following is greater among the lower 
institutional holding firms, small firms, and firms that are not included in the Nasdaq OMX 
Stockholm Benchmark index. The test is conducted on 324 firms that are listed on the largest 
Swedish stock market – Nasdaq OMX Stockholm from 2013 to 2016. The analysis is on the 
firm-quarterly basis. The pre-adoption period is from 2013Q1 to 2014Q4, whilst the post-
adoption period is from 2015Q1 to 2016Q4. The dependent variable is AF_SW, which is 
measured by the number of Swedish analysts following a firm listed on Nasdaq OMX 
Stockholm within each quarter. RPA is the indicator variable, equals to one when the 
observation is from post-RPA period (1 January 2015 onwards), and zero otherwise. PRE is 
the indicator variable, equals to one from 1 January 2014 onwards, and zero otherwise. 
LOWINST is a dummy variable, set equal to one when the firm has the institutional investor 
ownership lower than the median of all firms at the end of the last quarter in 2014, and zero 
otherwise. SMALL is an indicator variable, equals to one when the firm is defined as a small 
firm. Small firms are defined as when the firm’s market value of equity is less than the median 
of all firms at the end of the last quarter in 2014, and zero otherwise. NOBENCH is a dummy 
variable, with a value of one if the firm is not included in the Nasdaq OMX Stockholm 
Benchmark index at the end of the last quarter in 2014, and zero otherwise. MV represents the 
market value of equity in the logarithm form. INTA indicates the percentage of intangible 
assets, and is calculated as on the total intangible assets, scaled by total assets. MB is the 
market-to-book ratio and measured by dividing the market value of equity by the book value 
of equity. INST denotes the percentage of institutional investor ownership for a firm within 
each quarter. RETVOL is the stock return volatility within each quarter. RSQ is the R-squared 
from the market model of the individual stock return on the market return. Panel (A) presents 
descriptive statistics for variables used in the regression. Panel (B) reports Pearson (below 
diagonal) and Spearman (above diagonal) correlations. The correlations significant at the 5 
percent level are shown in bold.  Panels (C) to (E) outline the results with different partitions. 
All the regressions are clustered at the firm level. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Panel (A): Descriptive statistics 
RPA=0                 
Variable N Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Median 0.75 Max 
AF_SW       1,764   2.74   2.52   0.00   1.00   2.00   4.00   10.00  
LOWINST       1,764   0.46   0.50   0.00   0.00   0.00   1.00   1.00  
SMALL       1,764   0.52   0.50   0.00   0.00   1.00   1.00   1.00  
NOBENCH       1,764   0.74   0.44   0.00   0.00   1.00   1.00   1.00  
MV       1,764   7.81   2.04   2.65   6.23   7.63   9.30   12.85  
INTA       1,764   0.23   0.22   0.00   0.01   0.17   0.38   0.80  
INST       1,764   48.19   23.48   0.00   30.32   48.98   65.85   99.79  
RSQ       1,764   0.13   0.16   0.00   0.02   0.07   0.19   0.74  
RETVOL       1,764   0.02   0.01   0.01   0.01   0.02   0.02   0.09  
MB       1,764   2.99   3.15   0.17   1.17   2.08   3.57   22.12  
                  
RPA=1                 
Variable N Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Median 0.75 Max 
AF_SW       1,834  2.65 2.70 0.00 0.00 2.00 5.00 11.00 
LOWINST       1,834  0.47 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
SMALL       1,834  0.51 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
NOBENCH       1,834  0.75 0.43 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
MV       1,834  8.13 2.02 2.26 6.67 8.03 9.72 12.85 
INTA       1,834  0.24 0.23 0.00 0.01 0.19 0.41 0.80 
INST       1,834  53.20 23.05 0.00 36.96 54.75 70.49 99.79 
RSQ       1,834  0.19 0.20 0.00 0.03 0.11 0.30 0.74 
RETVOL       1,834  0.02 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.09 
MB       1,834  3.38 3.53 0.17 1.32 2.35 4.06 22.12 
 
Panel (B): Correlation matrix 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(1) AF_SW   -0.04 -0.37 -0.71 -0.64 0.80 0.14 0.38 0.57 -0.44 0.17 
(2) RPA -0.02   0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.08 0.02 0.11 0.16 0.10 0.07 
(3) LOWINST -0.33 0.02   0.34 0.30 -0.37 -0.20 -0.68 -0.22 0.16 -0.14 
(4) SMALL -0.66 -0.01 0.32   0.57 -0.84 0.01 -0.32 -0.55 0.47 -0.18 
(5) NOBENCH -0.65 0.01 0.28 0.55   -0.66 0.08 -0.24 -0.53 0.37 -0.03 
(6) MV 0.74 0.08 -0.33 -0.80 -0.68   -0.03 0.38 0.65 -0.52 0.25 
(7) INTA 0.13 0.03 -0.18 0.04 0.06 -0.04   0.23 -0.05 0.07 0.11 
(8) INST 0.35 0.07 -0.65 -0.30 -0.22 0.31 0.22   0.26 -0.17 0.17 
(9) RSQ 0.58 0.15 -0.21 -0.53 -0.58 0.67 -0.08 0.20   -0.36 0.06 
(10) RETVOL -0.35 0.04 0.17 0.38 0.27 -0.43 0.00 -0.22 -0.29   0.00 
(11) MB 0.06 0.07 -0.05 -0.08 -0.02 0.12 -0.09 0.02 -0.02 0.08   
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Panel (C): Results for low institutional ownership partition 
Dependent variable: AF_SW       
  Low institutional ownership 
  i ii iii iv    
RPA -0.430*** -0.034                   
  (0.095) (0.094)                   
LOWINST 0.034                     
  (0.203)                     
RPA × LOWINST -0.292** -0.206* -0.215** -0.184*   
  (0.124) (0.110) (0.108) (0.100)    
PRE × LOWINST       -0.065    
        (0.113)    
MV 0.865*** 0.170** 0.232*** 0.232*** 
  (0.052) (0.085) (0.083) (0.083)    
INTA 1.557*** -0.047 -0.128 -0.128    
  (0.313) (0.350) (0.356) (0.356)    
INST 0.006 0.003 0.004* 0.004*   
  (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)    
RETVOL 3.959 -2.990 -2.390 -2.417    
  (4.386) (2.046) (1.920) (1.918)    
RSQ 2.474*** 0.236 0.693*** 0.690*** 
  (0.471) (0.158) (0.195) (0.194)    
MB -0.006 -0.015 -0.011 -0.012    
  (0.025) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)    
Observations 3,598 3,598 3,598 3,598    
Adjusted R-squared 0.680 0.905 0.913 0.913    
RPA + PRA × 
LOWINST 
-0.722*** -0.240***                   
(0.090) (0.073)                   
Firm Fixed Effect No Yes Yes Yes    
Quarter Fixed Effect No No Yes Yes    
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
62 
 
Panel (D): Results for the small size partition 
Dependent variable: AF_SW       
  Small size 
  v vi vii viii 
RPA -0.313*** 0.228**                   
  (0.113) (0.093)                   
SMALL -0.598**                     
  (0.271)                     
RPA × SMALL -0.424*** -0.652*** -0.620*** -0.551*** 
  (0.123) (0.106) (0.105) (0.095)    
PRE × SMALL       -0.147    
        (0.116)    
MV 0.715*** 0.133* 0.200*** 0.196*** 
  (0.069) (0.076) (0.075) (0.075)    
INTA 1.581*** 0.015 -0.080 -0.073    
  (0.306) (0.317) (0.323) (0.325)    
INST 0.006* 0.003 0.004* 0.004*   
  (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)    
RETVOL 4.748 -3.749** -3.312* -3.436*   
  (3.946) (1.895) (1.796) (1.795)    
RSQ 2.466*** 0.062 0.455** 0.441**  
  (0.467) (0.149) (0.183) (0.183)    
MB -0.004 -0.011 -0.008 -0.008    
  (0.023) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)    
Observations 3,598 3,598 3,598 3,598    
Adjusted R-squared 0.690 0.908 0.916 0.916    
RPA + PRA × SMALL -0.737*** -0.424***                   
(0.071) (0.067)                   
Firm Fixed Effect No Yes Yes Yes    
Quarter Fixed Effect No No Yes Yes    
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Panel (E): Results for the non-benchmark stock partition 
Dependent variable: AF_SW       
  Non-bench Stocks 
  ix x xi xii 
RPA -0.100 0.215*                   
  (0.135) (0.127)                   
NOBENCH -1.304***                     
  (0.280)                     
PRA × NOBENCH -0.471*** -0.459*** -0.446*** -0.395*** 
  (0.147) (0.141) (0.139) (0.132)    
PRE × NOBENCH       -0.107    
        (0.143)    
MV 0.692*** 0.169** 0.234*** 0.234*** 
  (0.057) (0.080) (0.078) (0.078)    
INTA 1.671*** -0.073 -0.162 -0.165    
  (0.282) (0.343) (0.350) (0.350)    
INST 0.007** 0.003 0.004* 0.004*   
  (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)    
RETVOL 1.029 -3.420* -2.883 -2.922    
  (3.800) (1.986) (1.865) (1.862)    
RSQ 1.560*** 0.166 0.594*** 0.585*** 
  (0.446) (0.159) (0.194) (0.196)    
MB 0.002 -0.015 -0.012 -0.012    
  (0.022) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)    
Observations 3,598 3,598 3,598 3,598    
Adjusted R-squared 0.713 0.906 0.914 0.914    
RPA + PRA × 
NOBENCH 
-0.571*** -0.244***                   
(0.074) (0.069)                   
Firm Fixed Effect No Yes Yes Yes    
Quarter Fixed Effect No No Yes Yes    
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Table 1.5: Analysts’ research quality 
The table reports the test for analysts’ research quality. Panel (A) reports descriptive statistics. 
In this table, FORERR is the dependent variable, which is defined as analyst forecast error and 
calculated by taking the absolute value of the difference between the one-year-ahead EPS 
forecast and the actual EPS, scaled by the stock price two days before the forecast is provided, 
then multiplied by 100. SW is the indicator variable for the treatment group, equals to one for 
Swedish analysts, and zero for non-Swedish analysts. RPA is the indicator variable, equals to 
one when the observation is from post-RPA period (1 January 2015 onwards), and zero 
otherwise. MV represents the market value of equity in the logarithm form. AF is the total 
number of analysts following a firm within each quarter. INTA indicates the percentage of 
intangible assets scaled by total assets. MB is the market-to-book ratio and measured by 
dividing the market value of equity by the book value of equity. RETVOL is the stock return 
volatility within each quarter. LOSS is a dummy variable, and equals to one when the actual 
EPS is negative, and zero otherwise. DECL is a dummy variable, and equals to one when the 
current actual EPS is less than the EPS in the previous year. HOR denotes the forecast horizon 
in the logarithm form. Forecast horizon is the number of days between the date when the 
forecast is provided and the date when the actual EPS is announced. FEXP is the analyst’s 
experience to a specific firm in the logarithm form. Analyst’s experience to a specific firm is 
measured as the number of years since the analyst provides her first analyst’s opinion on the 
specific firm to present. GEXP is analysts’ general experience of being an analyst in the 
logarithm form. Analysts’ general experience is measured as the number of years from when 
the analyst issued her first analyst’s opinion for any firms to present. NUMCOV and NUMIND 
are total numbers of firms and industries that one analyst covers within each quarter 
respectively. PACY denotes the relative accuracy score of an analyst in the previous year, 
which is calculated in line with Hong and Kubik (2003). Panel (B) reports Pearson (below 
diagonal) and Spearman (above diagonal) correlations. The correlations significant at the five 
percent level are shown in bold.  Panels (C) and (D) outlines the results within the full sample 
and the mutual coverage sample respectively. Columns (i) to (iii) report the results in the full 
sample. Column (iv) reports the result within the sample restricting to analyst-firm pairs 
appearing in the both pre- and post-adopting period. All the regressions are clustered at the 
analyst level and the quarter level. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, 
and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Panel (A): Descriptive statistics 
Treatment: SW=1               
Variable N Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Median 0.75 Max 
FORERR 15,739 1.63 3.91 0 0.19 0.57 1.48 35.09 
RPA 15,739 0.52 0.50 0 0 1 1 1 
MV 15,739 7.76 1.72 3.82 6.61 7.82 8.94 12.19 
AF 15,739 13.17 9.68 1 5 10 21 61 
INTA 15,739 26.64 22.14 0 6.24 24.43 41.55 77.43 
MB 15,739 3.25 3.70 -8.58 1.50 2.51 3.75 26.44 
RETVOL 15,739 0.02 0.01 0 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.06 
LOSS 15,739 0.09 0.29 0 0 0 0 1 
DECL 15,739 0.39 0.49 0 0 0 1 1 
HOR 15,739 5.26 0.52 3.43 4.79 5.35 5.67 5.90 
FEXP 15,739 1.49 0.85 0 0.79 1.49 2.19 3.11 
GEXP 15,739 2.46 0.81 0.13 1.83 2.8 3.12 3.42 
NUMCOM 15,739 10.48 4.36 1 7 10 13 26 
NUMIND 15,739 4.16 2.43 1 2 3 5 11 
PACY 15,739 55.36 14.58 0 46.64 55.42 64.28 100 
                  
Control: SW=0               
Variable N Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Median 0.75 Max 
FORERR 155,560 1.92 4.67 0 0.14 0.51 1.58 35.09 
RPA 155,560 0.51 0.50 0 0 1 1 1 
MV 155,560 8.63 1.80 3.82 7.46 8.68 9.93 12.19 
AF 155,560 18.93 9.53 1 11 19 26 61 
INTA 155,560 20.3 20.31 0 2.16 13.62 33.72 77.43 
MB 155,560 2.98 3.96 -8.58 1.15 2.01 3.53 26.44 
RETVOL 155,560 0.02 0.01 0 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.06 
LOSS 155,560 0.20 0.40 0 0 0 0 1 
DECL 155,560 0.45 0.50 0 0 0 1 1 
HOR 155,560 5.24 0.55 3.43 4.83 5.35 5.69 5.90 
FEXP 155,560 1.40 0.79 0 0.78 1.39 1.99 3.11 
GEXP 155,560 2.40 0.75 0 1.82 2.48 3.06 3.49 
NUMCOM 155,560 15.2 8.54 1 9 13 20 45 
NUMIND 155,560 3.47 2.20 1 2 3 5 11 
PACY 155,560 53.92 11.37 0 47.27 54.24 60.79 100 
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 Panel (B): Correlation Matrix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
(1) FORERR   0.01 0.02 -0.30 -0.17 -0.19 -0.33 0.26 0.25 0.11 0.16 -0.04 -0.05 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 
(2) RPA 0.02   0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.24 0.04 -0.05 -0.03 0.04 0.07 0.10 0.03 -0.06 
(3) SW -0.02 0.00   -0.14 -0.17 0.09 0.07 -0.05 -0.08 -0.03 0.00 0.03 0.03 -0.17 0.09 0.03 
(4) MV -0.29 0.00 -0.14   0.72 0.15 0.25 -0.47 -0.30 -0.03 -0.01 0.16 0.11 -0.01 -0.14 -0.02 
(5) AF -0.16 -0.03 -0.17 0.71   0.05 0.03 -0.22 -0.11 0.04 0.01 0.17 0.09 0.02 -0.12 -0.02 
(6) INTA -0.12 0.03 0.09 0.11 0.00   0.36 -0.19 -0.14 -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.07 -0.14 0.12 0.00 
(7) MB -0.13 0.01 0.02 0.17 0.01 0.12   -0.27 -0.27 -0.10 -0.01 0.01 0.08 -0.05 0.12 0.00 
(8) RETVOL 0.32 0.20 -0.06 -0.49 -0.20 -0.17 -0.13   0.41 0.07 0.01 -0.09 -0.05 0.11 0.00 -0.01 
(9) LOSS 0.30 0.04 -0.08 -0.32 -0.10 -0.11 -0.13 0.47   0.24 0.00 -0.07 -0.07 0.07 -0.07 0.01 
(10) DECL 0.08 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 0.04 -0.01 -0.08 0.08 0.24   -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.03 0.00 
(11) HOR 0.06 -0.04 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.01   -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.00 
(12) FEXP -0.04 0.04 0.03 0.17 0.17 0.01 0.00 -0.09 -0.07 -0.01 -0.02   0.44 0.10 0.04 0.02 
(13) GEXP -0.05 0.06 0.02 0.12 0.10 0.06 0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.01 -0.02 0.46   0.19 0.13 0.01 
(14) NUMCOM 0.01 0.10 -0.16 -0.01 0.04 -0.13 -0.03 0.15 0.10 0.03 -0.02 0.09 0.21   0.33 -0.05 
(15) NUMIND -0.04 0.03 0.09 -0.12 -0.11 0.08 0.04 -0.02 -0.07 -0.02 0.00 0.04 0.13 0.42   -0.05 
(16) PACY -0.01 -0.06 0.04 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.06 -0.04   
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Panel (C): Results for analysts’ forecast accuracy within the sample of analysts’ 
entire firm coverage 
Dependent variable: FORERR         
  Full sample   Restricted sample 
Variables i ii iii   iv 
RPA -0.092                       
  (0.107)                       
SW 0.049 0.061                     
  (0.167) (0.120)                     
RPA × SW -0.636*** -0.324** -0.327*   -0.379*   
  (0.156) (0.142) (0.157)   (0.181)    
MV -0.332*** -1.636*** -1.610***   -1.542*** 
  (0.039) (0.181) (0.186)   (0.212)    
AF -0.014** -0.021 -0.020   -0.020    
  (0.005) (0.012) (0.012)   (0.013)    
INTA -0.011*** -0.001 -0.000   -0.002    
  (0.002) (0.007) (0.007)   (0.008)    
MB -0.064*** 0.008 0.006   0.007    
  (0.010) (0.012) (0.012)   (0.014)    
RETVOL 78.227*** 23.609** 23.157**   21.441**  
  (8.992) (8.031) (7.926)   (9.739)    
LOSS 1.975*** 1.135*** 1.139***   1.058*** 
  (0.155) (0.124) (0.122)   (0.144)    
DECL 0.200*** 0.336*** 0.335***   0.366*** 
  (0.052) (0.048) (0.049)   (0.052)    
HOR 0.546*** 0.466*** 0.471***   0.445*** 
  (0.064) (0.032) (0.030)   (0.033)    
FEXP 0.108** -0.015 -0.008   0.260*   
  (0.042) (0.016) (0.020)   (0.135)    
GEXP 0.011 -0.007 0.349   0.165    
  (0.054) (0.015) (0.223)   (0.284)    
NUMCOM -0.018** -0.001 -0.007*   -0.008    
  (0.007) (0.003) (0.004)   (0.005)    
NUMIND -0.036 0.004 0.018   0.019    
  (0.023) (0.007) (0.016)   (0.021)    
PACY -0.007** -0.003** 0.003   0.004    
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)   (0.002)    
Observations 167,468 167,468 167,468   128,698 
Adjusted R2 0.163 0.591 0.598   0.606    
Firm FE No Yes Yes   No 
Analyst FE No No Yes   No 
Quarter FE No Yes Yes   Yes 
Firm  × Analyst FE No No No   Yes 
No. of firms 3,590 3,590 3,590    2,560 
No. of Swedish analysts 161 161 161   122 
No. of non-Swedish analysts 1,212 1,212 1,212   969 
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Panel (D): Results for analysts’ forecast accuracy within the sample of Swedish 
and non-Swedish analysts’ mutual firm coverage 
Dependent variable: FORERR 
  Full sample   Restricted sample 
Variables i ii iii   iv 
RPA -0.334**                       
  (0.123)                       
SW -0.058 0.140*                     
  (0.127) (0.068)                     
RPA × SW -0.196 -0.279*** -0.262**   -0.319**  
  (0.143) (0.089) (0.111)   (0.126)    
MV -0.745*** 0.007 0.036   0.055    
  (0.122) (0.354) (0.366)   (0.395)    
AF 0.048*** -0.019 -0.016   -0.020    
  (0.013) (0.020) (0.020)   (0.020)    
INTA -0.008*** 0.028* 0.029*   0.027    
  (0.002) (0.014) (0.014)   (0.017)    
MB -0.012* 0.003 0.002   0.003    
  (0.006) (0.003) (0.004)   (0.003)    
RETVOL 61.221*** 9.420 8.070   4.474    
  (13.175) (8.798) (8.527)   (8.397)    
LOSS 0.221 0.332 0.395*   0.335    
  (0.178) (0.217) (0.207)   (0.238)    
DECL -0.022 0.103** 0.110**   0.191*** 
  (0.061) (0.044) (0.045)   (0.055)    
HOR 0.335*** 0.336*** 0.372***   0.317*** 
  (0.058) (0.070) (0.067)   (0.071)    
FEXP 0.178*** 0.014 0.008   0.158    
  (0.041) (0.015) (0.030)   (0.195)    
GEXP -0.080* -0.025 0.227   -0.099    
  (0.045) (0.021) (0.238)   (0.361)    
NUMCOM 0.008 0.006* 0.008   0.014    
  (0.006) (0.003) (0.007)   (0.008)    
NUMIND -0.077** -0.013 -0.024   -0.038    
  (0.027) (0.012) (0.025)   (0.033)    
PACY -0.007** -0.004** 0.003   0.002    
  (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)   (0.003)    
Observations 36,505 36,505 36,505   28,027 
Adjusted R2 0.163 0.591 0.598   0.595    
Firm FE No Yes Yes   No 
Analyst FE No No Yes   No 
Quarter FE No Yes Yes   Yes 
Firm  × Analyst FE No No No   Yes 
No. of firms 223 223 223   188 
No. of Swedish analysts 153 153 153   107 
No. of non-Swedish analysts 864 864 864   541 
69 
 
Table 1.6: The test of the likelihood of analysts dropping firms in the post-RPA 
period 
This table reports the results of the likelihood of Swedish analysts dropping firms in the post-
RPA period, compared to non-Swedish analysts, which is conducted in a logistic model with 
the one-year-ahead forecasts provided by each analyst for each firm in the pre-RPA period. 
The dependent variable is an indicator variable – DIS, and equals to one when the analyst-firm 
pairs appear in the pre-RPA period but disappear in the post-RPA period, and zero otherwise. 
FORERR is the dependent variable, which is defined as analyst forecast error and calculated 
by taking the absolute value of the difference between the one-year-ahead EPS forecast and 
the actual EPS, scaled by the stock price two days before the forecast is provided, then 
multiplied by 100. SW is the indicator variable for the treatment group, equals to one for 
Swedish analysts, and zero for non-Swedish analysts. RPA is the indicator variable, equals to 
one when the observation is from post-RPA period (1 January 2015 onwards), and zero 
otherwise. MV represents the market value of equity in the logarithm form. AF is the total 
number of analysts following a firm within each quarter. INTA indicates the percentage of 
intangible assets scaled by total assets. MB is the market-to-book ratio and measured by 
dividing the market value of equity by the book value of equity. RETVOL is the stock return 
volatility within each quarter. LOSS is a dummy variable, and equals to one when the actual 
EPS is negative, and zero otherwise. DECL is a dummy variable, and equals to one when the 
current actual EPS is less than the EPS in the previous year. FEXP is the analyst’s experience 
to a specific firm in the logarithm form. Analyst’s experience to a specific firm is measured 
as the number of years since the analyst provides her first analyst’s opinion on the specific 
firm to present. GEXP is analysts’ general experience of being an analyst in the logarithm 
form. Analysts’ general experience is measured as the number of years from when the analyst 
issued her first analyst’s opinion for any firms to present. NUMCOV and NUMIND are total 
numbers of firms and industries that one analyst covers within each quarter respectively. Panel 
(B) reports Pearson (below diagonal) and Spearman (above diagonal) correlations. The 
correlations significant at the five percent level are shown in bold. Panel (C) outlines the 
results. All the regressions are clustered at the analyst level. Robust standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively. 
Panel (A): Descriptive statistics 
Variable N Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Median 0.75 Max 
DIS 82,549 0.24 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
SW 82,549 0.09 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
FORERR 82,549 1.78 4.05 0.00 0.14 0.51 1.56 30.09 
MV 82,549 8.55 1.80 3.83 7.42 8.59 9.80 12.17 
AF 82,549 18.73 9.84 1.00 11.00 18.00 26.00 61.00 
INTA 82,549 20.25 19.78 0.00 2.52 14.20 33.72 75.05 
MB 82,549 2.96 3.70 -7.06 1.20 2.04 3.43 25.10 
RETVOL 82,549 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.06 
LOSS 82,549 0.17 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
DECL 82,549 0.47 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
FEXP 82,549 1.37 0.77 0.00 0.78 1.34 1.95 3.05 
GEXP 82,549 2.35 0.76 0.00 1.74 2.42 3.03 3.46 
NUMCOM 82,549 13.89 7.91 1.00 8.00 12.00 18.00 41.00 
NUMIND 82,549 3.46 2.19 1.00 2.00 3.00 5.00 11.00 
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 Panel (B): Correlation Matrix 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
(1) DIS   0.02 0.11 -0.12 -0.11 0.01 -0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03 -0.16 -0.15 -0.03 0.00 
(2) SW 0.02   0.05 -0.14 -0.18 0.09 0.05 -0.03 -0.06 -0.01 0.04 0.03 -0.17 0.08 
(3) FORERR 0.08 0.01   -0.30 -0.19 -0.15 -0.31 0.24 0.25 0.11 -0.05 -0.06 -0.03 -0.03 
(4) MV -0.14 -0.15 -0.29   0.78 0.11 0.23 -0.52 -0.33 -0.02 0.15 0.14 -0.01 -0.13 
(5) AF -0.11 -0.17 -0.18 0.76   0.05 0.06 -0.31 -0.17 0.05 0.17 0.12 0.01 -0.12 
(6) INTA 0.01 0.09 -0.10 0.07 0.00   0.32 -0.14 -0.12 0.03 0.04 0.06 -0.15 0.12 
(7) MB -0.05 0.02 -0.13 0.15 0.02 0.08   -0.20 -0.21 -0.09 0.03 0.09 -0.02 0.12 
(8) RETVOL 0.07 -0.05 0.29 -0.51 -0.28 -0.12 -0.08   0.39 0.05 -0.12 -0.08 0.06 0.01 
(9) LOSS 0.04 -0.06 0.32 -0.35 -0.16 -0.09 -0.09 0.46   0.19 -0.06 -0.08 0.04 -0.07 
(10) DECL 0.03 -0.01 0.08 -0.01 0.05 0.03 -0.08 0.05 0.19   -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.05 
(11) FEXP -0.16 0.05 -0.04 0.16 0.17 0.03 0.01 -0.12 -0.06 -0.02   0.43 0.09 0.05 
(12) GEXP -0.16 0.03 -0.05 0.14 0.12 0.06 0.04 -0.08 -0.07 -0.02 0.45   0.19 0.12 
(13) NUMCOM -0.03 -0.16 -0.02 -0.01 0.03 -0.14 -0.03 0.08 0.05 -0.01 0.08 0.20   0.32 
(14) NUMIND 0.00 0.08 -0.04 -0.11 -0.12 0.08 0.05 -0.03 -0.07 -0.04 0.05 0.12 0.42   
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Panel (C): Regression results 
Dependent variable: Pr(DIS=1)       
Variables i ii iii    
SW 0.155 0.034 -0.240    
  (0.196) (0.192) (0.253)    
FORERR 0.040*** 0.018** 0.000    
  (0.006) (0.008) (0.006)    
SW × FORERR 0.006 0.009 0.013    
  (0.017) (0.015) (0.023)    
MV   -0.103* -0.115    
    (0.061) (0.087)    
AF   -0.005 0.028*** 
    (0.009) (0.008)    
INTA   0.004 0.007    
    (0.002) (0.006)    
MB   -0.017* 0.020*** 
    (0.010) (0.007)    
RETVOL   3.097 2.432    
    (4.506) (3.218)    
LOSS   -0.074 0.143*   
    (0.111) (0.083)    
DECL   0.118* -0.056    
    (0.061) (0.050)    
FEXP   -0.344*** -0.461*** 
    (0.059) (0.070)    
GEXP   -0.289*** -0.274*** 
    (0.080) (0.093)    
NUMCOM   0.009 0.025**  
    (0.015) (0.012)    
NUMIND   0.008 -0.027    
    (0.044) (0.043)    
CONSTANT -1.258*** 1.151*** 1.688    
  (0.083) (0.447) (1.278)    
No. of Ob. 82,549 82,549 66,702 
Pseudo R-squared 0.006 0.101 0.217    
Firm Fixed Effect No No Yes 
Quarter Fixed Effect No Yes Yes 
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Table 1.7: Market reaction to forecast revisions 
This table reports the results of the change in the market reaction to forecast revisions with the 
RPA adoption. The analysis is on the firm-day basis among the Swedish firms followed by at 
least one analyst. The dependent variable, ABS_ABRET, is the size-adjusted absolute abnormal 
return in the percentage form. RPA is the indicator variable, equals to one for the post-RPA 
period (1 January 2015 onwards), and zero otherwise. PRE is the indicator variable, equals to 
one from 1 January 2014 onwards, and zero otherwise. ANALYST is the dummy variable, with 
the value of one if any analyst provides forecast revisions on the day or the next day ([0, +1]), 
and zero otherwise. EARN is the dummy variable, with the value of one if a firm makes an 
earnings announcement on the day or the next day ([0, +1]), and zero otherwise. Panel (A) 
presents descriptive statistics for variables used in the regression. Panel (B) reports the results. 
All regressions are clustered at the firm and day levels. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
Panel (A): Descriptive statistics 
Variable n Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Median 0.75 Max 
ABS_ABRET 276,137 1.43 1.57 0.00 0.42 0.94 1.84 9.14 
RPA 276,137 0.54 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
PRE 276,137 0.79 0.41 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
ANALYS 276,137 0.13 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
EARN 276,137 0.02 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
 
Panel (B): Regression results 
  i ii iii iv 
ANALYST 0.13*** 0.15*** 0.11*** 0.15*** 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
EARN 1.42*** 1.44*** 1.43*** 1.45*** 
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.09) 
RPA × ANALYST 0.11*** 0.06*** 0.10*** 0.07*** 
  (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
RPA × EARN 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) 
PRE × ANALYST     0.02 -0.00 
      (0.03) (0.03) 
PRE × EARN     -0.02 -0.03 
      (0.12) (0.11) 
Observations 276,137 276,137 276,137 276,137 
Adjusted R-squared 0.172 0.208 0.172 0.208 
Firm FE Yes No    Yes No    
Firm × Quarter FE No Yes    No Yes    
Day FE Yes Yes    Yes Yes    
No. of days having ANALYST before RPA 9,422 
No. of days having ANALYST after RPA  11,412 
No. of days having EARN before RPA  1,248 
No. of days having EARN after RPA  1,364 
Number of unique firms before RPA 309 
Number of unique firms after RPA 337 
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Chapter 2  
Broker-hosted credit investor conferences: Evidence 
from the corporate bond market 
 
2.1 Introduction  
The extant literature has documented the effects of various forms of direct 
interactions between firm managers and investors in the stock market. For example, 
conference presentations, roadshows, and Analyst/Investor days are found to elicit 
significant stock market reactions and analyst forecasting activities, and firms that 
engage in such direct interactions experience an increase in analyst following and in 
equity institutional investor holding, as well as a decrease in the cost of equity and in 
the bid-ask spread of the stock. (Bushee et al. 2011; Green et al. 2014a; Green et al. 
2014b; Markov et al. 2017; Bushee et al. 2018; Kirk and Markov 2016). However, we 
have little knowledge with regards to the effects of such direct interactions on the 
credit investors, the other important financier in the capital market. These direct-
interaction events are alternative forms of voluntary disclosure (Bushee et al. 2011). 
Firm managers that co-locate with investors at the same place may disclose the firm-
specific information tailored to the investors.45 Thus the type of investors participating 
in the events may determine the type of information disclosed by firm managers. If an 
event attracts mainly credit investors, we then expect that the information would be 
more likely to be credit risk related due to credit investors’ non-linear payoff 
determined by the probability of default (Merton 1974). In this paper, we focus on a 
typical direct-interaction event, broker-hosted conferences, and investigate the impact 
of broker-hosted conferences on the corporate bond market, in particular, when 
conferences are organized for credit investors mainly. 
Broker-hosted conferences are a type of research service provided by brokerage 
houses to the institutional investors (Brown et al. 2016). These conferences are 
invitation-only events where presentations, discussions, and face-to-face private 
meetings with firm managers would occur (Green et al. 2014a). Most of the 
                                                          
45 Under the Regulation Fair Disclosure, material private information is prohibited to be selectively 
disclosed. However, firm managers can still disclose non-material information in these events. Koch et 
al. (2013) provides a review of Regulation Fair Disclosure. 
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conferences are organized with an industry theme, such as the Healthcare Conference, 
or the Basic Materials Conference, where firms from the same industry are invited to 
present during the conference (Bushee et al. 2011). However, we have identified a 
subset of broker-hosted conferences that are credit investment oriented, rather than 
industry specific, such as the J.P. Morgan High Yield Leveraged Finance Conference, 
or the Bank of America Merrill Lynch Credit Conference. We label this type of 
conference as the credit conference and the remaining are the non-credit conferences. 
In either type of conferences, the hosting brokers determine the invitation of the 
audience and the presenting companies. If a conference is credit investment oriented, 
the host would be more likely to invite credit investors to attend. In this regard, we 
argue that the presenting firm managers would disclose more information related to 
firms’ credit risk within such environment where the most audience are credit 
investment driven.  
At the outset, we study the determinants of firms attending credit conferences. 
First, we find that firms with a higher likelihood of financial distress are more likely 
to attend credit conferences. Merton (1974) suggests that the sensitivity of debt price 
to the changes of the firm value increases with the firm’s financial distress. On the 
account of non-linear payoff of the debt, credit investors are more demanding to a 
firm’s information when the firm is in a state of financial distress. On the other hand, 
from the perspective of the brokerage house that organizes credit conferences, higher 
demand from investors may bring more trading transactions and commissions when 
the firm is in the financial distress. Second, we find that firms with a greater amount 
of public debt outstanding attend more credit conferences, as the demand for the credit 
information increases with the amount and the number of the public debt (Gurun et al. 
2016). Third, we find that firms with greater debt financing intention attend more 
credit conferences as the disclosure during the credit conference may help achieve a 
reduction in the cost of capital (Green et al. 2014a).  
Next, we turn to explore how the corporate bond market reacts to credit 
conferences, as well as to non-credit conferences. We focus on a large sample of 
publicly-traded, non-financial, and non-utility firms with the bond trading data 
available from 2005 to 2016. We find a significant abnormal return around both credit 
conferences and non-credit conferences, but the economic magnitude of the credit 
conferences is larger than that of the non-credit conferences. Specifically, we find that 
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the mean of abnormal return is 12.27 basis points (bps) to credit conferences and only 
2.01 bps to non-credit conferences. Given that firms with speculative-grade credit 
ratings and short time-to-maturity of bonds outstanding are more willing to attend 
credit conferences, we further find that the mean of the abnormal return to credit 
conferences is only significant when bonds have speculative grades or short time-to-
maturity.  
In line with the abnormal return test, we next use trading volume as the measure 
of the bond market reaction. We use the same sample as in the abnormal return test 
and conduct the trading volume test in the panel regression. After controlling for other 
events that affect the bond trading volume, we find an incremental 0.14% of bonds’ 
principal traded over the six-day window, starting from the credit conference day to 
the next five trading days. The economic magnitude of the trading volume to the credit 
conference is similar to the provision of analysts’ sell recommendations. Furthermore, 
we find that the trading volume on the credit conference window is larger for the firms 
with speculative grades than that with investment grades. In contrast, we do not find 
any significant change in the trading volume when non-credit conferences occur.  
Classical finance theory suggests that firms’ cost of capital is positively associated 
with information asymmetry (Leland and Pyle 1977; Stiglitz and Weiss 1981; 
Diamond 1985). As a type of voluntary disclosure, firms attending general broker-
hosted conferences experience a decrease in cost of equity (Green et al. 2014a). 
Analogously, we expect firms attending credit conferences may also experience a 
reduction in the cost of debt. We use monthly yield spread from the secondary bond 
market as a proxy of the cost of debt (Campbell and Taksler 2003; Chen et al. 2007; 
Huang and Huang 2012; Amiraslani et al. 2017). Then we test whether the yield spread 
decreases in the months after firms’ conference attendance. The result supports credit 
conferences but not non-credit conferences. Specifically, we use the change in the 
yield spread from the previous three months to the next three months as the dependent 
variable and find the yield spread decreases by 19.5 bps after the firm attends a credit 
conference. We do not find any reduction in cost of debt for firms’ non-credit 
conference attendance.  
Lastly, we examine whether the bond institutional investor ownership changes 
with firms’ conference participation. We find that the overall bond institutional 
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ownership increases by 0.42% when a firm attends a credit conference and such 
increase is mainly attributed to the mutual fund investors. We do not find any changes 
in insurance companies’ bond ownership. Moreover, we split the sample by bonds’ 
credit rating (investment grades versus speculative grades). We find that the 
significant increase in the mutual fund ownership is mainly from the speculative grade 
bonds, rather than the investment grade bonds. Similar to the previous section, we do 
not find any significant results on the non-credit conferences. 
We make following contributions to the literature. Firstly, we contribute to the 
voluntary disclosure literature. Numerous papers investigate the effects of voluntary 
disclosure on the cost of equity (Francis et al. 2008; Dhaliwal et al. 2011; Baginski 
and Rakow 2012), but there is no evidence whether credit investors or cost of debt are 
affected by voluntary disclosure, as the information disclosed voluntarily such as 
management forecasts is more likely to affect the wealth of equity investors, rather 
than credit investors. By studying broker-hosted credit conferences, where managers 
voluntarily disclose information tailored to credit investors, we find that voluntary 
disclosure, in this specific setting, affects cost of debt and bond institutional investor 
ownership. Secondly, our work complements the findings in Green et al. (2014a) and 
Bushee et al. (2011), who investigate the effects of conference presentations from the 
equity investor’s perspective. We show that the corporate bond market and credit 
investors also react to conferences, especially the credit conference. Thirdly, we also 
contribute to the analyst research service literature. Papers such as Maber et al. (2016), 
Brown et al. (2015 and 2016) document the importance of the corporate access service 
provided by sell-side analysts to the equity investors. Our paper suggests such service 
is also valuable to credit investors, in particular when the service is tailored to them. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature 
and propose hypothesis. In Section 3, we describe the data collection and discuss the 
general sample statistics. Section 4 investigates the determinants of firms attending 
credit conferences. Sections 5 and 6 present the results of the bond market reactions 
to the conferences by using abnormal return and trading volume as the separate 
measures.  In Section 7, we examine the change in the cost of debt of firms attending 
the conferences, whilst Section 8 reports the change in the bond institutional investor 
ownership around the conference quarters. Section 9 concludes the paper. 
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2.2 Data collection and general sample description 
In this section we present the data collection process. The key variable is whether 
and when a firm attends a broker-hosted conference and the type of the conference. 
Following Green et al., (2014), we obtain the data of broker-hosted conferences from 
the Bloomberg Corporate Events Database for a period from 2005 to 2016.46 Table 2.1 
reports the general data description. As reported in Panel (A), we initially obtained 
237,528 firm-conference observations. We manually deleted the conferences that are 
non-broker hosted or have no host names, or those whose Bloomberg tickers cannot 
be converted into 9-digit cusip, as well as non-conference events such as non-deal 
roadshows, analysts’ field trips, or Analyst/Investor days that are mistakenly classified 
by Bloomberg. This leaves us with 160,184 firm-conference observations remaining 
in the sample. Next, we identify credit conferences by finding the following key words 
in the conference name: “fixed income”, “credit”, “high-yield”, “yield”, “bond”, 
“debt”, and “loan”.47 We label the remaining conferences as the non-credit 
conferences. We successfully identified 4,380 firm-credit-conferences, and 155,804 
firm-non-credit-conferences. Within the 160,184 firm-conference observations, there 
are 7,144 unique companies, among which 2,227 companies have in total 17,935 
bonds outstanding during the sample period. Panel (B) presents the conference 
attendance within each year. With respect to credit conferences, there are on average 
365 firm-conferences, 230.8 unique firms, and 12.5 unique conferences per year, 
which indicates one firm attends on average 1.58 credit conferences per year and each 
conference has 29.2 firms attending. In addition, the average numbers of unique 
brokers are 8.5, suggesting one credit-conference hosting broker organize 1.47 credit 
conferences within a year. Turning to non-credit conferences, the statistics is much 
larger than credit conferences. There are on average 12,983.7 firm-conferences, 
3,119.1 firm-years, 598.3 unique conferences, and 117 unique brokers within each 
year, indicating one firm attending 4.2 non-credit conferences per year and each 
conference has 21.7 firms attending. Panel (C) reports the names of the conference-
hosting brokerage houses. Over the 12-year sample period, there are 150 credit 
                                                          
46 The 12-year sample period is chosen to match the availability of the data from other sources (e.g. 
TRACE). 
47 As the word “credit” is also part of the name of “Credit Suisse” and “Crédit Agricole”. We carefully 
read the title of the conferences hosted by these two brokerage houses and make sure that they are truly 
credit conferences. 
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conferences, among which 135 credit conferences are hosted by the major 15 brokers. 
Deutsche Bank and J.P. Morgan are the top hosting brokers. They host on average one 
credit conference each year and over 60 firms attending each credit conference. We 
also report the descriptive statistics of the credit-conference-brokers hosting non-
credit conferences. The top credit conference hosting brokers, Deutsche Bank and J.P. 
Morgan, do not dominate the market anymore. They host 239 and 248 non-credit 
conferences in total (around 20 conferences each year), and less than 30 firms attend 
each conference.  
2.3 Determinants of firms attending non-credit and credit conferences  
In this section we investigate the determinants of firms’ attendance of credit 
conferences and non-credit conferences. In the fourth section of Green et al., (2014), 
they investigate the determinants of broker-hosted conferences, regardless of non-
credit or credit conferences. As the majority of the conferences are non-credit, the 
results from Green et al., (2014) would be similar to our results for the non-credit 
conference. Thus, we mainly focus on the credit conference determinants in this paper. 
We firstly hypothesize the major factor driving a firm to attend credit conferences 
is the firm’s probability of financial distress. Merton (1974) suggests that the value of 
the firm information to debt investors increases with the probability of financial 
distress. When a firm is in financial distress, the demand for the firm’s information 
would be great. We use financial leverage (total liabilities over total assets), Altman 
Z-score, and firms’ distance to default as the proxies of the likelihood of financial 
distress.  Financial leverage is an intuitive measure for the financial distress, and firms 
with high financial leverage have a high likelihood of financial distress. Altman Z-
score considers balance sheet liquidity when measuring financial distress (Altman 
1968; Altman 2000). The distance to default measures corporate default risk, which 
combines financial leverage and asset volatility (Duan and Wang 2012; RMI 2012; 
Florou and Kosi 2015). Then we expect that firms with higher financial leverage, 
lower Altman Z-score, and lower distance to default will have greater financial 
distress. Moreover, we include cash ratio (cash holding over total assets) as an 
important control variable for the regression. Intuitively, we would expect that higher 
cash holdings should be “safer” and related to lower financial distress. However, 
Acharya et al. (2012) argue that a conserve cash policy is more likely to be adopted 
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by a firm with a higher likelihood of financial distress, as the firm may use cash 
holding as a safety cushion for the credit investors. Hence we do not expect the sign 
of the estimated coefficient on cash holding. Second, we expect that firms with a great 
amount of public debt outstanding would attend more credit conferences. Similar to 
Johnston et al. (2009) where they find sell-side debt analysts write more reports for 
companies with more debt, we argue that the demand for the credit information 
increases with the amount of public debt. We directly measure the amount of public 
debt by calculating the total amount and the total number of public bond outstanding 
for a firm within a year. We also create a dummy variable for firms without any debt 
as the extreme case for the amount of public debt. Then we expect positive coefficients 
on the amount and the number of the public debt outstanding, as well as a negative 
coefficient on the “no bond” dummy. The third determinant for firms attending credit 
conferences we expect is the needs of debt refinancing. Copious literature has 
documented a positive association between the information asymmetry and the cost of 
capital.48 Firms with greater debt refinancing needs may be more likely to attend credit 
conferences, as such conferences are an alternative mechanism of voluntary 
disclosure, which may lead to a reduction in the information asymmetry between the 
firm and the (potential) credit investors. We use the average time-to-maturity of all 
bonds outstanding for a firm within a year as a proxy for the firm’s debt refinancing 
intention. We expect that firms whose bonds have lower time-to-maturity may have a 
higher intention to refinance their debt and then have a higher chance of attending 
credit conferences. Lastly, we expect that firms with a credit rating just below the 
lowest investment grade (which is the highest speculative grade) have a higher 
likelihood of attending credit conferences.49 Firms with a credit rating on the “C” level 
are very close to default. Thus, investors may not demand the information disclosed 
by firms with deeply speculative grades. We use the Standard & Poor credit rating, 
and assign a firm to the “just below” category if the firm’s average credit rating of all 
bonds outstanding is within a range of BB and BB+. We also include other firm 
fundamental variables in the model as control variables, which are intangible assets 
over total assets, market adjusted stock return volatility, market to book ratio, market 
value of equity in the natural logarithm form, analyst following, as well as the number 
                                                          
48 See Healy and Palepu (2001) for the literature review.  
49 For example, Standard & Poor’s defines bonds with credit ratings above BBB- (including BBB-) as 
the investment grade bonds, and the remaining as the speculative grade bonds.  
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and the percentage of equity institutional investor ownership. Lastly, we control for 
the mutual fund bond ownership and insurance company bond ownership separately, 
rather than the total bond institutional investor ownership as these two types of 
investors dominate in the bond market and have different trading incentives due to 
different regulatory constraints (Dass and Massa 2014). 
We use a multinomial logit model to investigate the determinants of firms 
attending credit conferences within a sample of non-financial and non-utility firms 
from 2005 to 2016. In particular, we define a nominal variable 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡 as the 
dependent variable in the following model: 
 
Pr(𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡 = j|𝐱𝒊𝒕) =
exp (𝒙𝒊𝒕
′ 𝜷𝒋)
∑ (𝒙𝒊𝒕
′ 𝜷𝒋)′
2
𝑗=0
 
(2.1) 
where j takes value of zero if firm i does not attend any conference in year t, value of 
one if firm i attends at least one non-credit conference but no credit conference in year 
t, value of two if firm i attends at least one credit conference but no non-credit 
conference in year t, and value of three if firm i attends both credit and non-credit 
conferences in year t. The independent variable vector 𝒙𝒊𝒕 includes financial leverage 
(LEV), Altman Z-score (ZSCORE), and distance to default (DISTA_DEFT) for 
measuring the probability of financial distress; the dummy variable for no bond 
outstanding (NOBOND), as well as the total offering amount and the total number of 
public bond outstanding (OABD, NUMBD) for measuring investors’ credit 
information demand; and the average time-to-maturity of all bonds outstanding (MAT) 
for the measure of firms’ debt refinancing intention. Other control variables include 
cash ratio (CASH), the dummy variable of just below investment grade cutoff 
(JUSTBELOW), the percentage and the number of equity institutional investors 
(INSTEQ and NUMEQ), as well as bonds’ insurance company ownership and mutual 
fund ownership (INSTBD_INS and INSTBD_MUT). We also include other firm-level 
control variables such as the market value of equity in the logarithm form (MVE), 
intangible assets scaled by total assets (INTA), the market-to-book ratio (MB), and 
analyst following (AF). All variables, with an exception of NOBOND, are one year 
lagged and winsorized at 1% and 99% levels. 
Panel (A) of Table 2.2 reports the sample creation for the multinomial regression 
analysis. Column (i) reports the numbers of firm-years from Bloomberg that attend 
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non-credit conferences only (CONF=1), credit conferences only (CONF=2), and both 
conferences (CONF=3) respectively.50 We merge the conference data with the entire 
COMPUSTAT within the sample period from 2005 to 2016. Then in column (ii) we 
find 30,277 (44.3%) firm-years attending non-credit conferences only, 205 (0.3%) 
firm-years attending credit conferences only, 2020 (3.0%) firm-years attending both 
credit and non-credit conferences, and the remaining 35,823 (52.4%) firm-years do 
not attend any conferences. After excluding financial and utility industries, as well as 
missing data, we have 25,908 firm-year observations remained (column iv). The 
proportion of non-credit conferences only increases to 67.6%, as opposed to the no 
conference percentage declining to 27.2%. The credit-conference-related firm-year 
percentages (CONF=2 and CONF=3) increase slightly. Panel (B) of Table 2.2 presents 
the data description within each category of conference attendance. The variable 
statistics, except analyst following, between the credit-conference only group 
(CONF=2) and the both conference group (CONF=3) are very similar, compared to 
the non-credit conference group (CONF=1) or the no conference group (CONF=0).  
Specifically, the two credit conference related groups (CONF=2 and CONF=3) have 
higher financial leverage, lower Altman Z-score, lower distance-to-default, more 
bonds outstanding, and higher mutual fund investor ownership than the other two 
groups (CONF=1 and CONF=0). 
The results of estimating the multinomial model are reported in Panel (C) of Table 
2.2. Columns (i), (ii), and (iii) present the results when we choose firms that do not 
attend any conference within a year as the benchmark group (CONF=0), whilst the 
results in columns (iv) and (v) are based on the benchmark group of firms attending 
non-credit conferences only (CONF=1). Results are largely consistent with our 
expectations. Regarding the determinant of the probability of financial distress, in the 
estimation where no-conference firms are the benchmark, columns (ii) and (iii) show 
that the estimated coefficients for Altman Z-score and the distance to default are 
negatively significant, indicating firms with lower Altman Z-score and distance to 
default are more likely to participate in credit conferences. The positive coefficient on 
financial leverage suggests that more financially leveraged firms have a higher 
likelihood of attending credit conferences. With respect to the participation of non-
                                                          
50 The total number of the non-credit conference firm-year is equal to 37,429 (35,140 plus 2,289); and 
the total number of the credit conference firm-year is equal to 2769 (480 plus 2,289). These two 
figures are the same to the total firm-year number in Panel (B), Table 2.1. 
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credit conferences, financial distress seems inclusive as a determinant. In column (i), 
the estimated coefficients for the different financial distress measures are 
contradictory. The negative coefficient on the financial leverage implies that firms 
with a lower probability of financial distress attend more non-credit conferences, 
whereas the negative coefficients on Altman Z-score and the distance to default ratio 
suggest the opposite. This finding confirms our expectation that financial distress is 
the determinant of a firm attending credit conferences, but not non-credit conferences. 
Next, the deeply negatively significant coefficients on the NOBOND in columns (ii) 
and (iii) indicate that the demand for credit information are less when the firm has no 
debt. The amount and the number of public debt outstanding are insignificant, which 
are inconsistent with our expectation. But they turn to significant with the predicted 
signs in column (v) when we use the non-credit conference only as the benchmark. 
Furthermore, we find that the average time-to-maturity is negatively associated with 
the likelihood of attending credit conferences, indicating that firms with higher debt 
refinancing intention are more likely to attend credit conferences. Lastly, the 
coefficient on JUSTBELOW is highly positive and significant in column (iii), which 
suggests that firms whose credit rating is just below the cutoff of the 
investment/speculative grades have higher likelihood to attend credit conferences than 
firms with either deeply speculative grades or investment grades. However the 
coefficient for the credit conference-only model in column (ii) is insignificant. This 
may be due to the insufficient number of firms only attending credit conferences (less 
than 0.5% shown in Panel (B)). Turning to models where we use non-credit 
conferences only as the benchmark in columns (iv) and (v), the result is very similar 
to the estimation in columns (ii) and (iii). In addition, we restrict the sample to firms 
having at least one bond outstanding within a year and replicate model (1). Panel (E) 
presents the results and they are qualitatively unchanged.51 
In sum, the determinants of firms attending credit conferences are different to the 
non-credit conference attendance documented in Green et al. (2014). Firms in the 
greater financial distress, with more public debt outstanding and with short time-to-
maturity on average are more likely to attend credit conferences than their 
counterparts. 
                                                          
51 Within the restricted sample, we do not control for industry fixed effect as the sample size is not 
large enough for the inclusion. 
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2.4 Using abnormal return as the measure of the bond market reaction 
In this section, we investigate the bond market reaction to both credit and non-
credit conferences by using bonds’ abnormal return. To construct treatment group, we 
begin with 2,227 conference-attending companies with at least bond outstanding 
during the sample period from 2005 to 2016. We only focus on bonds whose issuers 
are non-financial and non-utility firms. Then we search Mergent FISD for bonds’ 
issuing information including the issuer’s identifier (6-digit cusip), offering date and 
amount, maturity, coupon rate, frequency of interest payment etc. Consistent with 
Bessembinder et al., (2009) and May (2010), we exclude putable, preferred, 
convertible and exchangeable issues, and foreign currency, Yankee and Canadian 
bonds, as well as bonds with varying or zero coupon rate. We also drop private 
placement and perpetual issues, and bonds whose principal is not $1000, or the “day 
count basis” is not “30/360”. We only keep bonds whose interest payment frequency 
within a year is 1, 2, 4, or 12.52 We further exclude bonds that are matured before 
January 1st 2005, and offered after December 31st 2016 as those issues are not within 
our sample period. To ensure that a bond’s accrued interest (for calculating the dirty 
price) and time-to-maturity can be calculated, we further require that several bonds’ 
attributes must be available, including coupon rate, interest payment frequency, as 
well as offering and maturity date. Finally, we drop bonds that do not exist on the 
conference dates.53 Panel (A) of Table 2.3 reports the filtering process and the number 
of treated bond candidates. We start from 17,935 bonds and 2,227 companies. After 
applying aforementioned restrictions, we have 7,556 bonds (1,037 companies) 
remained.  
Second, we use issuer identifiers (the first 6 digits of cusip) to merge the remaining 
7,556 bonds with the conference data collected from Bloomberg to construct a bond-
day panel as the treatment group. As shown in Panel (B) of Table 2.3, we obtained 
187,468 bond-conference-day observations. Furthermore, we delete bond-dates whose 
credit rating is not available or in default, as well as the time-to-maturity is over 30 
years. Then we have 166,762 bond-dates remained in the sample, among which there 
are 6,976 bonds issued by 993 companies (Panel B of Table 2.3). With respect to the 
                                                          
52 Issues that we delete either have no interest payment frequency, or have a frequency of 99, which is 
highly likely to be an error in Mergent FISD. 
53 These bonds are the issues matured before the conference or offered after the conference. But they 
do appear in the other time of the year. 
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control group, we use all the bonds (after applying the treated bonds’ filtering criteria) 
in Mergent FISD whose issuers do not attend any conferences on the conference dates 
as the candidates for the control group.54 
Third, we obtain bonds’ clean price from the enhanced TRACE. We use the 
algorithm from Dick-Nielsen (2009 and 2013) to clean the data. Specifically, we delete 
trade cancellations and corrections, and when multiple trades’ price, volume, yield, 
and transaction time are exactly the same, we discard all but keep one transaction.55 56 
As the bond price in TRACE (and enhanced TRACE) includes transaction cost and 
such cost varies with the size of the trade, which makes the price in TRACE less 
accurately reflect the underlying value of the bond (Edwards et al. 2007). We use the 
“trade-weighted price, all trades” approach suggested in Bessembinder et al., (2009) 
to aggregate the bond price to the daily level. This approach assigns higher weights to 
larger trades, which could reduce the noise of the transaction cost on small trades. 
Fourth, we use both clean price and dirty price to calculate bond return. The dirty 
price equals the clean price plus the interest accrued since the last interest payment 
date. In line with Bessembinder et al. (2009),  May (2010), and Ederington et al. 
(2015), we calculate bond return by using dirty price and clean price as follows: 
 
𝐵𝑅𝐸𝑇_𝐷𝑖𝑡 =
(𝑃𝑖,𝑡+1 + 𝐴𝐼𝑖,𝑡+1) − (𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐴𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1)
𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐴𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1
 
(2.2) 
 
𝐵𝑅𝐸𝑇_𝐶𝑖𝑡 =
𝑃𝑖,𝑡+1 − 𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1
 
(2.3) 
where 𝐵𝑅𝐸𝑇_𝐷𝑖𝑡 (𝐵𝑅𝐸𝑇_𝐶𝑖𝑡) is the bond return calculated by using dirty (clean) price 
for bond i on day t;57 𝑃𝑡+1 ( 𝑃𝑡−1) is the clean price one trading day after (before) the 
conference, where subscript t indicates the conference date;58 𝐴𝐼𝑡+1 and 𝐴𝐼𝑡−1 are the 
                                                          
54 Furthermore, to mitigate the information leaking prior to the conference and the delay of market 
reaction to the treated bonds, we also exclude ten-day observations of the treated bonds before (and 
after) the conference date when creating the control group. Therefore, 21-day bond observations that 
are centered on the conference date are deleted in the control group.  
55 These trades are highly likely the pass-through transactions. (Becker and Ivashina 2015). 
56 We also use the uncleaned enhanced TRACE data to aggregate the daily bond price, and the result is 
almost identical.  
57 In the bond level study, the firm subscript j is compressed. 
58 The reason that we use 𝑃𝑡+1 instead of 𝑃𝑡 as the post-conference bond price is similar to the 
explanation in Ederington et al. (2015). The bond price is the weighted average price throughout a day, 
rather than the bond closing price at the end of the day, and conference presentations may occur before, 
during, or after the trading on day t. Then the 𝑃𝑡 may not capture the information revealed from the 
conference. 
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interest accrued to day t+1 and t-1 respectively, from the last interest payment day. As 
the bond market is highly illiquid, we may not have bond transactions on day t+1 and 
day t-1. Thus we create three sets of returns. Firstly, we only keep those bonds that 
have transactions (and price) on day t+1 and t-1, and use them to calculate bond return. 
We use a suffix “_m1p1” to specify this set of return (BRET_D_m1p1 and 
BRET_C_m1p1). This approach has the least noise in the return but reduces the sample 
size severely. Secondly, when 𝑃𝑡−1 is not available, we use the last available daily 
price up to five trading days prior to the conference date as the substitute of 𝑃𝑡−1; and 
when 𝑃𝑡+1 is not available, we use the first available daily price within five trading 
days after the conference. We discard the bonds when 𝑃𝑡−1 or 𝑃𝑡+1 cannot be found 
within such ten-day period. We label this set of return as BRET_D_m5p5 and 
BRET_C_m5p5. The third method is analogous to the second, except we extend to ten 
trading days before and ten trading days after the conference to find substitutes for 
𝑃𝑡−1 and 𝑃𝑡+1. We name this set of return as BRET_D_m10p10 and BRET_C_m10p10. 
We do not further extend the pre- and post-conference days to mitigate the concern of 
including stale price. 
Fifth, we follow the matching portfolio method in Bessembinder et al., (2009) to 
calculate a bond’s abnormal return around a conference. We match each treated bond 
with the bonds from the control group with the similar credit rating, time-to-maturity, 
and industry on each conference date (Klein and Zur 2011). More specifically, we 
follow Baghai et al. (2014) to combine all the “+” and “–” in Standard & Poor’s credit 
rating with the middle rating, and create seven rating classes: AAA/AA, A, BBB, BB, 
B, CCC, and CC/C. Next, within each credit rating class, we split the sample into two 
maturity bands based on the time-to-maturity of each treated bond on the conference 
day (Bessembinder et al. 2009; Ederington et al. 2015; May 2010). In particular, for 
the classes CCC, the two bands are below four years, and four years and above. For 
the class AAA/AA, the two bands are below five years, and five years and above. For 
the remaining classes, the two bands are below six years, and six years and above. We 
do not partition the CC/C class as there are too few observations. This classification 
ensures that the number of treated bonds within each maturity band and each credit 
rating class are roughly equal. Finally, we match each treated bond with the bonds in 
the control group with the same credit rating class, time-to-maturity group, and 
industry. As one treated bond can have multiple matched bonds in the control group, 
86 
 
we calculate the value-weighted return of matched bonds in the control group by using 
the market value of each bond on the previous day of the conference, so that each 
treated bond return (TBRET) has one aggregated matched bond return (CBRET) from 
the control group. Then the abnormal return for each treated bond (ABRET) is the 
difference between TBRET and CBRET. Panel (C) of Table 2.3 presents the final 
abnormal return sample under each return group. Specifically, we 43,490, 84,107, and 
93,729 bond-day observations for the _m1p1, _m5p5, and _m10p10 groups 
respectively. The total number of treated bond-conference-day candidates is 166,762, 
which is the number before adding the bond price and the control group. This suggests 
that only 26%, 50%, and 56% remained in the _m1p1, _m5p5, and _m10p10 groups 
respectively with a valid abnormal return. 
We present the results on the bond level and the firm level respectively. On the 
bond level, one firm can have multiple bonds outstanding at the same time so that the 
standard error is biased. To mitigate such concern, we cluster the standard errors by 
firms when conducting mean tests. Panel (D) of Table 2.3 reports the means of the raw 
return for the treatment group and the control group respectively.59 For the credit 
conferences, the means of the raw returns in the treatment group are all positively 
significant. This compares to the insignificant raw returns in the control group. 
Turning to the raw return to the non-credit conferences, the results are puzzling. The 
raw returns to the non-credit conferences in both treatment and control groups are 
negatively significant. However, the economic magnitude of the raw return in the 
treatment group seems smaller than the control group. Panels (E) and (F) of Table 2.3 
present the mean and the median of the abnormal return. In Panel (E), the first and the 
second columns report the mean for credit conferences and non-credit conferences 
separately. For the credit conferences, the abnormal returns are all positively 
significant at least at 5% level, ranging from 6.65 bps to 12.27 bps across different 
measures of abnormal returns, whilst the mean of abnormal return for the non-credit 
conferences is also significant but the economic magnitude is much smaller than the 
credit conferences, ranging from 1.19 bps to 2.01 bps. The last column reports the test 
of the difference of the abnormal return between the two types of the conferences. All 
results are significant. Panel (F) presents the test of the median of the abnormal return. 
We use bootstrapped standard errors with 1000 replications. The result is similar to 
                                                          
59 We cluster the standard error of the raw return in the control group by dates. 
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the mean test of the abnormal return, albeit with three insignificant results for the credit 
conference and for the difference tests. In sum, consistent with our expectation, both 
panels (E) and (F) suggest that the bond market reacts to the broker-hosted 
conferences, regardless of the type of the conference. However, the market reaction to 
the credit conference is more pronounced than the non-credit conference. 
The value of firms’ information to debt investors increases with firms’ probability 
of financial distress (Merton 1974). We expect that the bond market reaction would 
be greater if the firm (issuer) has a higher likelihood of financial distress (default risk). 
To test this hypothesis, we partition the sample by bonds’ investment/speculative 
grade cutoff on the conference day as the credit rating is a good summary of firms’ 
financial distress. We use the Standard & Poor credit rating, and define a bond in the 
investment-grade group if the bond has a rating equal to or above BBB-. Bonds with 
a credit rating below BBB- are in the speculative grade group. We present the results 
in Panel (G) of Table 2.3. Among the credit conference (columns 1 and 2), the number 
of observations in the speculative-grade group is twenty times greater than that the 
investment-grade group. In contrast, the non-credit conference shows an opposite case 
where the number of the observations in the speculative-grade group is only a quarter 
than that in the investment-grade group. This is consistent with the results in Section 
3 that financially distressed firms attend more credit conferences than the financially 
healthy firms. The results show that the bond market only reacts to the conferences 
(both credit and non-credit) when the bond is in the speculative grades. The market 
reaction of the investment-grade bonds is insignificant across all the return measures. 
In particular, among the “_m1p1” measure where it contains least noise, the abnormal 
return measured by using dirty (clean) price is 13.06 (10.94) bps to the credit 
conference and 6.70 (5.84) bps to the non-credit conference. The difference in the 
speculative bond abnormal return between the credit and the non-credit conference 
seems to be large. Then we test such difference in the last column. However, we do 
not find evidence to support the speculative-grade bonds receiving a stronger market 
reaction to the credit conference than to the non-credit conference. This may be 
explained by the investors’ great demand for information when the bond is 
speculatively graded. Information from either type of the conferences is valuable for 
investors.  
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The time to maturity of a bond is another important risk factor, in addition to the 
default risk. We next assess the market reaction to the conferences of bonds with 
different time-to-maturity. We partition the sample into two classes based on the short 
or long time-to-maturity of a bond, and expect a greater market reaction to the bonds 
with short time-to-maturity. The results presented in Panel (H) of Table 2.3 support 
our expectation. In particular, we find that the abnormal return to the credit conference 
is only significant when the bonds have short time-to-maturity. In column (1), the 
abnormal return are all significant, ranging from 8.48 bps to 19.35 bps in the various 
return measures. In contrast, none of the return measures in the long time to maturity 
class is statistically significant at any conventional level. Regarding the non-credit 
conferences, we do not find a similar pattern. In the “_m1p1” group, both short and 
long time-to-maturity classes demonstrate significant results, and the abnormal return 
of the long time-to-maturity bonds is almost twice as large as the short time-to-
maturity bonds. For the “_m5p5” and “_m10p10” measures, the partition turns the 
abnormal return insignificant or weakly significant. The last two columns of the panel 
present the results of the difference test of the abnormal return between the credit 
conference and the non-credit conference. In the short time-to-maturity class, all the 
measures of the abnormal return are significant, indicating that credit conferences can 
elicit stronger market reaction than non-credit conferences when bonds have short 
time-to-maturity.  
Furthermore, we aggregate the overall abnormal return to the firm level. We use a 
weighted average approach suggested by Bessembinder et al. (2009). The weight is 
the market value of the bond on the day prior to the conference date. Panel (I) and 
Panel (J) of Table 2.3 report the results of testing the mean and the median of the firm-
level abnormal return respectively. The results are largely consistent with the bond 
level tests, although one measure of the abnormal return in the median test for the 
credit conference is insignificant. For example, in Panel (I), the dirty-price abnormal 
return is 14.49 bps to the credit conference and 2.03 bps to the non-credit conference 
in the “_m1p1” measure. In the last column, the difference test of the market reaction 
to the credit and the non-credit conferences is positively significant, suggesting that 
the market reaction is more pronounced to the credit conference than the non-credit 
conference. The median test in Panel (J) reports the similar results, but with a smaller 
economic magnitude in the “_m1p1” and the “_m5p5” measures. 
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Finally, we report the stock market reaction to the credit and the non-credit 
conferences. We use CRSP value-weighted index as the benchmark to calculate the 
stock abnormal return to both conferences. In order to make the bond market return 
and the stock market return comparable, we only include firms that are in the final 
sample of the bond market reaction tests when we conduct the stock return sample. 
Panel (K) of Table 2.3 present the results. The stock market reaction to the non-credit 
conference is 10.34 bps and positively significant, which is in line with the finding in 
Green et al. (2014a) and Bushee et al. (2011).  In contrast, we do not find that the stock 
market reacts to the credit conference as the result is insignificant at any conventional 
level.  
In sum, we use abnormal return as the measure of the market reaction to the 
conferences and find the evidence that the bond market reacts to both credit and non-
credit conferences. In addition, the bond market reaction to the credit conference is 
more pronounced than to the non-credit conference. Next we examine how the market 
reactions are associated with the two important risk factors of a bond – default risk 
and the maturity risk. We find that bonds with speculative grades or with short time-
to-maturity have significant abnormal return to credit conferences but bonds with 
investment grades or with long time-to-maturity do not have any significant abnormal 
returns. Furthermore, when aggregating the abnormal return to the firm level, we 
continue finding the significant results of the bond market reaction to both 
conferences. Lastly, we do not find that the stock market reacts to the credit 
conference.  
2.5 Using trading volume as the measure of the bond market reaction 
In this section we use daily trading volume of bonds as the measure to investigate 
the bond market reaction to credit and non-credit conferences (De Franco et al. 2009; 
De Franco et al. 2014). The abnormal return test in the previous section may bias 
towards the most liquid bonds as we require the occurrence of at least one transaction 
before and another one after the conference to calculate the abnormal return. Bonds 
that do not trade within 20 trading days centered on the conference are discarded. 
Using trading volume can mitigate the illiquidity concern as we can set the volume to 
zero when no transaction occurs within a day. We follow the method in De Franco et 
al. (2009) and use both raw daily volume and abnormal daily volume to measure the 
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market reaction. More specifically, we obtained bonds’ trading volume from the 
enhanced TRACE for the non-financial and non-utility firms that attend at least one 
credit conference or non-credit conference from 2005 to 2016. After cleaning the 
enhanced TRACE dataset as in Section 4, we aggregate the intraday trading volume 
to the daily level, and scale it by the bond’s offering amount (obtained from the 
Mergent FISD) to construct the raw daily volume of the bond. When there is no trade 
within a given day, we set the volume equal to zero. Next, we aggregate the bond-
level volume to the firm-level by taking the average of the raw daily volume of all 
bonds outstanding within a firm. We denote the firm-level raw volume as RawVol, and 
use it as the first dependent variable in the volume regression. Turning to the abnormal 
daily volume (AbnVol), we take the difference between the firm-level raw daily 
volume (RawVol) and the firm’s average daily volume in the previous six months.60 
Then we use either RawVol or AbnVol to conduct the volume regression analysis in 
the following model. 
 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑗𝑡 = 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑗𝑡 + 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑐𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑗𝑡 + 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑡
+ 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑗𝑡 + 𝐴𝑛𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑗𝑡 + 𝐴𝑛𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑡
+ 𝐴𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑗𝑡 + 𝐴𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑗𝑡 + 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑈𝑝𝑗𝑡
+ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑗𝑡 + 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗𝑡 + 𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑗𝑡
+ 𝑆𝑇𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑗𝑡 + 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡 (2.4) 
where 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑗𝑡 is either the raw trading volume (RawVol) or the abnormal volume 
(AbnVol) for firm j on day t. CredConf (NoncConf) is a dummy variable, and takes a 
value of one when firm j attends a credit conference (non-credit conference) on day t 
and the next five trading days (t+5). We control for a set of events that have a bearing 
on the trading volume documented in the prior literature (De Franco et al. 2009; De 
Franco et al. 2014; Easton et al. 2009). These events are earnings announcements 
(EarnAnn), negative earnings when the earnings is announced (NegEarn), provision 
of analysts’ earnings forecasts or recommendations (AnReport), analysts issuing “buy” 
recommendations (AnBuy), analysts issuing “sell” recommendations (AnSell), 
analysts issuing recommendations that conflicts with each other (AnConflicts), 
upgrades of credit rating (RatUp), and downgrades of credit rating (RatDown). They 
are all dummy variables, and take a value of one from t-1 to t+5, where t is the event 
                                                          
60 As we use the trading days rather than the calendar dates to conduct the volume regression, the 
previous six-month period is from -125 trading days to -3 trading days. 
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day. In addition, we also include firm-level control variables, including the average 
offering amounts of all bonds outstanding with a firm in the logarithm form 
(BondSize), the market value of equity in the logarithm form (MVE), and the stock 
daily volume scaled by the total share outstanding (STVolume). In addition, we include 
fixed effects in the different models to control for the time or firm invariant 
unobservable factors that influence the bond trading volume, including industry effect 
(or firm fixed effect), credit rating fixed effect, and day fixed effect.61 We cluster the 
standard errors by firms and days. All variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% levels. 
Table 2.4 presents the trading volume results. Panel (A) reports the sample creation 
process. We start from the 2,227 firms attending at least one conference (credit or non-
credit) and with at least one bond outstanding during the sample period. After applying 
similar filters as in the abnormal return test, we have 1,102 firm remained.62 Next, we 
expand the 1,102 firms into a firm-day panel, and delete the firm-days that are in 
default.63 Then we have 2,202,855 firm-day observations in the final sample. Panel 
(B) shows that the occurrence of conferences is highly infrequent. We only have 
0.11% and 1.37% firm-days that have credit and non-credit conferences. Panel (C) 
reports the statistical description of all variables used in the regression. As the bond 
market is highly illiquid, the raw daily volume is positively skewed and with a zero 
median, and the majority (over 75%) of the abnormal volume is negative.64 Most of 
the event-related control dummy variables, such as earnings announcement, changes 
in credit rating are less than 10%, suggesting that these events are not frequent. The 
mean of analysts’ providing a research report is 0.16, which indicates that one firm 
receive on average one analyst’s research report for a week.65 Panel (D) reports the 
main results from different specifications. The results are consistent with our 
expectations. Specifically, in column (i), the coefficients on both credit conferences 
and non-credit conferences are positively significant. However, the economic 
magnitude of the credit conferences is greater than that of the non-credit conferences. 
                                                          
61 The credit rating classification is the same as in Section 3. We combine all the “+” and “–” in Standard 
& Poor’s credit rating with the middle rating, and create seven rating classes: AAA/AA, A, BBB, BB, 
B, CCC, and CC/C. We drop the defaulted bonds (“D” as in the credit rating) 
62 As we do not need to calculate the accrued interest, we do not exclude bonds that have an abnormal 
“day count basis” or “interest payment frequency”. 
63 For simplicity, all the firm-days in the trading volume analysis refer to firms on the trading days. 
64 We use the daily raw volume minus the mean of the daily volume in the previous six months to 
calculate the abnormal volume. The mean volume is always non-negative. When there is no trade on 
the given day, the daily raw volume is zero. Then the abnormal volume is negative. 
65 1/0.16 report per day = 6.25 days per report 
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However, when we add control variables and include industry, rating and day fixed 
effects in column (ii), the non-credit conference coefficient becomes insignificant 
whilst the credit conference coefficient is still deeply significant. Turning to column 
(iii) when we control for the firm fixed effect, the coefficient for the credit conference 
still remains significant, although only at the 10 % level, and again the non-credit 
conference coefficient is insignificant. As in Section 4, we expect that the market 
reacts stronger to the credit conference than the non-credit conference. We test the 
difference of the coefficients between the credit conference and the non-credit 
conference, and the results are shown in the bottom of the table (Difference P-value). 
As shown in the table, the p-values are all smaller or equal to 0.05, indicating that the 
credit conference elicits a greater market reaction than the non-credit conference. In 
terms of the economic magnitude, the coefficient on the credit conference in column 
(iii) is 0.024, indicating an increase of 0.14% (6 days × 0.024%) of the bonds’ principal 
is traded on the day and the next five trading days when a firm attends a credit 
conference. When we use the abnormal volume as the dependent variable in columns 
(iv) to (vi), the results are similar to the raw trading volume. We still find a positively 
significant coefficient on the credit conference, but not on the non-credit conference 
after we include control variables and fixed effects. 
In line with the expectation in the abnormal return test in Section 4, we argue that 
the market reacts more strongly to credit conferences when the bond has a speculative 
grade of credit rating. In this regard, we add a dummy variable for bonds with 
speculative grades (Specu), and interact it with the conference indicator variables. We 
expect the interaction terms for the speculative-grade bonds with the credit conference 
to be positively significant. Then we conduct the regression analysis with the raw 
trading volume as the dependent variable, and present the results in Panel (E) of Table 
2.4.66 Column (i) is for the interaction with the credit conference only. The coefficient 
in Specu is 0.089 and significant at the 1% level, which suggests that the daily trading 
volume of bonds with speculative grades is higher than the bonds with investment 
grades by 0.089% on average on the days without any conferences. The interaction 
term with the credit conference has a coefficient of 0.14, meaning that speculative-
grade bonds receive an incremental trading volume of 0.14% when their issuer attends 
                                                          
66 We do not control for the credit rating fixed effect here as we include the speculative-grade dummy 
variable (Specu) to the regression. The results are qualitatively unchanged if we include credit rating 
fixed effect and drop Specu. 
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the credit conference. The overall daily trading volume effect of the credit conference 
on the speculative-grade bonds is 0.23%, or 1.37% for the six-day period starting from 
the day when the credit conference takes place. In other words, the market reaction of 
the speculative-grade bonds to the credit conference is nearly 10 times as large as to 
the overall bonds’ reaction that are documented in Panel (D) of Table 2.4 (0.14%), 
regardless of credit rating. Turning to the non-credit conferences, we again fail to find 
any evidence that the bond market reacts to the non-credit conference, regardless of 
the investment/speculative grades of the bond. 
From the trading volume analyses, we conclude that the bond market reacts to 
credit conferences that a firm attends, especially when the firm has a speculative grade 
of credit rating. These findings do not apply to non-credit conferences.  
2.6 The change in the yield spread on the secondary market 
In this section we investigate the change in the cost of debt after a firm attends a 
credit or non-credit conference. The finance theory suggests information asymmetry 
increases the cost of capital (Leland and Pyle 1977; Stiglitz and Weiss 1981; Diamond 
1985). Conference presentation is a special type of voluntary disclosure (Bushee et al. 
2011), which is an alternative mechanism to reduce the information asymmetry 
between the firm and the investors. Green et al. (2014) find a reduction in the cost of 
equity after a firm attends a broker-hosted conference. In a similar vein, we argue that 
the conference attendance may also reduce the cost of debt. We use firms’ public bond 
yield spread on the secondary market as a proxy of cost of debt (Anderson et al. 2003; 
Anderson et al. 2004; Mansi et al. 2004; Mansi et al. 2011). Specifically, we obtained 
bonds’ yield-to-maturity for each transaction from the enhanced TRACE from 2005 
to 2016, and clean and filter the data as in Section 3. In addition, we also exclude 
bonds with the time-to-maturity more than 30 years. We follow Becker and Ivashina 
(2015) and create the dataset on the monthly basis by exploiting the median yield of 
all transactions occurred on the last active trading day within a month. Then we 
compute the yield spread as the difference between a bond’s yield-to-maturity and the 
Treasure risk-free yield matched by maturity (Campbell and Taksler 2003; Chen et al. 
2007; Huang and Huang 2012; Amiraslani et al. 2017). If there is no Treasury yield 
with the same maturity, we linearly interpolate the risk-free yield for that maturity. 
Next, we calculate the firm level yield spread as the weighted average yield spread of 
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all bonds outstanding for the same firm with each bond’s offering amount as the 
weight (Derrien et al. 2016). Finally, we calculate the change of the firm-level yield 
spread as the difference of the yield spread from month t-3 to month t+3 
(Ch.YSpread).67 We conduct the regression on a monthly basis in the following model: 
 𝐶ℎ. 𝑌𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑡
= 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑀𝑗𝑡 + 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑐𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑀𝑗𝑡 + 𝐶ℎ. 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑀𝑗𝑡
+ 𝐶ℎ. 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑀𝑗𝑡 + 𝐶ℎ. 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑀𝑗𝑡
+ 𝐶ℎ. 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑀𝑗𝑡 + 𝐶ℎ. 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑀𝑗𝑡 + 𝐶ℎ. 𝑇𝐴𝑀𝑗𝑡
+ 𝐶ℎ. 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑀𝑗𝑡 + 𝐶ℎ. 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑀𝑗𝑡 + 𝐶ℎ. 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑀𝑗𝑡 + 𝐹𝐸
+ 𝜀𝑗𝑡 (2.5) 
where CredConfM (NoncConfM) is the dummy variable, and equals one if a firm 
attends at least one credit (non-credit) conference within a month. Ch.RatingM is the 
change in the average credit rating for a firm, where the average credit rating is the 
average of the numerical Standard & Poor’s credit rating for all bonds outstanding for 
a firm within a month.68 Ch.BondvalueM, Ch.NumBondsM, and Ch.MaturityM are the 
changes of a firm’s total bond value in the logarithm form, total number of bonds 
outstanding, and the average time-to-maturity. Ch.RetVolM is the change of the bond 
issuer’s market-adjust stock return volatility. All these changes are calculated from the 
month t-3 to the month t+3.69 We also control for the changes of firm fundamental 
variables, including total assets in the logarithm form (Ch.TAM), financial leverage 
(Ch.LevM), cash and short-term investment holding scaled by total assets (Ch.CashM), 
and return on total assets in the previous four quarters (Ch.ROAM). All the firm 
fundamental variables are the changes from the previous quarter to the next quarter 
                                                          
67 We use the ±3 month change in yield spread as the dependent variable rather than the ±1 month, 
although the latter contains less noise, because we want to control for the changes in firms’ fundamental 
variables, such as financial leverage. As we cannot obtain the monthly accounting fundamental 
variables from COMPUSTAT, we use quarterly data instead. Then ±3 month change in yield spread is 
more appropriate, albeit not perfect, to match with the changes in quarterly fundamental data. In the 
untabulated analyses where we use ±1 month change in yield spread as the dependent variable, the 
results are qualitatively unchanged for the regressions either including the changes in firm fundamentals 
or not. 
68 In line with Baghai et al. (2014), we firstly translate the alphanumeric ratings into a numerical scale 
by adding one for each rating notch starting from C with the numerical scale of 1, CC with 2, CCC- 
with 3, etc,, up to a score of 21 for a rating of AAA. We delete the default bonds. Then we calculate the 
average credit rating of all bonds outstanding for a firm by using the numerical scale, and round it to 
the integer number.  
69 The market adjusted stock return is defined as the difference between the individual stock return and 
the CRSP value-weighted return (Campbell and Taksler 2003). 
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(from Q-1 to Q+1). We also include industry, credit rating, and month-year fixed 
effects in different models to control for the unobservable factors. All variables are 
winsorized at 1% and 99% levels.  
Panel (A) of Table 2.5 provides the summary statistics. Only 1% and 11% firm-
months have at least one credit or non-credit conference as the means of CredConfM 
and NoncConfM are 0.01 and 0.11. As the regression is on the “change” basis, the 
dependent variable Ch.YSpread and all explanatory variables, except Ch.MaturityM, 
have a median of zero or close to zero. The median, 25th percentile, and 75th percentile 
of Ch.MaturityM are -6, which is exactly the ±3 month difference. The figure indicates 
no new bond issue in the most months. Our findings are reported in Panel (B). The 
first three regressions are conducted in the full sample, whilst the last three are the 
replicated regressions within the restricted sample where only firms that attend at least 
one conference over the sample period remain in the sample. We report the valid firm-
conference month number within each regression in the middle of the table 
(NumCredit for the credit conference and NumNonCredit for the non-credit 
conference). For example, the valid credit conference firm-month in column (iii) is 
1,420, which means 1,420 valid credit conference firm-month is used in the 
regression.70 The results from the restricted sample and the full sample are very 
similar, thus we focus on the full sample only. Across all models, the coefficients of 
firms attending credit conferences are always significant, but the non-credit 
conference coefficients are only significant in the most parsimonious model. In 
particular, in column (iii), where we include firm-level control variables, industry, 
month-year, and credit rating fixed effects, the estimated coefficient on the 
CredConfM is -0.195 and significant at 5% level, but insignificant on the NoncConfM. 
This suggests that a firm experiences on average 19.5 bps reduction in yield spread 
after attending credit conferences, but the non-credit conference has no bearing on 
firms’ yield spread. The effect of the credit conference is economically large, 
compared to 44 bps of the mean of the change in yield spread. With respect to control 
variables, the results are largely consistent with prior literature and intuitions. The 
                                                          
70 In this section, we do not conduct the investment/speculative grade partition as we do in the trading 
volume section due to the severe data attrition on the valid credit conference for the investment grade 
in the final regression. For example, in column (iii), the number of valid credit conference firm-month 
is 1,420, among which only 35 are for firms with investment grades. 
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coefficient on the Ch.RatingM in column (iii) is -0.626, suggesting that one notch 
improvement in credit rating is associated with 62.6 bps reduction in the yield spread 
on average. The positive coefficient on the change in excess stock return volatility 
(Ch.RetVolM) is consistent with the finding in Campbell and Taksler (2003) that 
idiosyncratic firm-level volatility can explain the cross-sectional variations in the 
corporate bond yield. In addition, an increase in the financial leverage is related to an 
increase in the yield spread as suggested by the positive coefficient on Ch.LevM. 
In this section we conduct the test regarding the change in the cost of debt for a 
firm attending a conference within a month. We find that firms experience a reduction 
in the cost of debt, as measured by the bond yield spread on the secondary market, 
after a credit conference. However, we do not find such reduction in the following 
months after the non-credit conference. 
2.7 Bond institutional investor ownership 
In this section we investigate the change in the bond institutional investor 
ownership after a firm attends credit conferences. We hypothesize that conferences, 
as an alternative information disclosure mechanism, are associated with the increase 
in the institutional ownership. Green et al. (2014) and Bushee et al. (2011) document 
an increase in equity institutional investors after a firm attends a broker-hosted 
conference. We focus on the institutional ownership of bonds with non-financial and 
non-utility issuers in this paper. We firstly test the overall change of bonds’ ownership, 
then we test how the mutual fund investor and the insurance company, the two major 
owners respond to the credit conference and the non-credit conference. We obtained 
the bond ownership data from the Lipper eMAXX. This dataset contains quarter-end 
issue level holding for the major institutional investors including mutual funds, 
insurance companies, and pension funds. We define the bond institutional investor 
ownership as the total amount of bond held by all institutional investors recorded in 
the Lipper eMAXX within each quarter, scaled by the offering amount of the bond. 
Then we conduct our analysis on the bond-quarter level.71 Next, we test the change in 
the bond ownership of the two major investors, mutual funds and insurance companies 
separately as these two are subject to different level of regulatory constraints, which 
                                                          
71 Lipper eMAXX provides not only corporate bond ownership, but also municipal bond ownership, as 
well as the public and the private issues. To ensure the homogeneity of the sample, we only use the 
bond ownership data whose issuer cusip (first 6 digits) can be found in Compustat. 
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may affect their trading behavior. We use the managing firm classification provided 
in eMAXX to classify the types of investors (Dass and Massa 2014; Manconi et al. 
2016).72 Specifically, we categorize the institutional investors into five major groups: 
mutual funds, insurance companies, pension funds, banks, and brokerage houses.73 
The mutual fund group and the insurance company group account for nearly 90% 
among all the institutional investor ownership. We define the dependent variable, the 
change in the institutional investor ownership (Ch.INST), as the difference of the bond 
institutional ownership from the quarter t-1 to the quarter t+1. The regression is as 
follows: 
 𝐶ℎ. 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑄𝑗𝑡 + 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑐𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑄𝑗𝑡 + 𝐶ℎ. 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑄𝑖𝑗𝑡
+ 𝐶ℎ. 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑄𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝐶ℎ. 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑄𝑖𝑗𝑡
+ 𝐶ℎ. 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑄𝑗𝑡 + 𝐶ℎ. 𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑄𝑗𝑡 + 𝐶ℎ. 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑄𝑗𝑡
+ 𝐶ℎ. 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑄𝑗𝑡 + 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 (2.6) 
where (Ch.Inst) is the change in the bond institutional investor for bond i with the 
issuer j at quarter t, which contains three types: the overall investor (Ch.InstALL), the 
mutual fund investor (Ch.InstMUT), and the insurance company investor 
(Ch.InstINS). CredConfQ (NoncConfQ) is the dummy variable with the value of one 
when the firm attends at least one credit conference (non-credit conference) within the 
quarter. Ch.RatingQ, Ch.NumTradeQ, and Ch.VolTradeQ are the bond related 
variables, which are the change in credit rating, the change in the number of trades in 
the logarithm form, and the change in the trading volume scaled by the offering 
amount. We also control for the change of firm-level variables, including the change 
in the excess return volatility (Ch.RetVolQ), the change in the market value of equity 
(Ch.MVEQ), the change in financial leverage (Ch.LevQ), and the change in cash and short-
term investment holding scaled by total assets (Ch.CashQ). All variables are the change 
                                                          
72 Lipper eMAXX provides the classification at both the fund level and the managing firm level. We 
follow Dass and Massa (2014) and use the managing firm level classification code. 
73 The corresponding Lipper eMAXX codes to these five groups are: MUT and INM for mutual funds; 
ILF, IMD, IND, IPC, and REI for insurance companies; CPE, GPE, and UPE for pension funds, BKG, 
BKM, BKP, BKT, CRU, SVG, TRT for banks; as well as BFM and BMS for the brokerage houses. 
The remaining codes are classified into the others. In Dass and Massa (2014), they only classify the 
investor with the firm code of MUT as the mutual fund investor. We add INM to the mutual fund group 
for two reasons. Firstly, the INM holding proportion is significantly large (If we classify the INM into 
the other group, the mutual fund group would reduce to less than 1%). Second, we check the 
corresponding fund-level codes and find that over 40% of mutual fund (fund level) codes belong to the 
INM group at the firm level.  
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variables from the quarter t-1 to quarter t+1. Additionally, we control for firm, year, credit 
rating, and time-to-maturity fixed effects (FE) in different specifications.  
Panel (A) of Table 2.6 reports the data statistics. As the variables in the regression 
are the changes between two quarters, most of the variables have a median of zero, or 
close to zero. The means of CredConfQ and NoncConfQ are 0.05 and 0.53 
respectively, indicating that 5% and 53% bond-quarters in the sample have credit 
conferences and non-credit conferences. Panel (B) presents the main results in the 
different specifications and with different dependent variables. Columns (i) to (iii) are 
the regressions with the dependent variable of overall bond institutional investor 
ownership, regardless of the type. After we control for the firm, year, credit rating, and 
time-to-maturity fixed effect in regression (ii), we find a positively significant 
coefficient on the credit conference quarter, suggesting an increase in the bond 
institutional investor ownership after the issuer attends a credit conference. In contrast, 
the coefficient on the non-credit conference is insignificant, which indicates that firms 
attending a non-credit conference have little impact on the bond institutional investors. 
Mutual funds and insurance companies are the major bond institutional investors and 
have different investment strategies due to the regulatory constraints. Regulation 
requires insurance companies to maintain a minimum level of capital on a risk-
adjusted basis so that such capital increases with the bond’s credit risk. Therefore, 
insurance companies mainly invest in investment-grade bonds, and may force to sell 
the bonds that are downgraded (Becker and Ivashina 2015; Ellul et al. 2011). In the 
section 3, we find that one of the major determinants of a firm attending credit 
conferences is the probability of financial distress. In addition, Section 4 shows that 
the majority of bonds in the credit conference are in the speculative grades. Thus we 
argue that the insurance company investors may not react to the credit conference 
where the speculative-grade bonds dominate. The increase in the overall bond 
institutional investor ownership we documented in the columns (ii) to (iii) may be 
attributed to the mutual fund investors mainly. We then test the ownership of mutual 
fund investors and insurance companies react to conferences separately. Columns (iv) 
to (vi) report the regression results with the mutual fund ownership as the dependent 
variable, whilst columns (vii) to (ix) are for the insurance company ownership. Within 
the mutual fund set, we continue to find the significant results for the credit conference 
but not for the non-credit conference. In contrast, in the insurance company ownership 
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group (columns vii to ix), the results do not hold anymore, as the CreditConfQ 
coefficient is not significant at any conventional level when we include control 
variables and various fixed effects. Therefore, we find evidence consistent with our 
expectation that the bond institutional investor ownership increases with the credit 
conference attendance, and this increase is mainly ascribed to the mutual fund 
investors. Next, we partition the sample by the bonds credit rating (speculative grades 
versus investment grades) and re-run the regression (2.6). Panel (C) of Table 2.6 
suggests that the majority of the sample is in the investment grades as the observations 
of the bond-quarters within the investment-grade subsample (iv to vi) are more than 
twice as in the speculative-grade subsample (i to iii). The coefficients of the credit 
conference on the changes in the overall ownership and in the mutual fund ownership 
are only significant in the speculative-grade subsample, not in the investment-grade 
subsample. This is consistent with the results from the market reaction tests that only 
speculative-grade bonds could elicit market reactions to the credit conference. 
2.8 Conclusion 
In this paper, we investigate the effects of the broker-hosted conferences on the 
corporate bond market. We identify a subset of conferences that are organized with 
the credit investors oriented. Then we study how the corporate bond market reacts to 
credit conferences, as well as to the non-credit conferences. We firstly investigate the 
determinants of firms attending credit conferences, and we find that firms with greater 
financial distress, more public bonds outstanding, and greater intention of debt 
refinancing have a higher likelihood of attending credit conferences. We do not find a 
similar pattern for non-credit conferences. Next, we use both abnormal return and 
trading volume to examine the bond market reaction to both conferences. We find that 
the market mainly reacts to credit conferences. Although we do find significant 
abnormal returns to non-credit conferences, the economic magnitude is very small, 
relative to credit conferences. In the cross-sectional test, we further find a greater 
market reaction to the credit conference when the bonds have speculative grades and 
short time-to-maturity. Furthermore, we find that firms attending credit conferences 
experience a reduction in the cost of debt as measured by the change in the yield spread 
on the secondary market. Lastly, we document a significant increase in the bond 
institutional ownership in the following quarter after firms participate in credit 
conferences, and such increase is mainly attributed to the mutual fund ownership and 
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when the bond has a speculative grade of the credit rating. But neither the reduction 
in cost of debt nor the increase in bond institutional investor ownership apply to non-
credit conferences.  
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2.9 Appendix: Definition of variables  
Bond return variables 
Variable Name   Description   Source 
RET_D_m1p1   Raw return of a bond around a conference, 
calculated by using the bond dirty price one day 
before the conference and one day after the 
conference. If there is no transaction on these two 
days, the observation is discarded. 
  Mergent 
FISD, 
enhanced 
TRACE 
RET_C_m1p1   Raw return of a bond around a conference, 
calculated by using the bond clean price one day 
before the conference and one day after the 
conference. If there is no transaction on these two 
days, the observation is discarded. 
  Mergent 
FISD, 
enhanced 
TRACE 
RET_D_m5p5   Raw return of a bond around a conference, 
calculated by using the bond dirty price one day 
before the conference and one day after the 
conference. If there is no transaction on these two 
days, the before-conference price is replaced with 
the last price within the five trading days before the 
conference; and the after-conference price is 
replaced with the first price within the five trading 
days after the conference. If still no applicable price, 
the observation is discarded. 
  Mergent 
FISD, 
enhanced 
TRACE 
RET_C_m5p5   Raw return of a bond around a conference, 
calculated by using the bond clean price one day 
before the conference and one day after the 
conference. If there is no transaction on these two 
days, the before-conference price is replaced with 
the last price within the five trading days before the 
conference; and the after-conference price is 
replaced with the first price within the five trading 
day after the conference. If still no applicable price, 
the observation is discarded. 
  Mergent 
FISD, 
enhanced 
TRACE 
RET_D_m10p10   Raw return of a bond around a conference, 
calculated by using the bond dirty price one day 
before the conference and one day after the 
conference. If there is no transaction on these two 
days, the before-conference price is replaced with 
the last price within the ten trading days before the 
conference; and the after-conference price is 
replaced with the first price within the five trading 
days after the conference. If still no applicable price, 
the observation is discarded. 
  Mergent 
FISD, 
enhanced 
TRACE 
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RET_C_m10p10   Raw return of a bond around a conference, 
calculated by using the bond clean price one day 
before the conference and one day after the 
conference. If there is no transaction on these two 
days, the before-conference price is replaced with 
the last price within the ten trading days before the 
conference; and the after-conference price is 
replaced with the first price within the five trading 
days after the conference. If still no applicable price, 
the observation is discarded. 
  Mergent 
FISD, 
enhanced 
TRACE 
ABRET_D_m1p1   Abnormal return of a bond, calculated by taking the 
difference of the RET_D_m1p1s between the 
treatment group (the issuer attending a conference on 
the day) and the control group (the aggregated return 
of the whole universe of the Mergent FISD whose 
issuers do not attend any conference on the day). 
  Mergent 
FISD, 
enhanced 
TRACE 
ABRET_C_m1p1   Abnormal return of a bond, calculated by taking the 
difference of the RET_C_m1p1s between the 
treatment group (the issuer attending a conference on 
the day) and the control group (the aggregated return 
of the whole universe of the Mergent FISD whose 
issuers do not attend any conference on the day). 
  Mergent 
FISD, 
enhanced 
TRACE 
ABRET_D_m5p5   Abnormal return of a bond, calculated by taking the 
difference of the RET_D_m5p5s between the 
treatment group (the issuer attending a conference on 
the day) and the control group (the aggregated return 
of the whole universe of the Mergent FISD whose 
issuers do not attend any conference on the day). 
  Mergent 
FISD, 
enhanced 
TRACE 
ABRET_C_m5p5   Abnormal return of a bond, calculated by taking the 
difference of the RET_D_m5p5s between the 
treatment group (the issuer attending a conference on 
the day) and the control group (the aggregated return 
of the whole universe of the Mergent FISD whose 
issuers do not attend any conference on the day). 
  Mergent 
FISD, 
enhanced 
TRACE 
ABRET_D_m10p10   Abnormal return of a bond, calculated by taking the 
difference of the RET_D_m10p10s between the 
treatment group (the issuer attending a conference on 
the day) and the control group (the aggregated return 
of the whole universe of the Mergent FISD whose 
issuers do not attend any conference on the day). 
  Mergent 
FISD, 
enhanced 
TRACE 
ABRET_C_m10p10   Abnormal return of a bond, calculated by taking the 
difference of the RET_C_m10p10s between the 
treatment group (the issuer attending a conference on 
the day) and the control group (the aggregated return 
of the whole universe of the Mergent FISD whose 
issuers do not attend any conference on the day). 
  Mergent 
FISD, 
enhanced 
TRACE 
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Variables used in the determinant regressions 
Variable Name   Description   Source 
AF  Analysts follow.  I/B/E/S 
CASH  Cash holding scaled by total assets.   
CONF  Categorical variable, with the value of zero if the 
firm does not attend any conference within a year, 
with the value of one if the firm only attends non-
credit conferences within a year; with the value of 
two if the firm only attends credit conference 
within a year; and with the value of three if the 
firm attends both credit conference and non-credit 
conference. 
 COMPUSTAT 
DISTA_DEFT  Numerical distance to default, provided by the 
Risk Management Institute at the National 
University of Singapore. 
 Risk 
Management 
Institute at NUS 
INSTBD_INS  The amount of bonds held by insurance 
companies divided by the offering amount, 
aggregated to the firm level. 
 Lipper eMAXX 
INSTBD_MUT  The amount of bonds held by mutual funds 
divided by the offering amount, aggregated to the 
firm level. 
 Lipper eMAXX 
INSTEQ  The percentage of equity institutional ownership.  Thomson Reuters 
INTA  Intangible assets scaled by total assets.  COMPUSTAT 
JUSTBELOW  Dummy variable with the value of one if the S&P 
credit rating is BBB or BBB-, and zero otherwise. 
 COMPUSTAT 
LEV  Financial leverage, defined as total liabilities 
scaled by total assets. 
 COMPUSTAT 
MAT  The average time to maturity of all bonds 
outstanding. 
 Mergent FISD 
MB  Market value of equity divided by book value of 
equity. 
 COMPUSTAT 
MVE  Market value of equity in the logarithm form.  COMPUSTAT 
NOBOND  Dummy variable, with the value of one if the firm 
has no bond outstanding within a year, and zero 
otherwise. 
 COMPUSTAT 
NUMBD  The number of bonds outstanding within a firm.  Mergent FISD 
NUMEQ  The number of equity institutional investors.  Thomson Reuters 
OABD  The total offering amount of bonds outstanding in 
the logarithm form. 
 Mergent FISD 
RETVOL  The standard deviation of a firm’s market 
adjusted stock return. Market adjusted stock 
return is the difference between the individual 
stock return and the CRSP Value-weighted return. 
 COMPUSTAT 
ZSCORE  Altman's Z-score.  COMPUSTAT 
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Variables used in the trading volume regressions 
Variable Name   Description   Source 
AbnVol   Abnormal trading volume, defined by the raw daily trading 
volume minus the mean of the trading volume of the bond 
in the previous half a year, then aggregated to the firm 
level.   
Enhanced 
TRACE 
AnBuy   Dummy variable, with the value of one if an analyst 
provides a “Buy” recommendation on the day for a firm, 
and zero otherwise.   
I/B/E/S 
AnConflicts   Dummy variable, with the value of one if different analysts 
provides conflict opinions on the same day for the same 
firm, and zero otherwise.   
I/B/E/S 
AnReport   Dummy variable, with the value of one if an analyst 
provides any forecasts or recommendations on the day for a 
firm, and zero otherwise.   
I/B/E/S 
AnSell   Dummy variable, with the value of one if an analyst 
provides a “Sell” recommendation on the day for a firm, 
and zero otherwise   
I/B/E/S 
BondSize   The average offering amount of all bonds outstanding in 
the logarithm form.   
Mergent FISD 
CredConf   Dummy variable, with the value of one if the firm (issuer) 
attends a credit conference on the day, and zero otherwise.   
Bloomberg 
EarnAnn   Dummy variable, with the value of one if the firm 
announces the earnings on the day, and zero otherwise.   
I/B/E/S 
MVE   Market value of equity in the logarithm form, defined as 
the total shares outstanding times the stock price.   
COMPUSTAT 
NegEarn   Dummy variable, with the value of one if the firm 
announces negative earnings on the day, and zero 
otherwise.   
I/B/E/S 
NoncConf   Dummy variable, with the value of one if the firm (issuer) 
attends a non-credit conference on the day, and zero 
otherwise.   
Bloomberg 
RatDown   Dummy variable, with the value of one if the credit rating 
of any bonds of a firm is downgraded, and zero otherwise.   
Mergent FISD 
RatUp   Dummy variable, with the value of one if the credit rating 
of any bonds a firm is upgraded, and zero otherwise.   
Mergent FISD 
RawVol   The raw daily trading volume, defined as the total trading 
volume of a bond scaled by its offering amount, then 
aggregated to the firm level.   
Enhanced 
TRACE 
Specu   Dummy variable, with the value of one if the firm’s 
average credit rating is in the speculative grades.   
Mergent FISD 
STVolume   The daily stock volume scaled by the total common stock 
outstanding.   
CRSP 
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Variables used in the cost of debt regressions 
Variable Name   Description   Source 
Ch.BondValueM   Changes in the total bond offering amount in the 
logarithm form from the previous three months to the 
next three months. 
  Mergent FISD 
Ch.CashM   Changes in the cash and short-term holding scaled by 
total assets from the previous three months to the next 
three months. 
  COMPUSTAT 
Ch.LevM   Changes in financial leverage from the previous three 
months to the next three months. Financial leverage is 
defined as total liabilities scaled by total assets. 
  COMPUSTAT 
Ch.MaturityM   Changes in the average time to maturity of all the 
bonds from the previous three months to the next three 
months. 
  Mergent FISD 
Ch.NumBondsM   Changes in the total number of bond outstanding in the 
logarithm form from the previous three months to the 
next three months. 
  Mergent FISD 
Ch.RatingM   Changes in the average credit rating of a firm from the 
previous three months to the next three months. 
  Mergent FISD 
Ch.RetVolM   Changes in the market adjusted return volatility of a 
firm from the previous three months to the next three 
months. Market adjusted return volatility is the 
difference between the individual stock return and the 
CRSP value-weighted return. 
  CRSP 
Ch.ROAM   Changes in the return on assets in preceding four 
quarters from the previous three months to the next 
three months. 
  COMPUSTAT 
Ch.TAM   Changes in the total assets in the logarithm form from 
the previous three months to the next three months. 
  COMPUSTAT 
Ch.YSpread   Changes in the average yield spread of all bonds for a 
firm from the previous three months to the next three 
months. 
  Enhanced 
TRACE 
CreditConfM   Dummy variable, with the value of one if the firm 
attends a credit conference within a month, and zero 
otherwise. 
  Bloomberg 
NoncConfM   Dummy variable, with the value of one if the firm 
attends a non-credit conference within a month, and 
zero otherwise. 
  Bloomberg 
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Variables used in the bond ownership regressions 
Variable Name   Description   Source 
Ch.CashQ   Change in the cash and short-term investment scaled 
by total assets from the previous quarter to the next 
quarter. 
  COMPUSTAT 
Ch.InstALL   Change in the total bond institutional investor 
ownership from the previous quarter to the next 
quarter. 
  Lipper 
eMAXX 
Ch.InstINS   Change in the insurance company ownership from the 
previous quarter to the next quarter. 
  Lipper 
eMAXX 
Ch.InstMUT   Change in the mutual fund ownership from the 
previous quarter to the next quarter. 
  Lipper 
eMAXX 
Ch.LevQ   Change in the financial leverage from the previous 
quarter to the next quarter. 
  COMPUSTAT 
Ch.MVEQ   Change in the market value of equity from the previous 
quarter to the next quarter. 
  COMPUSTAT 
Ch.NumTradeQ   Change in the total number of trades of a bond in the 
logarithm form from the previous quarter to the next 
quarter. 
  Enhanced 
TRACE 
Ch.RatingQ   Change in the credit rating of a bond from the previous 
quarter to the next quarter. 
  Mergent FISD 
Ch.RetVolQ   Change in the market adjusted stock return of the 
issuer from the previous quarter to the next quarter. 
Market adjusted return volatility is the difference 
between the individual stock return and the CRSP 
value-weighted return. 
  CRSP 
Ch.VolTradeQ   Change in the total trading volume of a bond, scaled by 
the offering amount from the previous quarter to the 
next quarter. 
  Enhanced 
TRACE 
CreditConfQ   Dummy variable, with the value of one if the firm 
attends a credit conference within a quarter, and zero 
otherwise. 
  Bloomberg 
NoncConfQ   Dummy variable, with the value of one if the firm 
attends a non-credit conference within a quarter, and 
zero otherwise. 
  Bloomberg 
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Table 2.1: Data collection 
This table reports the general description of the conference data. Panel (A) presents the data 
collection process. Panel (B) reports the conference attendance within a year. Panel (C) presents 
conferences hosted by the major brokerage houses.  
Panel (A): Conference data collecting process 
Sample period: 2005-2016     Observations 
Raw data scraped from Bloomberg (firm-conference 
observations)   237,528 
      less non-broker-hosted, or unidentifying brokers or firms 77,344   
Firm-conference      160,184 
Of which credit conference  4,380   
Of which non-credit conference  155,804   
        
Number of unique companies     7,144 
Companies that have bonds outstanding during the sample period   2,227 
Number of bonds outstanding during the sample period   17,935 
 
Panel (B): Conference attendance by year 
  Credit conferences   Non-credit conferences 
Year 
Firm-
conference 
Unique 
conferences 
Unique 
brokers 
Firm-
year   
Firm-
conference 
Unique 
conference 
Unique 
brokers 
Firm-
year 
2005 273 15 8 170   12,218 466 109 3,153 
2006 300 10 8 200   13,027 538 120 3,241 
2007 218 10 9 138   13,279 604 124 3,308 
2008 219 7 7 138   12,875 621 127 3,233 
2009 314 14 9 212   11,527 570 118 2,911 
2010 447 14 10 264   14,742 655 121 3,234 
2011 519 18 10 295   15,084 656 118 3,222 
2012 577 14 7 354   13,696 614 120 3,115 
2013 473 12 7 308   12,526 602 116 2,952 
2014 433 11 9 288   12,801 596 109 3,064 
2015 353 12 8 242   12,322 627 110 3,045 
2016 254 13 10 160   11,707 630 112 2,951 
Total 4,380 150 102 2,769   155,804 7179 1404 37,429 
Average 365.0 12.5 8.5 230.8   12,983.7 598.3 117.0 3,119.1 
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Panel (C): Conferences hosted by major brokerage houses 
  Credit conferences   Non-credit conferences 
Name of broker 
Firm-
conferences 
Unique 
conferences 
Ave.  No. 
of firm 
per conf.   
Firm-
conferences 
Unique 
conferences 
Ave.  No. 
of firm 
per conf. 
Deutsche Bank         1,015              15           67.7            5,676            239           23.7  
J. P. Morgan           896              14           64.0            7,279            248           29.4  
Bank of America Merrill Lynch           791              19           41.6            4,869            254           19.2  
Barclays           434              16           27.1            4,693            195           24.1  
Credit Suisse           262              13           20.2            6,436            398           16.2  
Lehman Brothers           190                7           27.1            2,399              62           38.7  
Bank of America           154                5           30.8            2,403              72           33.4  
Citigroup           139                8           17.4            5,928            239           24.8  
Bear Stearns           133                4           33.3            1,760              51           34.5  
UBS           123                3           41.0            5,940            368           16.1  
Goldman Sachs           116              22             5.3            5,433            304           17.9  
Morgan Stanley             52                3           17.3            4,604            247           18.6  
Merrill Lynch             21                2           10.5            1,919            121           15.9  
Royal Bank of Scotland             20                3             6.7                -                -     -  
Wachovia             12                1           12.0            1,145              34           33.7  
Others             22              15             1.5          95,320          4,347           21.9  
Total         4,380            150           29.2        155,804          7,179           21.7  
Total number of brokers:  24   246 
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Table 2.2: Determinants of firms attending credit and non-credit conferences 
This table reports the data description and the test results of the determinants of firms attending 
credit and non-credit conferences. We use a multinomial logit model with the dependent variable 
of CONF. CONF takes value of zero if a firm does not attend any conference within a year, value 
of one if a firm attends the non-credit conference only within a year, value of two if a firm attends 
the credit conference only within a year, and value of three if a firms attend both non-credit and 
credit conference within a year. Panel (A) reports the process of the sample creation, for both full 
sample and restricted sample where firms with no bond outstanding are excluded. Panels (B) and 
(C) present descriptive statistics and outline the results for the full sample respectively. Panels (D) 
and (E) present descriptive statistics and outline the results for the restricted sample respectively. 
Variables are cash ratio (CASH), Altman Z-score (ZSCORE), financial leverage (LEV), market 
adjusted stock return volatility (RETVOL), distance to default (DISTA_DEFT), the dummy 
variable of just below investment grade cutoff (𝐽𝑈𝑆𝑇𝐵𝐸𝐿𝑂𝑊), and the equity institutional 
investor holding percentage (INSTEQ) and the number (NUMEQ); and the number, value, and 
average time to maturity of firms’ bond outstanding (NUMBD, MVBD, MAT), and bonds’ 
insurance company ownership and mutual fund ownership (INSTBD_INS, INSTBD_MUT); and 
the market value of equity in the logarithm form (MVE), intangible assets scaled by total assets 
(INTA), market-to-book ratio (MB), and equity analyst following (AF), as well as a dummy 
variable for firms with no bond outstanding (NOBOND). All variables are one year lagged (except 
NOBOND). Standard errors are clustered by firm and reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Panel (A): Sample creation 
  i   ii   iii   iv   v 
CONF Firm-year %   Firm-year %   Firm-year %   Firm-year %   Firm-year % 
1     35,140  92.7%    30,277  44.3%   23,991 44.8%   17,526 67.6%   6,290 75.2% 
2         480  1.3%    205  0.3%   191 0.4%   106 0.4%   78 0.9% 
3       2,289  6.0%    2,020  3.0%   1,827 3.4%   1,224 4.7%   967 11.6% 
0  -  -    35,823  52.4%   27,487 51.4%   7,052 27.2%   1,032 12.3% 
Total  37,909      68,325      53,496     25,908     8,367   
                              
i Conference attending firm-year observations from Bloomberg. 
ii Total firm-year observations on Compustat from 2005 to 2016. 
iii Compustat from 2005 to 2016 after deleting financial and utility industries. 
iv Final sample where all one-year lagged variables are not missing. 
v Final sample excluding "no-bond" firms. 
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Panel (B): Data description for the final sample where all one-year lagged variables are not missing 
  CONF=1   CONF=2   CONF=3   CONF=0 
Variable Mean S.D. Median   Mean S.D. Median   Mean S.D. Median   Mean S.D. Median 
LEV 0.53 0.32 0.49   0.88 0.35 0.82   0.83 0.32 0.77   0.49 0.31 0.44 
ZSCORE 4.83 6.88 3.65   1.59 1.35 1.35   1.76 1.50 1.66   4.16 6.58 3.48 
DISTA_DEFT 5.26 2.67 4.83   3.10 1.62 3.00   3.58 1.97 3.38   4.40 2.72 3.85 
CASH 0.28 0.31 0.17   0.09 0.10 0.06   0.09 0.13 0.06   0.19 0.22 0.12 
NOBOND 0.64 0.48 1.00   0.26 0.44 0.00   0.21 0.41 0.00   0.85 0.35 1.00 
NUMBD 1.68 3.40 0.00   3.88 4.60 2.00   4.19 4.35 3.00   0.57 1.89 0.00 
OABD 4.72 6.57 0.00   9.90 6.32 13.10   10.66 5.99 13.51   1.90 4.66 0.00 
MAT 2.93 5.17 0.00   3.98 3.15 4.73   4.77 3.96 4.79   0.98 3.08 0.00 
JUSTBELOW 0.06 0.23 0.00   0.15 0.36 0.00   0.25 0.44 0.00   0.03 0.17 0.00 
INTA 0.23 0.25 0.15   0.26 0.27 0.19   0.29 0.30 0.21   0.14 0.20 0.06 
RETVOL 0.03 0.01 0.02   0.03 0.01 0.02   0.03 0.01 0.02   0.03 0.02 0.03 
MVE 6.83 1.85 6.72   6.68 1.46 6.71   7.25 1.30 7.29   5.08 1.93 4.87 
MB 3.38 4.99 2.43   2.04 7.55 1.47   2.35 6.32 1.90   2.32 3.94 1.64 
AF 10.91 9.33 8.00   6.68 6.15 5.00   11.93 8.87 10.00   3.60 6.31 1.00 
INSTEQ 0.63 0.29 0.72   0.60 0.31 0.70   0.68 0.28 0.76   0.38 0.31 0.33 
NUMEQ 4.46 1.58 4.76   4.16 1.62 4.62   4.60 1.50 4.96   3.24 1.64 3.40 
INSTBD_MUT 0.05 0.10 0.00   0.10 0.12 0.08   0.14 0.13 0.13   0.02 0.06 0.00 
INSTBD_INS 0.04 0.10 0.00   0.03 0.05 0.01   0.04 0.05 0.01   0.01 0.06 0.00 
Observations 17,526   106   1,224   7,052 
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Panel (C): Regression results  
 Benchmark: CONF=0   Benchmark: CONF=1 
Dep.Var= CONF=1 CONF=2 CONF=3   CONF=2 CONF=3 
  i ii iii   iv v 
LEV -0.313*** 1.238*** 1.056***   1.551*** 1.369*** 
  (0.103)    (0.324)    (0.195)      (0.319)    (0.179)    
ZSCORE -0.009*   -0.059*   -0.063***   -0.049    -0.054*** 
  (0.005)    (0.035)    (0.017)      (0.035)    (0.016)    
DISTA_DEFT -0.116*** -0.594*** -0.426***   -0.478*** -0.310*** 
  (0.017)    (0.095)    (0.038)      (0.094)    (0.035)    
CASH 1.283*** -2.746**  -2.115***   -4.029*** -3.398*** 
  (0.145)    (1.186)    (0.566)      (1.183)    (0.553)    
NOBOND -0.483*** -1.106**  -1.530***   -0.623    -1.048*** 
  (0.152)    (0.479)    (0.224)      (0.469)    (0.194)    
NUMBD -0.025    0.044    0.029      0.069    0.053*** 
  (0.023)    (0.060)    (0.029)      (0.059)    (0.020)    
OABD -0.038**  0.056    0.016      0.094**  0.054*** 
  (0.015)    (0.043)    (0.021)      (0.042)    (0.017)    
MAT 0.020    -0.085*** -0.054***   -0.105*** -0.074*** 
  (0.013)    (0.031)    (0.019)      (0.030)    (0.016)    
JUSTBELOW -0.165    0.309    0.743***   0.474    0.908*** 
  (0.148)    (0.355)    (0.194)      (0.334)    (0.136)    
INTA 1.270*** 1.260*** 1.648***   -0.010    0.378    
  (0.165)    (0.467)    (0.293)      (0.455)    (0.254)    
RETVOL -0.618    -1.598    -5.015      -0.979    -4.397    
  (2.100)    (9.710)    (4.548)      (9.685)    (4.318)    
MVE 0.409*** 0.827*** 0.642***   0.417*** 0.232*** 
  (0.037)    (0.141)    (0.069)      (0.141)    (0.059)    
MB 0.016*** 0.005    0.008      -0.010    -0.008    
  (0.006)    (0.022)    (0.009)      (0.022)    (0.008)    
AF 0.062*** -0.061**  0.032**    -0.124*** -0.031*** 
  (0.011)    (0.030)    (0.014)      (0.029)    (0.009)    
INSTEQ 1.681*** 1.411*   2.275***   -0.270    0.594*   
  (0.194)    (0.761)    (0.358)      (0.751)    (0.310)    
NUMEQ -0.526*** -0.015    -0.661***   0.511    -0.136    
  (0.087)    (0.457)    (0.204)      (0.455)    (0.192)    
INSTBD_MUT -0.072    1.528    1.816**    1.600    1.888*** 
  (0.589)    (1.751)    (0.766)      (1.670)    (0.563)    
INSTBD_INS 0.019    -6.664*** -8.343***   -6.683*** -8.362*** 
  (0.559)    (2.149)    (1.095)      (2.102)    (0.970)    
Constant -1.926*** -6.530*** -5.882***   -4.604*** -3.956*** 
  (0.650)    (1.588)    (0.952)      (1.575)    (0.805)    
Observations 25,908   25,908 
Pseudo R2 0.291   0.291 
Industry FE Yes   Yes 
Year FE Yes   Yes 
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Panel (D): Final sample excluding “no-bond” firms 
  CONF=1   CONF=2   CONF=3   CONF=0 
Variable Mean S.D. Median   Mean S.D. Median   Mean S.D. Median   Mean S.D. Median 
LEV 0.65 0.30 0.61   0.87 0.35 0.76   0.83 0.32 0.77   0.68 0.30 0.63 
ZSCORE 3.34 3.66 3.00   1.54 1.32 1.39   1.69 1.32 1.65   3.12 3.67 2.83 
DISTA_DEFT 5.70 2.90 5.23   3.20 1.60 3.07   3.58 1.95 3.39   4.94 2.93 4.41 
CASH 0.19 0.24 0.11   0.08 0.10 0.06   0.09 0.11 0.06   0.14 0.18 0.08 
NUMBD 4.67 4.28 3.00   5.27 4.63 4.00   5.29 4.26 4.00   3.83 3.46 2.00 
OABD 12.96 3.47 13.59   13.46 2.46 13.83   13.41 2.87 13.83   12.61 3.17 13.23 
MAT 8.19 5.60 7.00   5.41 2.38 5.17   6.04 3.49 5.71   6.70 5.16 5.00 
JUSTBELOW 0.12 0.32 0.00   0.19 0.40 0.00   0.27 0.45 0.00   0.12 0.33 0.00 
INTA 0.27 0.25 0.21   0.27 0.26 0.20   0.27 0.29 0.18   0.20 0.23 0.12 
RETVOL 0.02 0.01 0.02   0.03 0.01 0.02   0.03 0.01 0.02   0.02 0.02 0.02 
MVE 8.10 1.69 8.06   6.78 1.47 6.74   7.32 1.30 7.33   7.09 1.84 6.88 
MB 3.43 5.55 2.48   2.23 8.20 1.49   2.46 5.84 1.90   2.93 5.65 1.87 
AF 16.18 9.92 15.00   7.10 6.13 6.00   12.87 9.00 11.00   9.26 9.21 6.00 
INSTEQ 0.74 0.22 0.78   0.64 0.28 0.71   0.71 0.25 0.77   0.65 0.28 0.71 
NUMEQ 5.26 1.32 5.40   4.45 1.35 4.68   4.82 1.23 5.03   4.63 1.47 4.87 
INSTBD_MUT 0.14 0.12 0.14   0.14 0.12 0.11   0.17 0.12 0.17   0.12 0.11 0.10 
INSTBD_INS 0.12 0.14 0.05   0.04 0.06 0.03   0.04 0.05 0.03   0.10 0.13 0.03 
Observations 6,290   78   967   1,032 
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Panel (E): Regression results within the sample where “no-bond” firms are 
excluded 
  Benchmark: CONF=0   Benchmark: CONF=1 
Dep.Var= CONF=1 CONF=2 CONF=3   CONF=2 CONF=3 
  i ii iii   iv v 
LEV -0.600*** 0.716    0.947***   1.315*** 1.547*** 
  (0.214)    (0.467)    (0.266)      (0.440)    (0.200)    
ZSCORE -0.059*** -0.088    -0.127***   -0.029    -0.068*** 
  (0.018)    (0.065)    (0.031)      (0.063)    (0.026)    
DISTA_DEFT -0.015    -0.388*** -0.274***   -0.374*** -0.259*** 
  (0.035)    (0.115)    (0.050)      (0.113)    (0.038)    
CASH 1.552*** -3.282**  -3.258***   -4.835*** -4.810*** 
  (0.379)    (1.551)    (0.669)      (1.527)    (0.596)    
NUMBD -0.002    0.063    0.055*     0.066    0.057*** 
  (0.025)    (0.062)    (0.030)      (0.061)    (0.021)    
OABD -0.060*** 0.098    0.002      0.157    0.062*** 
  (0.018)    (0.097)    (0.026)      (0.097)    (0.021)    
MAT 0.033*** -0.078**  -0.042**    -0.111*** -0.076*** 
  (0.013)    (0.032)    (0.019)      (0.030)    (0.016)    
JUSTBELOW -0.019    0.644*   0.874***   0.663*   0.893*** 
  (0.172)    (0.382)    (0.216)      (0.358)    (0.140)    
INTA 1.557*** 1.327**  1.111**    -0.230    -0.446    
  (0.395)    (0.561)    (0.456)      (0.486)    (0.271)    
RETVOL 12.263*   12.872    7.573      0.610    -4.690    
  (6.981)    (14.313)    (8.049)      (12.788)    (5.155)    
MVE 0.275*** 0.445**  0.311***   0.170    0.035    
  (0.084)    (0.201)    (0.113)      (0.199)    (0.082)    
MB 0.003    0.005    0.005      0.002    0.002    
  (0.009)    (0.025)    (0.010)      (0.025)    (0.008)    
AF 0.071*** -0.073**  0.054***   -0.145*** -0.017*   
  (0.013)    (0.033)    (0.016)      (0.031)    (0.009)    
INSTEQ 1.568*** 0.713    1.842***   -0.856    0.273    
  (0.427)    (1.027)    (0.546)      (0.969)    (0.391)    
NUMEQ -0.265*** 0.147    -0.225**    0.412**  0.041    
  (0.082)    (0.198)    (0.108)      (0.190)    (0.083)    
INSTBD_MUT 0.182    2.128    2.832***   1.947    2.650*** 
  (0.602)    (1.914)    (0.804)      (1.837)    (0.568)    
INSTBD_INS 0.085    -6.406*** -7.596***   -6.491*** -7.680*** 
  (0.635)    (2.245)    (1.088)      (2.168)    (0.901)    
Constant -0.663    -7.381*** -3.082***   -6.718*** -2.419*** 
  (0.587)    (1.827)    (0.780)      (1.802)    (0.605)    
N 8,367   8,367 
Pseudo R2 0.202   0.202 
Year FE Yes   Yes 
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Table 2.3: The abnormal return test 
This table reports the market reaction to the credit and non-credit conferences by using abnormal 
return.  Panel (A) reports the bond filtering process for the treated bond candidates. Panel (B) 
presents the bond-conference date panel for the treatment group. Panel (C) reports the final bond-
conference date panel for the abnormal return with different measures. Panel (D) reports the raw 
returns for the treatment group and the control group separately. Panels (E) and (F) present the 
mean and median of the bond market reaction to the credit conference and the non-credit 
conference respectively. Panel (G) reports the mean of the abnormal return partitioned by the 
investment/speculative grades. Bonds with a credit rating lower than BBB- (Standard & Poor’s 
rating) are in the speculative-grade group; and BBB- and above are in the investment-grade group. 
Panel (H) reports the mean of the abnormal return partitioned by the time to maturity of the bond 
on the conference date. Panels (I) and (J) reports the mean and the median of the abnormal return 
on the firm level respectively. Panel (K) reports the mean of the abnormal return of the stock 
market to the credit and the non-credit conference. All returns are on the basis point form. The 
name of variables start with “RET” and “ABRET” are raw return and signed abnormal return 
respectively. The letter “D” or “C” in the middle of the variable name stands for “Dirty” or 
“Clean”, suggesting the return (or abnormal return) is calculated with “dirty” price or “clean” 
price. The suffix “_m1p1”, “_m5p5”, and “_m10p10” indicates the extended periods of finding 
pre- and post-conference price to calculate the return. The suffix “_m1p1” requires the pre-
conference (post-conference) price must be available on the day prior to (after) the day when the 
conference occurs, and discard other observations. The suffix “_m5p5” (“_m10p10”) extends the 
days of finding the pre-conference price substitute and the post-conference price substitute to five 
(ten) trading days before the conference and five (ten) trading days after the conference. To 
mitigate the correlation between different bonds issued by the same firm, standard errors are 
clustered by firms (except the median test) and reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
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Panel (A): Bond filtering process for the treatment group 
    Deleted No. of bonds No. of firms  
As in Panel (A) of Table 2.1: Number of bonds outstanding during the sample period   17,935 2,227 
  less banking, insurance, utility, and unidentifiable industry 6,363     
  less putable, preferred, convertible, exchangeable issues 2,616     
  less foreign currency, Yankee, Canadian bonds 250     
  less varying- and zero-coupon rate bonds 445     
  less private placement and perpetual issues 13     
  less principal amount not $1,000 36     
  less “day count basis” not “30/360” 3     
  less interest payment frequency not 1, 2, 4, or 12 33     
   8,176 1,102 
  
less bonds not existed on the conference dates (due to bonds mature before the 
conference date or offered after the conference date) 620     
Treated bond candidates   7,556 1,037 
 
Panel (B): Creation of the bond-conference date panel for the treatment group 
    Deleted 
No. of bond-
conference-dates  No. of bonds  
No. of 
firms  
Merge treated bond candidates with conference dates  187,468 7,556 1,037 
  less bond-dates that credit rating is not available 17,677       
  less bond-dates that credit rating is in default 545       
  less time-to-maturity over 30 years 2,484       
Treated bond-conference date candidates   166,762 6,976 993 
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Panel (C): Creation of the bond-conference date panel for the abnormal return 
 
_m1p1 Deleted No. of bond-conf.  No. of bonds  No. of firms  
Treated bond-conf. date candidates   166,762 6976 993 
  less the treated bond price on ±1 day around conf. not available 114,250       
Bond-conf. date observations in _m1p1 treatment group    52,512     
  less treated bond-date without matching control bonds 9,022       
Final _m1p1 abnormal return sample    43,490 4031 719 
  For credit conferences   1,773 678 232 
  For non-credit conferences   41,717 3938 686 
            
 _m5p5         
Treated bond-conf. date candidates   166,762 6976 993 
  less the treated bond price on ±5 day around conf. not available 72,158       
Bond-conf. date observations in _m5p5 treatment group    94,604     
  less treated bond-date without matching control group 10,497       
Final _m5p5 abnormal return sample    84,107 4757 824 
  For credit conferences   3462 1,003 323 
  For non-credit conferences   80,645 4660 793 
            
 _m10p10         
Treated bond-conf. date candidates   166,762 6976 993 
  less the treated bond price on ±10 day around conf. not available 62,860       
Bond-conf. date observations in _m10p10 treatment group    103,902     
  less treated bond-date without matching control group 10,173       
Final _m10p10 abnormal return sample    93,729 4875 851 
  For credit conferences   3829 1,075 347 
  For non-credit conferences   89,900 4768 817 
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Panel (D): Mean of the raw return  
  Credit conference Non-credit conference 
  Treatment Control Treatment  Control 
RET_D_m1p1 11.6*** 3.71 -1.47* -3.28*** 
  (2.87) (2.64) (0.75) (0.60)    
RET_C_m1p1 11.4*** 3.58 -1.40* -2.78*** 
  (3.04) (2.59) (0.72) (0.58)    
Observations 1,773 983 41,717 13,929 
          
RET_D_m5p5 6.26*** 0.91 -6.10*** -7.04*** 
  (2.11) (2.02) (0.69) (0.49)    
RET_C_m5p5 5.90*** 1.03 -5.96*** -6.82*** 
  (2.23) (1.98) (0.65) (0.48)    
Observations 3,462 1,798 80,645 23,053    
          
RET_D_m10p10 5.18** -0.023 -8.06*** -9.07*** 
  (2.11) (1.99) (0.73) (0.49)    
RET_C_m10p10 4.87** 0.22 -7.92*** -8.75*** 
  (2.14) (1.96) (0.69) (0.48)    
Observations 3,829 1,973 89,900 25,148    
 
Panel (E): Mean of the abnormal return  
  Credit conference Non-credit conference Difference 
ABRET_D_m1p1 12.27*** 2.01*** 10.26*** 
  (3.68) (0.73) (3.73)    
ABRET_C_m1p1 10.72*** 1.92*** 8.80**  
  (3.79) (0.66) (3.86)    
Observations 1,773 41,717 43,490    
        
ABRET_D_m5p5 8.13*** 1.19* 6.94**  
  (2.78) (0.66) (2.80)    
ABRET_C_m5p5 6.65** 1.19* 5.46* 
  (2.84) (0.64) (2.87) 
Observations 3,462 80,645 84,107    
        
ABRET_D_m10p10 8.36*** 1.55** 6.81**  
  (3.01) (0.74) (3.02)    
ABRET_C_m10p10 7.53** 1.50** 6.03**  
  (3.02) (0.73) (3.04)    
Observations 3,829 89,900 93,729    
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Panel (F): Median of the abnormal return  
  Credit conference Non-credit conference Difference 
ABRET_D_m1p1 4.38** 1.51*** 2.87 
  (2.06) (0.28) (2.22) 
ABRET_C_m1p1 2.61 0.74** 1.87    
  (1.95) (0.27) (2.00)    
Observations 1,773 41,717 43,490    
        
ABRET_D_m5p5 6.78*** 2.16*** 4.62*** 
  (1.43) (0.23) (1.41)    
ABRET_C_m5p5 4.80*** 1.24*** 3.56*** 
  (1.27) (0.25) (1.25)    
Observations 3,462 80,645 84,107    
        
ABRET_D_m10p10 7.72*** 2.67*** 5.05*** 
  (1.57) (0.26) (1.57)    
ABRET_C_m10p10 5.51*** 1.72*** 3.79*** 
  (1.38) (0.23) (1.39)    
Observations 3,829 89,900 93,729    
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Panel (G): Mean of the abnormal return partitioned by the investment/speculative grade cutoff 
  Credit conference Non-credit conference Difference 
  
Investment 
grade 
Speculative 
grade 
Investment 
grade 
Speculative 
grade 
Investment 
grade 
Speculative 
grade 
ABRET_D_m1p1 0.17 13.06*** 0.88 6.70*** -0.71 6.36    
  (12.29) (3.76) (0.77) (1.92) (12.06) (4.15)    
ABRET_C_m1p1 8.06 10.94*** 1.00 5.84*** 7.06 5.09    
  (11.32) (3.94) (0.70) (1.88) (11.16) (4.31)    
Observations 99 1,670 33,476 7968 33,575 9,638    
              
ABRET_D_m5p5 0.61 8.80*** 0.50 4.22*** 0.11 4.58    
  (8.51) (2.87) (0.70) (1.51) (8.40) (3.08)    
ABRET_C_m5p5 5.41 6.98** 0.67 3.60** 4.75 3.38    
  (5.93) (2.97) (0.67) (1.52) (5.93) (3.22)    
 Observations 163 3,283 63,278 16848 63,441 20,131    
              
ABRET_D_m10p10 4.85 8.52*** 0.58 5.31*** 4.27 3.21    
  (7.88) (3.12) (0.82) (1.49) (7.88) (3.22)    
ABRET_C_m10p10 9.71 7.41** 0.69 4.67*** 9.02 2.74    
  (5.83) (3.16) (0.81) (1.53) (5.93) (3.26)    
Observations 176 3,630 70,569 18729 70,745 22,359    
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Panel (H): Mean of the abnormal return partitioned by time to maturity 
  Credit conference Non-credit conference Difference 
Time to Maturity Short Long Short Long Short Long 
ABRET_D_m1p1 19.35*** 3.20 1.20* 2.89** 18.15*** 0.31    
  (4.55) (4.75) (0.65) (1.23) (4.59) (4.81)    
ABRET_C_m1p1 16.89*** 2.82 1.21* 2.70** 15.68*** 0.12    
  (4.91) (4.40) (0.62) (1.15) (4.95) (4.49)    
Observations 996 777 21,757 19,960 22,753 20,737   
              
ABRET_D_m5p5 10.20*** 5.50 0.73 1.67 9.48** 3.83 
  (3.72) (3.74) (0.63) (1.06) (3.75) (3.90) 
ABRET_C_m5p5 8.48** 4.32 0.77 1.63 7.71** 2.69 
  (3.61) (3.92) (0.62) (1.03) (3.65) (4.09) 
Observations 1,939 1,523 40,941 39,704 42,880 41,227 
              
ABRET_D_m10p10 10.68*** 5.38 1.12 1.99* 9.56** 3.40 
  (3.82) (3.88) (0.72) (1.17) (3.81) (4.07) 
ABRET_C_m10p10 9.66*** 4.81 1.11 1.90 8.56** 2.91 
  (3.68) (4.01) (0.72) (1.17) (3.66) (4.21) 
Observations 2,149 1,680 45,166 44,734 47,315 46,414  
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Panel (I): Mean of the abnormal return on the firm level  
  Credit conference Non-credit conference Difference 
ABRET_D_m1p1 14.49*** 2.03** 12.45**  
  (4.80) (0.92) (4.84)    
ABRET_C_m1p1 14.54*** 2.31*** 12.24*** 
  (4.70) (0.87) (4.74)    
Observations 820 11,836 12,656    
        
ABRET_D_m5p5 7.74** 1.49* 6.25* 
  (3.56) (0.83) (3.63) 
ABRET_C_m5p5 7.17** 1.63** 5.54    
  (3.61) (0.82) (3.69)    
Observations 1,433 19,281 20,714 
        
ABRET_D_m10p10 6.52* 1.51* 5.01 
  (3.67) (0.88) (3.75) 
ABRET_C_m10p10 6.51* 1.49* 5.02 
  (3.61) (0.87) (3.70) 
Observations 1,575 20,855 22,430 
 
Panel (J): Median of the abnormal return on the firm level  
  Credit conference Non-credit conference Difference 
ABRET_D_m1p1 6.26** 1.39*** 4.87*   
  (2.82) (0.50) (2.87)    
ABRET_C_m1p1 3.57 0.94* 2.63 
  (2.76) (0.53) (2.86) 
Observations 820 11,836 12,656    
        
ABRET_D_m5p5 6.25*** 1.69*** 4.56**  
  (2.15) (0.51) (2.32)    
ABRET_C_m5p5 4.70** 1.14** 3.56    
  (2.34) (0.53) (2.37)    
Observations 1,433 19,281 20,714    
        
ABRET_D_m10p10 7.66*** 2.12*** 5.54*** 
  (2.17) (0.53) (2.13)    
ABRET_C_m10p10 7.59*** 1.16** 6.43*** 
  (2.26) (0.54) (2.32)    
Observations 1,575 20,855 22,430    
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Panel (K): Mean of stock return to different types of conferences 
  Treatment 
CRSP value 
weighted index Abnormal return 
Credit 
Conference 
0.05 14.02 -1.73 
(9.54) (9.51) (8.34) 
Observations 1421 197 1421 
        
Non-credit 
Conference 
18.47*** 9.13** 10.34*** 
(2.42) (3.59) (1.95)    
Observations 20718 1656 20718    
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Table 2.4: The trading volume test 
This table reports the market reaction to the conferences by using trading volume as the measure 
of the market reaction. The dependent variable is either raw trading volume (RawVol) or abnormal 
trading volume (AbnVol). Raw trading volume (RawVol) is defined as the dollar value of 
aggregated trading volume on each trading day scaled by the bond offering amount, and then 
aggregated to the firm level. We set the value of RawVol to zero when there is no trade within a 
day. Abnormal trading volume (AbnVol) is the difference between the raw trading volume and the 
mean of the firm’s raw trading volume six months before the conference. CredConf (or NoncConf) 
is a dummy variable with the value of one if the firm attends a credit conference (or non-credit 
conference) on the day and the next five trading days, and zero otherwise. Specu is a dummy 
variable with the value of one if the firm’s average credit rating is below BBB- on the conference 
day, and zero otherwise. EarnAnn is the dummy variable for the earnings announcement. NegEarn 
is the dummy variable for firms announcing negative earnings. AnBuy is the dummy variable for 
financial analysts providing “buy” recommendations. AnSell is the dummy variable for financial 
analysts providing “sell” recommendations. AnConflicts is the dummy variable when different 
financial analysts providing conflict recommendations. AnReport is the dummy variable when 
financial analysts provide any recommendations or forecasts. RatUp is the dummy variable when 
a firm’s credit rating is upgraded. RatDown is the dummy variable when a firm’s credit rating is 
downgraded. These events are studied in De Franco et al. (2009) and Easton et al. (2009). 
BondSize is the average value of all bonds’ outstanding within a firm in the logarithm form. MVE 
is the market value of equity in the logarithm form. STVolume is the stock trading volume scaled 
by total share outstanding. Panel (A) reports the sample creation process. Panel (B) presents the 
number of conference dates within the final sample. Panel (C) presents descriptive statistics. 
Panels (D) and (E) report the regression results with different specifications. Standard errors are 
clustered by firms and dates, and reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
125 
 
Panel (A): Trading volume sample creation 
 
Panel (B): Description of conference dates in the final trading volume sample  
     No. of firm-days   Percent  No. of firms 
Credit conference day                       2,377  0.11% 472 
Non-credit conference day                     30,245  1.37% 992 
No conference                 2,170,233  98.52%   
Total                   2,202,855      
          
Credit conference day and next five trading days (CredConf)                     14,096  0.64% 472 
Non-credit conference day and next five trading days (NoncConf)                   165,075  7.49% 992 
No conference                2,023,684  91.87%   
Total                   2,202,855      
 
    Deleted No. of bonds  No. of firms  
As in Panel (A) of Table 2.1: Number of bonds outstanding during the sample 
period   17,935 2,227 
  less banking, insurance, utility, and unidentifiable industry 6,363     
  less putable, preferred, convertible, exchangeable issues 2,616     
  less foreign currency, Yankee, Canadian bonds 250     
  less varying- and zero-coupon rate bonds 445     
  less private placement and perpetual issues 13     
  less principal amount not $1,000 36     
Remaining sample   8,212 1,102 
          
    Deleted No. of firm-day  No. of firms 
Merge the remaining sample with conference dates and enhanced TRACE, and 
expand it into the firm-(trading) day panel for the entire sample period. When 
no trade on a (trading) day, set value to zero   2,209,984 1,102 
  less firm-day when the firm is in default 7,129     
Final sample for the trading volume analysis   2,202,855 1,101 
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 Panel (C): Statistical description 
Variable n Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Median 0.75 Max 
RawVol   2,202,855  0.30 0.77 0 0 0 0.21 5.07 
AbnVol   1,773,945  -0.09 0.87 -2.19 -0.40 -0.18 -0.01 4.90 
CredConf   2,202,855  0.01 0.08 0 0 0 0 1 
NoncConf   2,202,855  0.07 0.26 0 0 0 0 1 
Specu   2,202,855  0.48 0.5 0 0 0 1 1 
EarnAnn   2,202,855  0.07 0.26 0 0 0 0 1 
NegEarn   2,202,855  0.01 0.09 0 0 0 0 1 
AnBuy   2,202,855  0.08 0.27 0 0 0 0 1 
AnSell   2,202,855  0.02 0.13 0 0 0 0 1 
AnConflicts   2,202,855  0.01 0.08 0 0 0 0 1 
AnReport   2,202,855  0.16 0.36 0 0 0 0 1 
RatUp   2,202,855  0.00 0.06 0 0 0 0 1 
RatDown   2,202,855  0.00 0.06 0 0 0 0 1 
BondSize   2,202,855  12.68 0.65 8.52 12.24 12.65 13.12 14.32 
MVE   1,893,767  8.09 1.73 3.69 6.99 8.09 9.26 12.10 
STVolume   1,686,134  0.01 0.01 0 0 0.01 0.01 0.06 
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Panel (D): Trading volume regression 
 Volume= Raw trading volume   Abnormal trading volume 
  i ii iii   iv v vi 
CredConf 0.168*** 0.077*** 0.024*   0.049*** 0.039** 0.043*** 
  (0.022) (0.019) (0.014)   (0.015) (0.016) (0.016)    
NoncConf 0.081*** 0.001 0.000   0.019*** 0.001 0.003    
  (0.007) (0.005) (0.003)   (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)    
EarnAnn   -0.001 0.002     0.038*** 0.025*** 
    (0.005) (0.004)     (0.004) (0.004)    
NegEarn   0.129*** 0.120***     0.096*** 0.106*** 
    (0.024) (0.017)     (0.017) (0.017)    
AnBuy   -0.019*** -0.020***     -0.011** -0.010*   
    (0.006) (0.005)     (0.005) (0.005)    
AnSell   0.031*** 0.028***     0.023** 0.025*** 
    (0.012) (0.010)     (0.009) (0.009)    
AnConflicts   0.064*** 0.059***     0.067*** 0.067*** 
    (0.017) (0.016)     (0.017) (0.016)    
AnReport   0.020*** 0.016***     0.005 0.009**  
    (0.004) (0.004)     (0.004) (0.004)    
RatUp   0.140*** 0.118***     0.171*** 0.167*** 
    (0.023) (0.022)     (0.024) (0.024)    
RatDown   0.397*** 0.342***     0.297*** 0.295*** 
    (0.032) (0.030)     (0.032) (0.032)    
BondSize   0.125*** 0.212***     -0.005 -0.009    
    (0.012) (0.023)     (0.007) (0.015)    
MVE   0.023*** -0.009     0.005* 0.027*** 
    (0.006) (0.009)     (0.003) (0.007)    
STVolume   7.947*** 8.045***     4.201*** 6.842*** 
    (0.548) (0.450)     (0.345) (0.389)    
Observations 2,202,855  1,601,386  1,601,386    1,773,945  1,424,592  1,424,590  
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.056 0.099   0.000 0.021 0.033    
Difference P-
value 0.000 0.000 0.090   0.050 0.019 0.013  
Firm FE No No Yes   No No Yes    
Industry FE No Yes No   No Yes No    
Rating FE No Yes Yes   No Yes Yes    
Day FE No Yes Yes   No Yes Yes    
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Panel (E): Raw trading volume regression with interaction variables 
  i ii iii 
CredConf -0.107***  -0.108*** 
  (0.038)  (0.038) 
CredConf × Specu 0.140***  0.141*** 
  (0.041)  (0.041) 
NoncConf  0.005 0.005 
   (0.004) (0.004) 
NoncConf × Specu  -0.010 -0.011 
   (0.007) (0.007) 
Specu 0.089*** 0.090*** 0.090*** 
  (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
EarnAnn 0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
NegEarn 0.123*** 0.123*** 0.123*** 
  (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
AnBuy -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
AnSell 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
AnConflicts 0.059*** 0.059*** 0.059*** 
  (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
AnReport 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
RatUp 0.119*** 0.119*** 0.119*** 
  (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
RatDown 0.349*** 0.349*** 0.349*** 
  (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
BondSize 0.220*** 0.220*** 0.220*** 
  (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
MVE -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
STVolume 8.054*** 8.053*** 8.054*** 
  (0.453) (0.453) (0.453) 
Observations 1,601,386 1,601,386 1,601,386 
Adjusted R2 0.098 0.098 0.098 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Day Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 2.5: The change in the yield spread on the secondary market 
This table presents the results for the regression of the change in the secondary market bond yield 
spread around the month when a firm attends a credit (or non-credit) conference. Ch.YSpread is 
the change in the yield spreads from the previous three month to the next three months (-3 month 
to +3 month). YSpread is the difference between the monthly yield-to-maturity of each bond and 
the maturity-matched Treasury yield, aggregated to the firm level with the weight of the offering 
amount. Monthly yield-to-maturity is the median yield of all transactions occurring on the last 
active trading day within a month. Maturity-matched Treasury yield are computed by linearly 
interpolating benchmark Treasury yields in Federal Reserve H-15. CreditConfM (NoncConfM) is 
the dummy variable, and takes a value of one if the firm attends at least one credit (non-credit) 
conference within a month. Ch.RatingM is the change in the average credit rating within a firm 
from the previous three months to the next three months. Ch.BondValueM is the change in the 
total bond value (in the logarithm form) within a firm from the previous three months to the next 
three months. Ch.NumBondsM is the change in the number of bonds outstanding within a firm 
from the previous three months to the next three months. Ch.MaturityM is the change in the 
average time to maturity of all bonds outstanding within a firm from the previous three months to 
the next three months. Ch.RetVolM  is the change in the issuer’s market-adjusted stock return 
volatility from the previous three months to the next three months. Ch.TAM is the change in total 
assets in the logarithm form from the previous quarter to the next quarter. Ch.LevM is the change 
in financial leverage from the previous quarter to the next quarter. Financial leverage is total 
liabilities scaled by total assets. Ch.CashM is the change in the cash and short-term investments 
holding scaled by total assets from the previous quarter to the next quarter. Ch.ROAM is the 
change in return on total assets for the preceding four quarters from the previous quarter to the 
next quarter. Panel (A) presents descriptive statistics. Panels (B) reports regression results with 
different specifications. Standard errors are clustered by firms, and reported in parentheses. *, **, 
and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.  
  
Panel (A): Data description 
Variable n Mean S.D. Min .25 Median .75 Max 
Ch.YSpread 147,479 0.44 4.35 -11.83 -0.6 -0.01 0.59 29.94 
CreditConfM 167,113 0.01 0.10 0 0 0 0 1 
NoncConfM 167,113 0.11 0.32 0 0 0 0 1 
Ch.RatingM 156,266 -0.04 0.50 -2.5 0 0 0 2 
Ch.BondValueM 162,995 0.02 0.17 -0.61 0 0 0 0.77 
Ch.NumBondsM 162,995 0.03 1.17 -3.99 -0.38 0 0.37 5.06 
Ch.MaturityM 162,995 -2.66 9.25 -12 -6 -6 -6 49.5 
Ch.RetVolM 78,753 0 0.01 -0.05 0 0 0 0.06 
Ch.TAM 67,432 0.02 0.10 -0.32 -0.02 0.01 0.05 0.44 
Ch.LevM 67,382 0 0.08 -0.27 -0.03 0 0.03 0.34 
Ch.CashM 67,382 0 0.04 -0.14 -0.01 0 0.01 0.15 
Ch.ROAM 66,969 0 0.05 -0.19 -0.03 0 0.03 0.17 
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Panel (B): Regression results  
  Full Sample  Restricted Sample 
  i ii iii  iv v vi 
CreditConfM -0.276** -0.313*** -0.195**  -0.184* -0.253*** -0.200** 
  (0.110) (0.096) (0.093)  (0.107) (0.095) (0.095) 
NoncConfM -0.333*** -0.017 0.003  -0.185*** 0.005 -0.001 
  (0.039) (0.031) (0.031)  (0.041) (0.032) (0.032) 
Ch.RatingM  -0.883*** -0.626***   -0.808*** -0.632*** 
   (0.086) (0.085)   (0.089) (0.091) 
Ch.BondValueM  -0.261 -0.126   -0.301* -0.076 
   (0.170) (0.172)   (0.171) (0.163) 
Ch.NumBondsM  0.028 0.041   0.035 0.040 
   (0.037) (0.036)   (0.039) (0.036) 
Ch.MaturityM  -0.001 0.001   0.000 0.001 
   (0.001) (0.001)   (0.001) (0.001) 
Ch.RetVolM  0.723*** 0.667***   0.687*** 0.684*** 
   (0.043) (0.041)   (0.045) (0.042) 
Ch.TAM   -3.594***    -3.575*** 
    (0.455)    (0.461) 
Ch.LevM   3.170***    3.095*** 
    (0.493)    (0.499) 
Ch.CashM   -0.033    -0.106 
    (0.477)    (0.483) 
Ch.ROAM   -1.212**    -1.175** 
    (0.530)    (0.539) 
Observations 147,479 76,408 63,823  69,753 64,928 60,513 
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.331 0.341  0.001 0.330 0.345 
NumCredit 1,802 1,594 1,420  1,802 1,594 1,420 
NumNonCredit 18,740 17,069 16,291  18,740 17,069 16,291 
Industry FE No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes 
Month-year FE No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes 
Rating FE No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes 
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Table 2.6: The change in bond institutional ownership   
This table presents the results for the regressions of the change in bond institutional investor 
ownership around the quarter when firms attend credit (or non-credit) conferences. The dependent 
variable is Ch.InstALL, Ch.InstMUT, or Ch.InstINS, which are the changes in the overall bond 
institutional investor ownership, the mutual fund ownership, and the insurance company 
ownership. CreditConfQ and NoncConfQ are the dummy variables with the value of one when a 
firm attends at least one credit conference or non-credit conference within a quarter, and zero 
otherwise. Ch.RatingQ is the change in the credit rating. Ch.NumTradeQ is the change in the 
number of trades in the logarithm form. Ch.VolTradeQ is the change in the total dollar value of 
aggregated trading volume within a quarter scaled by the bond issue size. Ch.RetVolQ is the 
change in the market adjusted stock return volatility. Ch.MVEQ is the change in market value of 
equity in the logarithm form. Ch.LevQ is the change in financial leverage. Ch.CashQ is the change 
in cash and short-term investment scaled by total assets. All changes are calculated by using value 
in the next quarter minus the value from the previous quarter. Panel (A) presents descriptive. 
Panels (B) and (C) outline the results with different partitions. All the regressions are clustered at 
the firm (issuer) level. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
Panel (A): Data description 
Variable n Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Median 0.75 Max 
Ch.InstALL 121,002 -1.80 9.68 -50.53 -2.74 -0.06 0.92 25.12 
Ch.InstMUT 104,010 -0.75 6.59 -32.15 -1.82 0.00 1.21 18.87 
Ch.InstINS  96,190  -0.74 4.25 -20.61 -1.36 0.00 0.49 11.65 
CreditConfQ 121,002 0.05 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
NoncConfQ 121,002 0.53 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Ch.RatingQ 111,285 -0.03 0.45 -2.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 
Ch.NumTradeQ 121,002 -0.07 0.82 -3.64 -0.34 0.00 0.22 2.48 
Ch.VolTradeQ 121,002 -4.45 24.75 -141.79 -6.33 0.00 2.13 56.28 
Ch.RetVolQ 95,422 0.00 0.01 -0.04 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.05 
Ch.MVEQ 96,578 0.02 0.27 -1.02 -0.09 0.04 0.16 0.73 
Ch.LevQ 96,350 0.00 0.08 -0.29 -0.03 -0.00 0.03 0.30 
Ch.CashQ 96,348 -0.00 0.04 -0.15 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.13 
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Panel (B): Main regression results 
Dep.Var All   Mutual fund   Insurance company  
  i ii iii   iv v vi   vii viii ix 
CreditConfQ -1.051*** 0.462** 0.419**   -1.181*** 0.368** 0.315*   -0.138* -0.085 -0.035 
  (0.180) (0.202) (0.209)   (0.144) (0.158) (0.163)   (0.084) (0.065) (0.065) 
NoncConfQ 0.596*** 0.018 -0.085   0.342*** 0.017 -0.018   0.318*** -0.020 -0.065 
  (0.093) (0.098) (0.093)   (0.076) (0.073) (0.073)   (0.049) (0.056) (0.055) 
Ch.RatingQ   0.628*** 0.721***     0.239*** 0.326***     0.365*** 0.375*** 
    (0.124) (0.132)     (0.091) (0.093)     (0.061) (0.065) 
Ch.NumTradeQ   1.832*** 1.965***     1.185*** 1.267***     0.371*** 0.396*** 
    (0.108) (0.120)     (0.076) (0.085)     (0.032) (0.036) 
Ch.VolTradeQ   -0.039*** -0.043***     -0.024*** -0.026***     -0.011*** -0.012*** 
    (0.002) (0.002)     (0.001) (0.001)     (0.001) (0.001) 
Ch.RetVolQ     20.384***       11.238***       -11.505*** 
      (5.414)       (4.015)       (2.523) 
Ch.MVEQ     -0.100       -0.075       -0.149 
      (0.219)       (0.167)       (0.107) 
Ch.LevQ     -0.559       -0.084       0.355 
      (0.687)       (0.492)       (0.328) 
Ch.CashQ     -3.163***       -3.176***       0.503 
      (1.175)       (0.848)       (0.665) 
Observations 121,002 111,260 89,780   104,010 96,701 78,213   96,190 91,818 74,477 
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.074 0.082   0.002 0.062 0.067   0.001 0.082 0.087 
NumCredit 6,116 5,456 5,079   6,116 5,456 5,079   6,116 5,456 5,079 
NumNonCredit 64,095 61,449 59,854   64,095 61,449 59,854   64,095 61,449 59,854 
Firm FE No Yes Yes   No Yes Yes   No Yes Yes 
Year FE No Yes Yes   No Yes Yes   No Yes Yes 
Rating FE No Yes Yes   No Yes Yes   No Yes Yes 
Maturity FE No Yes Yes   No Yes Yes   No Yes Yes 
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Panel (C): Regressions partitioned by speculative-grade bonds and by investment-grade bonds 
  Speculative grade only   Investment grade only 
Dep.Var All Mutual fund Insurance company   All Mutual fund Insurance company 
  i ii iii   iv v vi 
CreditConfQ 0.489** 0.361** -0.048   -0.577 -1.019 0.102 
  (0.213) (0.165) (0.063)   (0.721) (0.773) (0.379) 
NoncConfQ -0.162 -0.128 -0.100   -0.046 0.016 -0.045 
  (0.156) (0.134) (0.062)   (0.112) (0.082) (0.073) 
Ch.RatingQ 0.847*** 0.463*** 0.395***   0.452*** 0.086 0.304*** 
  (0.189) (0.150) (0.076)   (0.163) (0.092) (0.099) 
Ch.NumTradeQ 4.167*** 2.856*** 0.647***   1.008*** 0.551*** 0.300*** 
  (0.204) (0.143) (0.056)   (0.091) (0.058) (0.043) 
Ch.VolTradeQ -0.066*** -0.044*** -0.010***   -0.035*** -0.020*** -0.012*** 
  (0.004) (0.003) (0.001)   (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Ch.RetVolQ 5.049 -9.870 0.993   32.939*** 30.509*** -26.752*** 
  (8.366) (6.179) (2.499)   (5.696) (3.876) (3.935) 
Ch.MVEQ 0.223 0.002 0.113   -0.479* -0.022 -0.401** 
  (0.312) (0.245) (0.105)   (0.265) (0.189) (0.186) 
Ch.LevQ -1.981* -1.002 -0.210   1.016 0.787 1.066** 
  (1.066) (0.845) (0.342)   (0.849) (0.526) (0.492) 
Ch.CashQ -3.389* -4.536*** 0.717   -3.622** -2.974*** 0.659 
  (2.052) (1.592) (0.723)   (1.409) (0.929) (0.915) 
Observations 28,204 24,476 20,677   61,573 53,731 53,794 
Adjusted R2 0.078 0.078 0.086   0.108 0.063 0.102 
NumCredit 4,912 4,912 4,912   167 167 167 
NumNonCredit 16,416 16,416 16,416   43,438 43,438 43,438 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Credit Rating FE Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Maturity FE Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
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Chapter 3  
The interactive effect of firms’ R&D intensity and 
analysts’ educational background on analysts’ 
behavior: Evidence from the chemical 
manufacturing industry 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This paper studies how sell-side analysts’ educational background affects their 
coverage decision and forecasting behavior in an industry with a high level of 
technological complexity.74 Sell-side analysts play an important role in the capital 
market by gathering and disseminating information to the market. Prior literature 
documents a number of factors that affect analysts’ coverage decision and quality of 
their activities such as earnings forecasts and stock recommendations. These factors 
can be categorized into the firm related and the analyst related. For example, analysts’ 
earnings forecast accuracy is a function of information and predictability of the 
underlying firm, as well as skills and incentives of the analyst who gives the forecast 
(Pope 2003). On the firm side, firms’ information and predictability capture the quality 
of inputs for the forecasting model. The extant literature documents that firms’ market 
value of equity, the institutional investor ownership, information disclosure, future 
prospects, location, and business complexity are associated with analysts’ coverage 
decision and forecast accuracy (Bhushan 1989; O’Brien and Bhushan 1990; 
McNichols and O’Brien 1997; Lang and Lundholm 1996; Jennings et al. 2017; 
O’Brien and Tan 2015; Barth et al. 2001; Gu and Wang 2005; Amir et al. 2003). Gu 
and Wang (2005) and Amir et al. (2003) use R&D intensity to measure firms’ 
complexity, and find that analysts’ forecast accuracy is negatively associated with the 
R&D investment. Relatedly, Barth et al. (2001) analyze the benefit and cost for 
analysts covering firms with a high level of complexity, and document a positive 
association between analyst following and the level of firms’ R&D investment, 
indicating that the benefit of covering highly intense R&D firms outweighs the cost. 
                                                          
74 I use “analyst coverage” and “analyst following” interchangeably. Both terms mean the number of 
analysts following a firm. 
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 Skills and incentives are the analyst related factors affecting analysts’ coverage 
decision and forecast behavior. Controlling for the aforementioned firm 
characteristics, a wide array of papers document individual analysts’ characteristics 
affecting analysts’ behavior, including general and firm-specific experience (Clement 
1999), career concern (Hong and Kubik 2003; Hong et al. 2000), analysts’ 
geographical location (Malloy 2005; Bae et al. 2008), social connections with firms’ 
executives (Cohen et al. 2010), encounters with management in broker-hosted investor 
conferences (Green et al. 2014b), being affiliated underwriting analysts (Fang 2005; 
Cowen et al. 2006; Cliff and Denis 2004), political preference (Jiang et al. 2016), 
industry knowledge (Kadan et al. 2012; Bradley et al. 2017) and so forth. In Bradshaw 
(2011) and Brown et al. (2015), both papers use survey data and find that the most 
important trait of sell-side analysts valued by institutional investors is industry 
knowledge. In addition, Bradley et al. (2017) use analysts’ employment history as a 
proxy of industry knowledge to study the association between analysts’ industry 
knowledge and their forecasting behavior. They find that an analyst who covers firms 
in an industry in which she has previous work experience outperforms her counterparts 
without such relevant employment history on forecast accuracy, market reactions to 
forecast revisions, and career prospects. Industry knowledge is imperative to analysts. 
Having said that, the contribution of industry knowledge to analysts’ performance may 
vary across firms within the industry. The cross-sectional variations of firm-specific 
complexity may reinforce or undermine the importance of analysts’ industry 
knowledge.  
In this paper, I combine the firm related (firms’ technological complexity) and the 
analyst related (industry knowledge) factors and study the interactive effect of the two 
on analysts’ behavior. Specifically, I focus on the chemical manufacturing industry, 
and use the amount of firms’ R&D investment – relative to their industry peers – to 
measure its technological complexity. In addition, I use a new proxy for analysts’ 
industry knowledge: the educational degree that an analyst holds. The reasons that I 
choose the chemical manufacturing industry and analysts’ educational degrees are as 
follows: (1) firms in this industry have sufficient cross-sectional variations in the 
amount of R&D relative to their industry peers within a year, thus allowing for 
effective differentiation of technological complexity across firms; and (2) analysts’ 
educational degree is convincing for the analyst possessing industry knowledge 
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(technological knowledge in this context). For instance, an analyst with a BSc in 
Chemical Engineering is more likely to be skilled to analyze firms in the chemical 
manufacturing industry than one without such degree does.  
 Elaborating on this theme, I exploit a sample containing 1,118 firms in the 
chemical manufacturing industry (SIC 2800 – 2899) for the period from 2003 to 2016, 
and the educational qualifications of 1,218 sell-side analysts covering those firms 
during the sample period. Among these 1,218 analysts, 440 analysts have a 
technological degree related to chemistry (matching analysts), 703 analysts have non-
technological degrees (non-matching analysts), and 75 analysts have other 
technological degrees unrelated to chemistry (irrelevant analysts).  
As my starting point, I test the association between the type of analysts’ education 
degrees and the number of industries they follow. An analyst with a matching 
technological degree may have more technological knowledge of an industry that 
matches with her degree. On this account, the employing brokerage house is more 
likely to assign her the matched industry over other analysts who do not have 
technological degrees. Based on this argument, I predict and find that analysts having 
a matching degree cover less industries.  
My second hypothesis is motivated by Barth et al. (2001), who document the 
benefit and the cost for analysts following firms with a high level of intangible assets 
(including R&D, advertising expense, and intangible assets on the balance sheet) and 
find that analyst coverage is positively associated with the amount of firms’ R&D 
intensity. This indicates that the benefit of covering a complex firm outweighs the 
cost. But analysts are not homogenous. The net benefit may vary with analysts’ ability 
to analyze complex technological information. Against the background of the 
chemical manufacturing industry, I argue that analysts with matching technological 
degrees more likely generate a positive net benefit for the coverage of R&D-intensive 
firms. Consistent with my hypothesis, the empirical result presents a positive 
(negative) association between firms’ matching (non-matching) analyst following and 
R&D intensity.  
The third hypothesis builds on the contention that firms’ complexity and 
uncertainty have a negative impact on analysts’ forecast accuracy, with Gu and Wang 
(2005) finding that analysts’ forecast accuracy is negatively associated with the 
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amount of R&D investment and the level of firms’ balance-sheet intangible assets. 
The degree of R&D intensity in a firm reflects the level of technological complexity. 
However, the complexity related to balance-sheet intangible assets is less likely 
ascribable to the technology as the balance-sheet intangible assets are mainly goodwill 
and brand recognition. Analysts with a matching degree may possess better 
understanding of technological knowledge, and generate better forecasts than non-
matching analysts when the firm has a high degree of technological complexity. In 
contrast, the technological degree may fall short to analyze firms with the greater 
amount of balance-sheet intangible assets. Accordingly, I argue and find that matching 
analysts ameliorate the negative association between forecast accuracy and firms’ 
complexity only when the complexity is due to technology, rather than balance-sheet 
intangible assets. 
Fourth, I expect that the market rewards analysts with a matching educational 
degree. To test this hypothesis, I use five-day cumulative abnormal return to analysts’ 
recommendation revisions. Consistent with my expectation, the market reaction to 
matching analysts’ recommendation revisions is greater than that to non-matching 
analysts. However, the result holds only for upward revisions. Furthermore, I also find 
that the market reaction to matching analysts’ recommendation revisions increases 
with firms’ R&D intensity. 
Lastly, I test whether matching analysts issue bolder earnings forecasts than non-
matching analysts for firms with intensive R&D investment. I restrict the sample to 
pharmaceutical firms only (SIC from 2833 to 2836) which account for over eighty 
percent of all the firms in this industry.75 By using a logistic model, I find a negative 
association between firms’ R&D intensity and analysts’ boldness, and analysts’ 
matching degree mitigates such negative association. 
 My paper contributes the literature as follows. The first contribution speaks to the 
analyst literature in terms of the impact of analysts’ industry knowledge on their 
coverage decision and forecast behavior. Survey evidence shows that institutional 
investors value analysts’ industry knowledge as the most important trait (Brown et al. 
2015; Bradshaw 2011). However, there is a paucity of empirical evidence that 
specifically studies analysts’ industry knowledge. So far, only Bradley et al. (2017) 
                                                          
75 The figure can be calculated in Panel (B), Table 3.1. 
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find a way to define industry knowledge and provide empirical evidence to the impact 
of analysts’ industry knowledge on their performance. My paper provides insights into 
how the importance of analysts’ industry knowledge varies with the level of firms’ 
(technological) complexity. I find an interactive effect of analysts’ industry knowledge 
and firms’ complexity on their coverage decision and forecasting behavior. 
 My paper also contributes to the literature relating to education in the realm of the 
capital market. Some papers that study the impact of educational background touch on 
the level or the quality of the educational degree – such as Chevalier and Ellison (1999) 
finding that mutual managers who attended high-SAT undergraduate institutions have 
higher risk-adjusted excess return, and  Falato et al. (2015) finding that CEOs 
graduated from prestige institutions receive a premium in pay – with these papers 
using educational degrees as a proxy of unobservable ability. Additionally, several 
papers pertain to the type of educational degrees, including Tyler and Steensma (1998) 
and Barker and Mueller (2002) that find the type of an educational degree (science- or 
engineering-related degrees versus business degrees) that a CEO holds influences the 
funding of firms’ R&D. My paper builds on this research, investigating the education 
effect in the context of capital market on analysts’ behavior to shed lights on how the 
specific knowledge of an educational degree is transferred into analysts’ performance. 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. In the next section, I discuss 
the related literature and develop the hypotheses. In Section 3, I outline the research 
design and variables I need. Section 4 presents the various sources of data collection 
and the general sample description. Section 5 reports the primary results and findings. 
Section 6 concludes. 
3.2 Literature review and hypotheses  
I build on the literature that studies the impact of firms’ (technological) complexity 
spurred by R&D (firm-related factors) and analysts’ individual characteristics 
(analyst-related factors) on analysts’ coverage decision and forecast behavior.  
 Firm-related factors 
Firm-related factors that influence analysts’ behavior include the market value of 
equity, institutional investor ownership, stock return volatility, future prospects, 
information disclosure, firms’ location, intangible assets, and so forth (O’Brien and 
Bhushan 1990; McNichols and O’Brien 1997; Lang and Lundholm 1996; O’Brien and 
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Tan 2015; Jennings et al. 2017; Barth et al. 2001; Gu and Wang 2005; Amir et al. 
2003). Barth et al. (2001) study the association between analyst coverage and firms’ 
intangible assets (R&D, advertising expense, and intangible assets on the balance 
sheet). They argue that firms with more R&D investment are more likely to be 
mispriced, and mispriced firms may incentivize analyst following. Notwithstanding, 
analysts’ cost of covering firms with a high level of R&D investment may not be trivial 
for a number of reasons. Firstly, R&D-intensive firms have greater information 
asymmetry than firms with less R&D (Aboody and Lev 2000; Boone and Raman 2001; 
Barth and Kasznik 1999). The great information asymmetry may impede analysts’ 
information acquisition. Secondly, prior studies highlight the deficiency of financial 
reporting in R&D-intensive industries such as wireless communication or biotech. 
Amir and Lev (1996) focus on the wireless communication industry and find that 
financial information is largely value irrelevant. Xu et al. (2007) and Callen et al. 
(2010) find that non-financial information is value relevant for bio-tech firms after 
controlling for financial information. Thirdly, firms with greater R&D investments 
would have greater uncertainties. Kothari, Laguerre and Leone (2002) compare the 
uncertainties of future benefits generated by capital investment and by R&D 
investment, and find the latter is thrice as large as the former. In light of the greater 
information asymmetry, less relevant financial information, and greater uncertainty in 
R&D-intensive firms, covering such firms would be costlier. Barth et al. (2001) 
present a positive association between firms’ analyst following and R&D investment, 
indicating that the benefit of covering firms with substantial R&D investment 
outweighs the cost on average. In addition, Gu and Wang (2005) investigate the impact 
of firms’ intangible assets (including R&D, advertising expense, and intangible assets 
on the balance sheet) on analysts’ forecast accuracy. They find that firms with more 
intangible assets are associated with more complex information and uncertainty, 
which complicates analysts’ earnings forecast activities, leading to a decrease in their 
forecast accuracy.  
 Analyst-related factors 
The literature that explores the influence of analyst-related factors on analysts’ 
behavior is substantial. Papers find that analysts’ forecasting behavior is linked to their 
general and firm-specific experience, the size of the employing brokerage house, the 
numbers of firms and industries they follow, innate ability, personal conservatism, 
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location, social connection with the executives of the firms they cover, private 
incentives, industry knowledge, and so on (Clement 1999; De Franco and Zhou 2009; 
Jiang et al. 2016; Malloy 2005; Bae et al. 2008; Cohen et al. 2010; Lin and McNichols 
1998; Michaely and Womack 1999; Cowen et al. 2006; Jackson 2005; Jacob et al. 
2008; Francis and Philbrick 1993). The review paper of Bradshaw (2011) and the 
survey paper of Brown et al. (2015) show the importance of analysts’ industry 
knowledge. Specifically, in Bradshaw (2011), the author demonstrates a number of 
analysts’ traits valued by institutional investors. Among other traits presented in the 
survey with rankings varying across the time, industry knowledge has always been the 
top trait all the time. In line with Bradshaw (2011), Brown et al. (2015) conduct a 
comprehensive survey of 365 sell-side analysts, and find that analysts themselves 
believe that industry knowledge is the most important skill. Boni and Womack (2006) 
and Kadan et al. (2012) find that analysts have superior ability to select and rank 
individual stocks within the industry. However, there is still a paucity of empirical 
evidence that specifically studies analysts’ industry knowledge, mainly because of the 
difficulty of measuring industry knowledge. So far, only Bradley et al. (2017) find a 
way to define industry knowledge. In Bradley et al. (2017), the authors use pre-analyst 
employment history as the proxy of the analyst possessing industry knowledge, and 
find that an analyst with previous experience in the industry that matches her coverage 
portfolio tends to generate more accurate forecasts, evoke stronger market reactions 
to forecast revisions, and have a better career path than their peer analysts who do not 
have such experience.  
 Educational background 
In the domain of the education literature, some papers focus on the level or the 
quality of the degrees, such as comparing bachelor degrees to master degrees, or the 
reputation between the degree-awarding institutions. Frey and Detterman (2004) find 
that CEOs have greater managerial ability if they are graduated from schools requiring 
higher scores in the entrance exam.  Along similar lines, Chevalier and Ellison (1999) 
provide evidence that mutual fund managers who attended higher-SAT schools have 
higher risk-adjusted excess returns. Falato et al. (2015) find that CEOs who graduated 
from prestige institutions receive a premium in pay. Miller et al. (2015) find that the 
differences in CEOs’ skill sets can be attributed to the levels and quality of the 
awarding institutions. These studies use educational degrees as a proxy of the 
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underlying persons’ unobservable ability. A person having a higher level or quality 
degree is indicative of better ability, which could be translated into better performance. 
Relatedly, in the financial analyst literature, De Franco and Zhou (2009) use the 
Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) designation to be a proxy of analysts’ 
unobservable innate ability, and find that CFA analysts issue bolder and timelier 
forecasts than their peers without CFA.  
Another stream of the education literature in the capital market considers the type 
or the content of educational degrees. Hitt and Tyler (1991) document that the type of 
CEOs’ educational background (liberal arts or engineering) is  related to the 
information that they use in the evaluation of strategic decisions. Tyler and Steensma 
(1998) find that CEOs with a technical educational degree emphasize more on the 
opportunities provided by strategic alliance than those with a non-technical degree. In 
addition, Barker and Mueller (2002) find that a CEO that holds a technical degree 
spends significantly more on R&D than other CEOs without such a degree. Similarly, 
King et al. (2016) find that bank CEOs with an MBA degree exhibit better 
performance than their peers with bachelor degrees or PhD degrees, suggesting that 
business knowledge matters more in doing management work than technical expertise.  
My paper adds to literature by studying the interactive effect of analysts’ 
educational degrees and firms’ R&D on their coverage decision and forecast behavior. 
Specifically, I establish the research within the chemical manufacturing industry (SIC 
2800 – 2899). Firms in this industry have significant variations in R&D investment 
relative to their industry peers. Firms with more R&D investment may require analysts 
to have more knowledge specific to this technology. A matching educational degree 
may satisfy this requirement.76 I define a “matching degree” as one with a title 
including the following words: chemical, chemistry, biology, biochemistry, medical, 
medicine, pharmacy, or Doctor of Medicine (MD). Analysts with a matching degree 
are matching analysts. Concomitantly, analysts only with business degrees 
(accounting, finance, management or economics), other social science degrees, or 
                                                          
76 An anecdotal evidence supports this assumption: “…When you’re looking at life science companies, 
both large and small, the big questions are, will the drug or device they’re working on be successful in 
pivotal or phase three clinical trials? Is the FDA going to approve it? Is there enough clinical utility that 
the payers will reimburse? Those are the three big things that determine whether a bio-pharmaceutical 
investment will be successful, and that’s where the finance world really wants doctors…” Available at: 
http://www.leaddoc.org/Stories/2013/story1-0523.html#.Vyxg3vkrLIU [Accessed 16 August 2016] 
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liberal arts degrees are non-matching analysts. Analysts with irrelevant technological 
degrees, including non-chemical engineering degrees (such as electrical, civil, 
computer, geology and so on), are excluded from the sample as the effect of the 
irrelevant degrees on the chemical manufacturing industry analysis is unclear. 
Being a financial analyst calls for a certain level of financial knowledge. Thus, 
matching analysts would normally undertake an MBA program or obtain a CFA (or 
CPA) certification to make up the lack of financial knowledge. Therefore, I assume 
that all the analysts, regardless of the types of degrees they hold, would be skilled with 
financial knowledge.77 This may not be the case for non-matching analysts who only 
have a degree in business, literal arts, or social science. Unlike matching analysts 
doing an MBA or CFA for obtaining financial knowledge, non-matching analysts 
rarely do a second degree related to technology or natural science because they require 
a relevant technological background from the previous degree. Therefore, the financial 
knowledge of all analysts are levered. The technological knowledge is the additional 
expertise to analysts with a matching technological degree. 
 Hypotheses development 
  Analysts who have a matching technological degree are specialists in industries 
with great technological complexity. The technological knowledge from the degree 
would work best when it matches with the industry. Once analysts with technological 
degrees switch to another industry that has less technological complexity (such as the 
retail industry), or an unmatched industry, their technological degree may fall short. 
In contrast, business degrees are more likely to train analysts with knowledge related 
to management and financial analysis, which is transferrable knowledge across the 
industries when financial information is more relevant. Hence, analysts having a 
technological degree may cover less industries than their peers without a technological 
degree. 
Hypothesis 1: analysts with a matching technological degree cover less industries 
than those with a non-matching degree. 
                                                          
77 Section 4 will discuss the collection of analysts’ educational background for the sample. All analysts 
identified have reported the source of financial knowledge they obtained (from either bachelor or master 
degree in a business related subject, or MBA, or CFA, or CPA). I do not see any analyst without 
financial knowledge. 
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 Barth et al. (2001) find a positive association between analyst coverage and firms’ 
R&D intensity, suggesting an overall benefit of covering a firm with great 
technological complexity. I argue that the cost of coverage may not be equal across 
analysts with different backgrounds. A matching technological degree that an analyst 
holds may mitigate the coverage cost more than a non-matching degree in that the 
matching degree would facilitate analysts to better analyze and process complex 
technological information. In contrast, analysts without a matching degree would bear 
higher cost on covering R&D-intensive firms relative to matching analysts. On this 
account, firms’ R&D intensity may on one hand encourage analysts with a matching 
technological degree to cover them, and restrain, on the other hand, non-matching 
analysts from following them. Taken together, firms with great R&D intensity would 
be more likely to be followed by matching analysts than non-matching analysts, 
whereby my hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 2a: Firms’ analyst following by analysts with a matching (non-
matching) degree is positively (negatively) associated with firms’ R&D intensity. 
Matching analysts may benefit from covering firms with great R&D intensity 
because they understand the technological knowledge better than non-matching 
analysts. However, matching analysts may not have such an advantage to cover firms 
with great complexity that are not primarily driven by R&D. In line with Barth et al. 
(2001), I use intangible assets on the balance sheet as the proxy of non-technological 
complexity, and expect that matching analyst following has no association with the 
amount of balance-sheet intangible assets.78 Thus, my hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 2b: The matching analyst following is not associated with the amount 
of firms’ intangible assets on the balance sheet. 
 Amir et al. (2003) find that analysts’ forecast error is positively associated with 
firms’ R&D intensity, concluding that analysts fail to fully understand the impact of 
R&D on firms’ future profitability. Likewise, Gu and Wang (2005) find that firms’ 
information complexity of R&D increases the difficulty of information process, 
leading to an increase in analysts’ forecast error. Further to this, I argue that a matching 
technological degree would assist analysts in processing complicated R&D 
                                                          
78 I do not use advertising expense as over seventy percent of the advertising expense in my sample is 
missing. 
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information, resulting in a mitigation in the negative effect of firms’ R&D intensity 
on forecast accuracy. In contrast, the matching degree would have less impact on the 
forecast accuracy influenced by the non-technological complexity, which is proxied 
by balance-sheet intangible assets. I use analysts’ forecast error to be the proxy of 
forecast accuracy, whereby a larger forecast error suggests lower forecast accuracy. 
My hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 3a: analysts’ matching degrees mitigate the positive association 
between analysts’ forecast error and firms’ R&D intensity; 
Hypothesis 3b: analysts’ matching degrees do not mitigate the positive association 
between analysts’ forecast error and the amount of firms’ intangible assets on the 
balance sheet; 
 Next, I compare the market reaction to matching analysts’ recommendation 
revisions to those of non-matching analysts. Frankel et al. (2006) argue that the 
primary role of financial analysts is to provide private information to their clients. 
Analysts collect and process public information, as well as generate and disseminate 
private information to the market, contributing to the price discovery process (Kim 
and Verrecchia 1997; Kim and Verrecchia 1994; Barron et al. 2002). Palmon and 
Yezegel (2012) find a positive association between the market reaction to analysts’ 
recommendation revisions and the intensity of firms’ R&D. They interpret the result 
as that firms with greater R&D are likely to be less informative in the stock prices. In 
this regard, analysts’ activities would somewhat compensate for the weak information 
environment of R&D-intensive firms, and evoke a greater market reaction than R&D-
free firms. In light of the difficulty in interpreting the complicated technological 
information, an analyst’s ability to process such information may determine the quality 
of the private information she generates. I contend that analysts with a matching 
degree may be more competent in interpreting and processing complex technological 
information, and then generating more private information to the market compared to 
their peers without a matching degree. In alternative form, my fourth hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 4: The market reaction to the recommendations revised by analysts 
with a matching degree is greater than that by analysts without a matching degree. 
 Lastly, I compare analysts’ boldness on the forecasts revised by matching analysts 
and by non-matching analysts. The extant literature in the analyst boldness area 
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primarily pertains to analysts’ characteristics, such as analysts’ reputation (Scharfstein 
and Stein 1990); career concern (Hong et al. 2000; Hong and Kubik 2003); self-
assessment ability (Trueman 1994); decision fatigue (Hirshleifer et al. 2017); and 
historical accuracy, forecasting frequency, general experience, as well as the number 
of industries that analysts cover (Clement and Tse 2005). Less research studies the 
association between analysts’ boldness and firms’ attributes. In one of the handful of 
studies, Lin et al. (2011) find that analysts are more likely to follow consensus 
recommendations (less bold) for larger firms and firms with higher book-to-market 
ratios. Leece and White (2017) study how the opacity of firms’ information 
environment influences analysts’ herding behavior. They use firms’ transient 
institutional ownership as a measure of firms’ information environment opacity, and 
find analysts tend to herd (issue less bold forecasts) in firms with greater opaque 
information environment where private information is more valuable than public 
information. In line with their argument, I argue that firms’ R&D intensity may lead 
analysts to herd in that the technological complexity intensifies firms’ information 
asymmetry (Aboody and Lev 2000). Compared to corporate insiders, sell-side analysts 
as a whole are a less informed party with less private information. On this account, 
analysts, on average, following R&D intensive firms are less likely to issue bold 
forecasts.  
Hypothesis 5a: Analysts’ boldness is negatively associated with firms’ R&D 
intensity. 
However, some analysts’ personal traits may affect the negative association 
between analysts’ boldness and firms’ R&D intensity. Zwiebel (1995) develops a 
model to show an alternative herding incentive. An agent with average ability prefers 
conservativeness to innovations because innovations may lead to a greater downside 
risk of getting fired, while agents with high or low ability prefer innovations that 
involve more risk. Building on this, Hong, Kubik, and Solomon (2000) find that 
experienced analysts are more likely to issue bold forecasts than inexperienced 
analysts. In this paper, I argue that analysts with a matching degree would have high 
ability to collect and process information related to techological complexity, and 
subsequently issue forecasts that “stand out” from the consensus, relative to their peers 
without a matching degree. My hypothesis is as follows: 
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Hypothesis 5b: analysts’ matching degree mitigates the negative association 
between firms’ R&D intensity and boldness of analysts’ forecasts 
3.3 Research Design 
 Analysts’ industry following 
I use the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression to test Hypothesis 1. In an 
attempt to obtain more variations on the dependent variable, I use four-digit SIC to 
define industries. Then the number of four-digit SIC industries covered by each analyst 
is the dependent variable (NUMIND). The variable of interest is the indicator variable 
– 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝐶𝐻𝑗, with the value of one if the analyst j has a matching technological degree, 
and zero for analysts without any technological degree. I exclude analysts with a 
technological degree that is irrelevant to chemical technology. In the model (1), I 
include several control variables: (1) the number of firms (NUMCOM) covered by 
each analyst within a year as the likelihood of an analyst following more industries 
may increase with the number of firms she covers; (2) the total number of forecasts 
made by each analyst within a year in the natural logarithm form (lnNFORE_T); (3) 
analysts’ score of the forecast accuracy in the previous year in the natural logarithm 
form (lnPACY) in line with Hong and Kubik (2003); (4) analysts general experience 
(lnGEXP), defined as the natural logarithm form of the number of years since the 
analyst provided her first analyst forecast; and (5) the size of the brokerage house 
where the analyst works (lnBRO), measured as the number of analysts employed in 
the brokerage house in the natural logarithm form. I also include year fixed effect 
and/or brokerage house fixed effect in the various specifications. When the brokerage 
house fixed effect is included, I drop lnBRO to avoid the perfect multicollinearity. I 
double cluster standard errors at the analyst and year levels to correct for cross-
sectional and time-series dependence.  
 
𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑀𝐴𝑇𝐶𝐻𝑗 + 𝛼2𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗𝑡
+ 𝛼3𝑙𝑛𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐹𝑂𝑅_𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐴𝐶𝑌𝑗𝑡
+ 𝛼5𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼6𝑙𝑛𝐵𝑅𝑂𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡 (3.7) 
 Firms’ analyst coverage  
Turning to the test of firms’ analyst coverage, I build on the research design builds 
upon Barth et al. (2001). Specifically, I examine the association between the matching 
analyst following and firms’ R&D intensity. Thus, the dependent variable is the 
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number of analysts that have a matching degree (AF_MA). As a comparison, I also 
replicate the regression with total analyst following (AF_TOT) and the non-matching 
analyst following (AF_nonMA). The variable of interest is annual R&D expense scaled 
by total operating expense (RD). 79 In order to control the effect of intangible assets on 
the analyst coverage decision, I include balance-sheet intangible assets (INTA) as one 
of the explanatory variables, defined as intangible assets on the balance sheet scaled 
by total assets. In line with Barth et al. (2001), I include the average analyst effort for 
covering a firm (EFF), defined as the sum of firms followed by a firm’s all analysts 
scaled by the number of analyst following the firm, multiplying by -1. Other control 
variables are the market value of equity in the natural logarithm form (lnMCAP), stock 
return volatility (RETVOL), the percentage of institutional investor ownership (INST), 
the correlation between the stock return and the market return (RSQ), the market-to-
book ratio (BM) (Bhushan 1989; O’Brien and Bhushan 1990; Lang and Lundholm 
1996; Frankel et al. 2006). In line with the Barth et al. (2001), I also control for the 
industry-year level variations by adding four-digit SIC industry times year fixed 
effect.80 I double cluster standard errors at the firm and year levels. The model is 
shown as follows: 
 
𝐴𝐹𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛼5𝑅𝑆𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼6𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼7𝐵𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝐸
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (3.8) 
where AF is AF_MA, AF_TOT, and AF_nonMA, in each specification. 
 Analysts’ forecast accuracy 
 This section examines the impact of matching analysts on the negative association 
between analysts’ forecast accuracy and firms’ R&D documented in the previous 
literature. The dependent variable is forecast error (FORERROR), defined as the 
absolute value of the difference between the one-year-ahead annual EPS forecast and 
the actual EPS value, and scaled by the stock price two days before the forecast is 
made. Thus greater forecast error suggests lower forecast accuracy. I create an 
                                                          
79 Some research chooses total sales as the deflator. I keep in line with Barth et al. (2001) who use total 
operating expense as the deflator. In the chemical manufacturing industry, especially pharmaceutical 
companies, the R&D expenditure is enormous before it generates any revenue. Switching to sales as 
the deflator will generate many extreme observations in the sample. 
80 In Barth et al. (2001), the authors calculate the industry-year median of R&D and balance-sheet 
intangible assets for each firm, and add them back to the model as the additional control variable. In 
my paper, I use industry times year fixed effect. 
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indicator variable – MATCH equal to one for matching analysts and zero for non-
matching analysts, and interact it with RD.81 Then the interactive term MATCH × RD 
captures the influence of the matching degree on the association between analysts’ 
forecast error and firms’ R&D intensity. In addition, I also include balance-sheet 
intangible assets (INTA) and the interaction term with the matching indicator – 
MATCH × INTA – in the model to investigate whether the matching degree also has 
an impact on the forecast error related to the non-technological complexity. I include 
a set of analyst-related and firm-related control variables documented in the prior 
literature: analysts’ firm-specific experience (lnFEXP)  defined as the number of years 
in the natural logarithm form since the analyst provided her first forecast for the firm, 
and general experience (lnGEXP) defined as in the previous section (Clement 1999; 
Mikhail et al. 1997); the numbers of firms and industries that the analyst covers in the 
natural logarithm form (lnNUMCOM and lnNUMIND) (Clement 1999); the size of the 
brokerage house (lnBRO) and the score of analysts’ past forecast accuracy (lnPACY) 
as defined previously; as well as the forecast horizon measured as the number of days, 
in the natural logarithm form,  from when the forecast is provided to when the firm’s 
earnings is released (lnHOR). Firm-related control variables are the market value of 
equity (lnMCAP), total analyst following in the natural logarithm form (lnAF), the 
percentage of institutional investor ownership (INST), the market-to-book ratio (BM), 
and stock return volatility (RETVOL), and a dummy variable for the firm with a 
negative net income (Hwang et al. 1996; Brown 2001). In addition, I include four-digit 
SIC industry times year fixed effects. I double cluster standard errors at the analyst 
and the year levels. 
 
𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑀𝐴𝑇𝐶𝐻𝑗 + 𝛼4𝑀𝐴𝑇𝐶𝐻𝑗
× 𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑀𝐴𝑇𝐶𝐻𝑗 × 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝜷𝑪𝑶𝑵𝑻𝑹𝑶𝑳
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 (3.9) 
 Market reactions to the recommendation revisions 
This section details the research design to examine the market reaction to the 
recommendations revised by the matching analysts relative to non-matching analysts. 
I use 5-day cumulative abnormal CRSP value-weighted adjusted returns ([-1, +3]-day) 
                                                          
81 Consistent with the research design for the Hypothesis 1, I exclude analysts with technological 
degrees irrelevant to the chemical manufacturing industry. 
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as the measure of the market reaction (CAR). Palmon and Yezegel (2012) find a 
positive association between the cumulative abnormal return around analysts’ 
recommendation revisions and firms’ R&D intensity. I argue that market reactions to 
the recommendations revised by matching analysts are greater than non-matching 
analysts. In line with Palmon and Yezegel (2012), I classify revisions as upward 
(downward) revisions if the current recommendation is more (less) favorable than the 
previous one that are also provided by the same analyst, and delete all reiterated 
revisions. I firstly test no-directional revisions where I multiply cumulative abnormal 
returns for downward revisions by -1. I also run the regression in the subsamples with 
upward revisions and downward revisions separately. The variables of interest are still 
MATCH, RD, and their interaction term. I control for firm size (lnMCAP), the book-
to-market ratio (BM), institutional investor ownership (INST), total analyst following 
(lnAF), and stock return volatility in the percentage form (RETVOL_PC). Analyst-
related control variables are analysts’ firm-specific experience (lnFEXP), general 
experience (lnGEXP), the numbers of firms and industries covered (lnNUMCOM and 
lnNUMIND), and analysts’ past forecast accuracy (lnPACY). Additionally, Industry 
times year fixed effect are also included. All variables are previously defined. I adjust 
standard errors for two-way clustering at the firm and year levels. Then the model is 
as follows: 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑀𝐴𝑇𝐶𝐻𝑗 + 𝛼3𝑀𝐴𝑇𝐶𝐻𝑗 × 𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜷𝑪𝑶𝑵𝑻𝑹𝑶𝑳 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 (3.10) 
 Boldness 
 This section provides the research design to test the boldness between matching 
analysts and non-matching analysts. Following Clement and Tse (2005), I define the 
dependent variable, 𝐵𝑂𝐿𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡, as an indicator variable, equal to one if analyst j’s 
forecast is above both her prior forecast and the consensus forecast immediately before 
her forecast revision, or else below both. It is set to zero otherwise. The consensus 
forecast is calculated as the mean of forecasts issued by all analysts within 90 days 
prior to analyst j’s forecast. The variables of interest are all previously defined, which 
are MATCH, RD, and their interaction term. Firm-related control variables are 
lnMCAP, BM, INST, lnAF, and RETVOL. Analyst-related variables are lnFEXP, 
lnGEXP, lnNUMCOM, lnNUMIND, lnNFORE_T, lnNFORE_F, lnPACY, and lnHOR. 
Besides, I also control the days elapsed (lnELAPSE), as suggested in Clement and Tse 
150 
 
(2005), which is defined as the number of days since the last forecast made by each 
analyst following the firm within the year in the natural logarithm form. I use a logistic 
model to run the regression with industry times year fixed effects. I cluster the standard 
error by analysts. The model is as follows: 
 
𝑃𝑟 (𝐵𝑂𝐿𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 1)
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑀𝐴𝑇𝐶𝐻𝑗 + 𝛼3𝑀𝐴𝑇𝐶𝐻𝑗 × 𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜷𝑪𝑶𝑵𝑻𝑹𝑶𝑳 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 (3.11) 
3.4 Data and sample 
 Data collection 
The key variable in this paper is analysts’ educational background. In order to 
identify the biographical information of analysts who cover the chemical 
manufacturing industry, I firstly merge the recommendation file in the Institutional 
Broker Estimate System (I/B/E/S) with CRSP/Compustat Merged (CCM). I/B/E/S 
provides analysts’ surnames, initials of their first names, and their employment 
history. CCM provides SIC codes. I keep firms in the chemical manufacturing industry 
only (SIC 2800 to 2899) for the period from 2003 to 2016. Then I obtain 1,118 firms 
and 2,028 analyst codes to be identified (Table 3.1, Panel A). Next, I search analysts’ 
surnames, initials of first names, and their brokerage houses on Bloomberg, and 
manually match analysts’ coverage portfolio in I/B/E/S and the coverage list of 
analysts in Bloomberg who have the same surname, first-name initial and the 
brokerage house.82 Once matched successfully, I have the full name. Lastly, by using 
the full names identified in the previous step, together with the name of their 
employing brokerage houses, I go to LinkedIn and search those analysts’ names for 
their educational background (Bradley et al. 2017). If analysts’ full name and their 
employing brokerage houses from LinkedIn are matched with that from Bloomberg, 
the biographical identification is successful. Using this technique, I obtained the 
majority of analysts’ educational information from LinkedIn. In some cases when 
LinkedIn fails to provide the analyst’s degree or specify the major of the degree, I go 
                                                          
82 This step is essential in the identifying process. As I only have partial information of analysts’ name, 
Bloomberg returns multiple results quite often when I use surnames and first-name initials only, 
especially for those widely-used surnames like “Brown”, “Williams”, or “Li” etc. Bloomberg provides 
analysts’ coverage list, which presents the names of the firms they follow. Matching the coverage lists 
from Bloomberg and I/B/E/S would to the largest extent reduce mistakes in the process of identification.  
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for alternative sources, such as the official websites of the brokerage houses, some 
search engines that specialize in collecting biographical information like 
zoominfo.com (Cohen et al. 2010), and other websites that also provide some analysts’ 
information such as streetwisereoports.com and twst.com.  
Other variables are collected from various sources. I obtain accounting 
fundamental variables from CCM, analyst-related variables from I/B/E/S, stock price 
from CRSP, ownership of institutional investors from Thomson Reuters, and the CRSP 
value-weighted cumulative abnormal return from EventStudy by WRDS.  
 Sample description 
Panel (A) of Table 3.1 reports the result of the analyst identification. Starting with 
2,028 identifiable analysts’ codes, I successfully identified 1,218 US analysts with 
their complete educational information, and 391 non-US analysts, which together 
account for nearly eighty percent of total identifiable codes (Panel B). I keep US 
analysts only in an attempt to mitigate the geographical influence on analysts’ 
performance (Malloy 2005; Bae et al. 2008). Panel (C) presents the result of analysts’ 
classification by the type of their degrees. By reading the title of all identified analysts’ 
degrees, I find that 440 analysts have a matching technological degree, accounting for 
36%; as well as 703 non-matching analysts that only have business, literary arts, or 
social science related degrees, accounting for 58%. The remaining 75 analysts have 
irrelevant technological degrees, which are excluded from the analysis. Panel (D) and 
Panel (E) of Table 3.1 report the numbers of matching and non-matching analysts by 
four-digit SIC and by year respectively. Specifically, in Panel (D), the first two 
columns show that the chemical manufacturing industry is dominated by firms with 
an SIC of 2834, 2835 or 2836. These firms, together with firms in 2833, are medical, 
pharmaceutical, or biological product manufacturers (Appendix 1 reports the names 
of industries in detail).83 All firms with a SIC starting with 283 account for over eighty 
percent of the total number of chemical manufacturing companies and are followed by 
a great portion of analysts with a matching degree. Turning to Panel (E), the total 
number of analysts covering the chemical manufacturing industry is stable during the 
                                                          
83 Firms in 2833 manufacture medicinal chemicals and botanical products. Firms in 2834 manufacture 
pharmaceutical preparations. Firms in 2835 manufacture in vitro and in vivo diagnostic substances. 
Firms in 2836 manufacture biological products. 
152 
 
sample period. In a similar vein, the number of matching analysts does not have a large 
variation either, ranging from 39.4% in 2014 to 46.5% in 2005. 
3.5 Empirical results 
 Analysts’ industry coverage  
In this section I present the result for Hypothesis 1 – analysts with a matching 
technological degree cover less industries than those with a non-matching degree. The 
unit of analysis is analyst-year. Table 3.2, Panel (A) shows the descriptive statistics 
for matching analysts and non-matching analysts respectively. Compared to non-
matching analysts, matching analysts on average follow less industries and have less 
general experience. However, they do not have much difference regarding the number 
of firms in their coverage portfolio (NUMCOM), the annual forecasting frequency 
(lnNFORE_T), their past forecast accuracy (lnPACY), or the size of employing 
brokerage house (lnBRO). Panel (C) reports the results in different specifications. 
Consistent with my hypothesis, the MATCH coefficient is negatively significant in all 
specifications, indicating that analysts with a matching technological degree are less 
likely to cover multiple industries that are not relevant to their educational degrees. 
With regard to control variables, the coefficient on the number of firms that each 
analyst follows (NUMCOM) is significantly positive, suggesting a positive association 
between the number of industries and the number of firms covered by an analyst. The 
size of the employing brokerage house reports a negative coefficient, meaning that 
analysts from large brokerage houses cover less industries, which may be ascribed to 
their colleagues sharing the workload. In sum, the result supports Hypothesis 1 that 
analysts with a matching technological degree follow less industries than their peers 
without a matching degree. 
 Firms’ analyst following 
In this section, I present the results for Hypothesis 2 – the association between 
firms’ matching (non-matching) analyst following and the R&D intensity. The unit of 
analysis is firm-year. Panel (A) of Table 3.3 reports the statistical description of the 
data. On average, one firm is followed by 6.41 analysts (AF_TOT), of which 2.86 
analysts have a matching degree (AF_MA) and 1.90 analysts have non-matching 
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degrees (AF_nonMA).84 The mean of RD is 0.36, indicating that firms’ R&D expense 
on average amounts to 36% of the total operating expense. Intangible assets (INTA) is 
highly right skewed with a mean of 0.13 and a median of 0.04, which suggests most 
firms have few intangible assets or fail to report intangible assets on the balance sheet.  
Panel (C) of Table 3.3 reports the regression results with different dependent 
variables in each specification. In model (i) where the total number of analyst 
following (AF_TOT) is the dependent variable, I find that the estimated coefficient on 
RD is positively significant, which is consistent with Barth et al. (2001), indicating 
that the net benefit of covering R&D-intensive firms is positive. In addition, the 
coefficient on the intangible assets is insignificant, whereas Barth et al. (2001) find a 
negatively significant result that contradicts their hypothesis. Next, I partition 
AF_TOT into matching analyst following (AF_MA) and non-matching analyst 
following (AF_nonMA) and re-run the regression.85 Model (ii) uses matching analyst 
following as the dependent variable. The estimated coefficient on RD is still positively 
significant and the magnitude is larger than that in model (i). Turning to model (iii) 
where the dependent variable is non-matching analyst following (AF_nonMA), the 
result changes drastically. The estimated coefficient on RD is significantly negative, 
suggesting that analysts without a matching technological degree are less likely to 
follow firms with greater R&D. Moreover, the INTA coefficient turns positively 
significant, indicating a positive association between non-matching analyst following 
and intangible assets on the balance sheet. With regard to the control variables, most 
of them are consistent with prior literature. I find that analyst following is positively 
associated with the market value of equity, the stock return volatility, and intuitional 
investors’ ownership (Bhushan 1989; O’Brien and Bhushan 1990). Moreover, the 
negative coefficient on EFF suggests that analysts are reluctant to cover firms 
requiring great effort to follow. Collectively, I find the evidence consistent with 
Hypotheses 2a and 2b that the cost of covering R&D intensive firms is lower for 
matching analysts than non-matching analysts, evidenced by a positive (negative) 
association between the firm’s R&D intensity and matching (non-matching) analyst 
following.  
                                                          
84 The means of AF_MA and AF_nonMA do not add up to AF_TOT, because AF_TOT includes non-US 
analysts, irrelevant-degree analysts, and unidentified analysts. 
85As I delete non-US analysts, analysts with irrelevant technology-related degrees, and unidentified 
analysts, so that the sum of coefficients in Model (ii) and Model (iii) does not equal that in Model (i). 
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 Analyst forecast accuracy  
This section presents the result for testing analysts’ forecast accuracy. I use 
forecast error as the proxy of forecast accuracy. Then larger forecast error indicates 
lower forecast accuracy. I run the regression (3.3) in one full sample and two sub-
samples. In an attempt to balance the forecasting frequency of analysts for different 
firms, the first sub-sample only contains the last annual earnings forecast made by 
each analyst for each firm within a year (De Franco and Zhou 2009). The second sub-
sample contains earnings forecasts provided within the week following firms’ quarter 
or annual earnings announcement. The earnings announcement discloses a large 
amount of information. The second subsample may lever the cost of information 
collection so that the test would mainly reflect analysts’ ability to process the 
information. For the purpose of simplicity, I report data description and correlation 
matrix for the full sample only.  
Panel (A) of Table 3.4 reports summary statistics for matching and non-matching 
analysts separately. Analysts with a matching degree have a higher level of forecast 
error compared to non-matching analysts. This counter-intuitive result could be 
justified by the higher R&D amount in the matching analyst group in the sense that 
matching analysts mainly cover R&D-intensive firms that are hard to forecast.86 
Moreover, more than half of firms followed by matching analysts have negative 
earnings in the previous year, whereas this figure in the non-matching analyst group 
is only 27%, which may also explain the higher forecast error in the matching group. 
Furthermore, non-matching analysts cover more industries than matching analysts, 
which is in line with Hypothesis 1 that matching analysts are specialists and more 
likely to only cover the industry matching their technological knowledge. The 
statistics for the remaining variables are similar between the two groups.  
Panel (C) of Table 3.4 presents the regression results. Columns (i) and (ii) report 
the results for the full sample. Columns (iii) and (iv) are for the sub-sample with the 
last observation within a year, and columns (v) and (vi) are for the sub-sample with 
the observations in the week following the earnings announcement. Column (i) shows 
that R&D is positively associated with analysts’ forecast error, consistent with Gu and 
Wang (2005) and Amir et al. (2003). However, the INTA coefficient is insignificant at 
                                                          
86 This is consistent with Hypothesis 2 in this paper. 
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any conventional level. Turning to column (ii) where I introduce the interaction terms 
of dummy variable MATCH with RD and with INTA, the coefficient on RD represents 
the effect of R&D intensity on the error of forecasts made by non-matching analysts. 
The estimated coefficient is 0.847, implying that a one-standard-deviation increase in 
RD is associated with 0.21 increase in forecast error from non-matching analysts, 
which amounts to 16% of the mean of forecast error.87 The coefficient on the 
interaction term is -0.430, indicating analysts with a matching degree mitigate the 
impact of R&D on forecast error by 0.430 (or 51% relative to non-matching analysts). 
The overall impact of R&D on matching analysts is 0.417 (as in 0.847-0.430), 
suggesting a one-standard-deviation increase in RD is only associated with 0.117 
increase in forecast error among matching analysts, which amounts to 6.2% of the 
mean of forecast error.88 The R&D results in the two subsamples are similar to that in 
the full sample, albeit one insignificant coefficient on the R&D in column (iii). 
Turning to balance-sheet intangible assets, the results support the Hypothesis 3b. The 
interaction term of R&D and intangibles report different results in different samples. 
In column (iv), the positively significant coefficient on the interaction term suggests 
analysts with a matching degree perform worse with an increase in the balance-sheet 
intangible assets. However, the result is insignificant in columns (ii) and (vi) where 
different samples are chosen. Collectively, consistent with Hypothesis 3a, I find that 
firms’ R&D has an unfavorable impact on analysts’ forecasting error, probably due to 
the technological complexity generated by R&D. The technological degree that 
matching analysts possess significantly mitigates such impact. Furthermore, the 
matching degree does not mitigate the unfavorable effect on the analyst forecasts 
ascribed to balance-sheet intangible assets. 
 The market reaction to recommendation revisions 
This section reports the results for Hypothesis 4. I run the regression with three 
different samples based on the direction of the recommendation revisions. In the first 
sample, I multiply the dependent variable, 5-day CAR, for downward revisions by -1 
                                                          
87 The standard deviation and the mean of the forecast error in the non-matching group are 0.25 and 
1.32 respectively. Therefore, one-standard-deviation increase in RD affects forecast error by 0.847 × 
0.25, which is 0.21. I compare this figure to the mean, 0.21/1.32, and obtain 16% 
88 The standard deviation and the mean of the forecast error in the matching group are 0.28 and 1.90 
respectively. Therefore, one-standard-deviation increase in RD affects forecast error by 0.417 × 0.28, 
which is 0.117. I compare this figure to the mean, 0.117/1.90, and obtain 6.2%. 
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to account for the different signs of CAR to the upward and the downward revisions. 
Then I obtain a uniform measure of market reactions with all the observations. Next, 
I run the regressions in two subsamples that only contain upward or downward 
revisions respectively. Panel (A) in Table 3.5 shows the data description with different 
samples. The CAR in the non-direction sample has a mean of 5.75 basis points. This 
figure in the upward-revision sample is 4.05 basis points and -6.61 basis points in the 
downward-revision sample. 
In Panel (C), columns (i), (iii), and (v) report the results of regressions without the 
interaction term. I find a positive association between the R&D intensity and the 
market reaction when analysts issue upward recommendation revisions. In addition, 
the MATCH coefficient is also positively significant in the specification when upward 
recommendations are provided, which suggest that investors value analysts’ matching 
technological degrees, in particular when analysts provide favorable 
recommendations. Turning to models where the interaction term of R&D with 
matching degree is included, the result in column (iv) reports a significant positive 
coefficient, indicating that the positive association between the market reaction and 
R&D intensity is more pronounced on the recommendations revised by the analysts 
with a matching degree than non-matching analysts, when recommendations are 
favorable. However, when it comes to downgrades as shown in columns (v) and (vi). 
I fail to find any significance on the interaction term or the main variable at any 
conventional level. Overall, I find evidence that supports the Hypothesis 4 that the 
association between the market reaction to analysts’ recommendation and firms’ R&D 
intensity is more pronounced among matching analysts than non-matching analysts. 
However, the evidence only holds for the favorable recommendation revisions. 
 Boldness 
In this section, I present the results for the test of analysts’ boldness in Table 3.6. 
In line with the concern in testing analysts’ forecast error, I run the logistic regressions 
with three different samples: (1) the full sample; (2) the sub-sample with the last 
observation of the forecast made by each analyst within each year; and (3) the sub-
sample that contains forecasts made in the week following earnings announcement. 
Firstly, I find the result consistent with my hypothesis within the full sample in models 
(i) and (ii). The negatively significant coefficient on RD indicates that analysts’ 
boldness is negatively associated with firms’ R&D intensity, while the positively 
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significant coefficient on the interaction term MATCH × RD suggests that analysts 
matching degree alleviates such negative impact. When switching to sub-samples, I 
still find consistent results for Hypothesis 5a in terms of the association between 
analysts’ boldness and R&D intensity, presented in models (iii) to  (vi). However, I 
fail to find evidence for Hypothesis 5b as the estimated coefficients on the interaction 
term MATCH × RD are insignificant at any conventional levels.  
As the entire sample contains over eighty percent pharmaceutical firms (SIC 2833 
to 2836) who have more R&D than non-pharmaceutical firms in general, the test 
power may be stronger within the pharmaceutical firms than non-pharmaceutical 
firms. In this regard, I restrict the sample and replicate the regression (3.5) with 
pharmaceutical firms (labeled as “Pharma firms”) only. Then I find the results 
consistent with my hypotheses across all specifications. Panel (D) reports the 
empirical results. In models (i), (iii), and (v), the RD coefficient is significantly 
negative in all specifications, consistent with Hypothesis 5a that analysts’ boldness is 
negatively associated with firms’ R&D intensity. When including MATCH, and the 
interaction term MATCH × RD in models (ii), (iv), and (vi), as predicted in the 
Hypothesis 5b, the interaction term exhibits a significantly positive coefficient in all 
models, indicating that the matching degree mitigates the negative influence of R&D 
intensity on analysts’ boldness. Collectively, I find the evidence to support Hypothesis 
5a and 5b in the restricted sample that contains pharmaceutical firms only.  
3.6 Conclusion 
The extant literature has documented analyst-related and firm-related factors that 
have an impact upon analysts’ coverage decision and forecasting behavior. This paper 
focuses on the interactive effect of these two forces. More precisely, I explore the 
impact of analysts’ technology-related knowledge and firms’ technological 
complexity. I focus on the chemical manufacturing industry, and use firms’ R&D 
intensity to measure the degree of technological complexity relative to their industry 
peers, as well as analysts’ educational degree as a proxy of their technological 
knowledge to test whether a matching educational degree alleviates the negative 
impact of firms’ R&D on analysts’ behavior. Based on the analysis above, I have 
following findings. Firstly, I find analysts with a matching degree cover less 
industries. Secondly, extending the finding in Barth et al. (2001), I find that firms’ 
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R&D intensity is positively (negatively) associated with analyst following of analysts 
that (do not) have a matching technological degree. Furthermore, I find that analysts’ 
matching degree mitigates the negative impact between firms’ R&D intensity and 
analysts’ forecast accuracy. Next, I find that analysts with a matching degree elicit a 
greater market reaction to recommendation revisions when firms have a high level of 
R&D intensity. However, the result only holds for the upward revisions. Finally, I find 
that firms’ R&D intensity negatively affects analysts’ boldness, but analysts’ matching 
degree alleviates this negative influence within the restricted sample that only contains 
pharmaceutical firms.  
 This paper has the following caveats. Firstly, I focus on one industry only. Thus, 
generalization to other industries may be a concern, especially for the industries that 
demand less technological knowledge such as retail, wholesale or services industries. 
Secondly, I do not have a clear setting to draw a causal inference of the interactive 
effect between these two forces on analysts’ behavior, which calls for further research 
to identify an exogenous shock to the industry. 
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3.7 Appendix: The name of each 4-digit SIC industries. 
This table lists the name of each four-digit SIC industries from U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) official website: https://www.sec.gov/info/edgar/siccodes.htm  
SIC Name 
2800 Chemicals & allied products 
2810 Industrial inorganic chemicals 
2820 Plastic material, synth resin/rubber, cellulose (no glass) 
2821 Plastic materials, synth resins & non-Vulcan elastomers 
2833 Medicinal chemicals & botanical products 
2834 Pharmaceutical preparations 
2835 In vitro & in vivo diagnostic substances 
2836 Biological products, (no diagnostic substances) 
2840 Soap, detergents, cleaning preparations, perfumes, cosmetics 
2842 Specialty cleaning, polishing and sanitation preparations 
2844 Perfumes, cosmetics & other toilet preparations 
2851 Paints, varnishes, lacquers, enamels & allied prods 
2860 Industrial organic chemicals 
2870 Agricultural chemicals 
2890 Miscellaneous chemical products 
2891 Adhesives & sealants 
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3.8 Appendix: Definition of variables 
    Firm-level variables     
Variable Name   Description   Source 
AF_MA   The number of analysts having a matching 
technological degree following each firm.  
  I/B/E/S 
AF_nonMA   The number of analysts not having a matching 
technological degree following each firm. 
Irrelevant degrees such as industrial engineering 
are not included. 
  I/B/E/S 
AF_TOT   Total number of analysts following each firm, 
regardless of their educational degrees. 
  I/B/E/S 
BM   Book value of equity divided by market value of 
equity. 
  Compustat 
CAR_UP   5-day [-1, 3] cumulative abnormal CRSP value-
weighted adjusted returns, in the percentage form, 
to upward recommendation revisions. 
  EventStudy 
by WRDS 
CAR_DOWN   5-day [-1, 3] cumulative abnormal CRSP value-
weighted adjusted returns, in the percentage form, 
to downward recommendation revisions. 
  EventStudy 
by WRDS 
CAR_nonD   5-day [-1, 3] cumulative abnormal CRSP value-
weighted adjusted returns, in the percentage form, 
to all recommendation revisions, adjusting the 
downward reaction by multiplying -1. 
  EventStudy 
by WRDS 
EARNANN    Dummy variable, set equal to one on the day 
when a firm announces the earnings, and zero 
otherwise. 
  I/B/E/S 
EFF Firms’ average analyst effort, calculated as the 
sum of the number of firms followed by all 
analysts for a firm divided by the number of 
analysts following the firm within a year, then 
multiple by -1. 
I/B/E/S 
INTA   Intangible assets scaled by total assets in the 
percentage form. 
  Compustat 
LOSS   Dummy variable, set equal to one when actual 
EPS in the previous year is negative, and zero 
otherwise. 
  Compustat 
lnMCAP   Market value of equity in the logarithm form.   Compustat 
lnAF   Total analyst following in the logarithm form.   I/B/E/S 
R_SQ   R-squared from the regression of daily stock 
return on the market return (the return of OMX30 
index) within each year. 
  CRSP 
RD   Annual R&D expense scaled by total annual 
operating expense. 
  Compustat 
RETVOL   Standard deviation of the daily stock return within 
each year. 
 CRSP 
RETVOL_PC   Standard deviation of the daily stock return within 
each year in the percentage form 
  CRSP 
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    Analyst-level variables     
Variable Name   Description   Source 
BOLD   Indicator variable, equal to one if an analyst’s 
forecast is above both her prior forecast and the 
consensus forecast immediately before her 
forecast revision, or else below both. It is set to 0 
otherwise. The consensus forecast is calculated as 
the mean of forecasts issued by all analysts within 
90 days prior to the analyst’s forecast. 
  I/B/E/S 
FORERROR   Analyst forecast error. Take the absolute value of 
the difference between the one-year ahead EPS 
forecast and actual EPS, scaled by the stock price 
two days before the forecast is provided, then 
times 100. 
  I/B/E/S 
lnBRO   The number of analysts employed in a brokerage 
house in the logarithm form. 
  I/B/E/S 
lnELAPSE   The number of days since last forecast made by 
any analyst in the logarithm form. 
  I/B/E/S 
lnFEXP   Firm-specific experience in the logarithm form. 
Firm-specific experience is measured as the 
number of days from the analyst’s first opinion 
for the specific firm to the present. 
  I/B/E/S 
lnGEXP   General experience in the logarithm form. 
Analyst general experience is measured as the 
number of days from the analyst’s first opinion 
for any firm to the present. 
  I/B/E/S 
lnHOR   Forecast horizon in the logarithm form. Forecast 
horizon is the number of days between the date 
when the forecast is provided and the date when 
the actual EPS is announced. 
  I/B/E/S 
lnNUMCOM   Total number of firms covered by an analyst in 
the logarithm form. 
  I/B/E/S 
lnNFORE_F   Total number of forecasts provided by an analyst 
for a firm within a year in the logarithm form. 
  I/B/E/S 
lnNFORE_T   Total number of forecasts provided by an analyst 
for any firm within a year in the logarithm form. 
  I/B/E/S 
lnNUMIND   Total number of industries (four-digit SIC codes) 
covered by an analyst in the logarithm form. 
  I/B/E/S 
lnPACY   Analysts’ relative accuracy score in the previous 
year in the logarithm form. Analyst’s relative 
accuracy score is calculated in line with the 
method in Hong and Kubik (2003). 
  I/B/E/S 
MATCH   Indicator variable, equals one if an analyst has a 
matching degree, and zero otherwise. 
  Bloomberg 
and 
LinkedIn 
NUMCOM   Total number of firms covered by an analysts.   I/B/E/S 
NUMIND   Total number of industries (four-digit SIC codes) 
covered by an analyst.   
  I/B/E/S 
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Table 3.1: Data collection and general description of the sample 
This table presents the result of the identification of analysts’ educational degrees within the 
sample period from 2003 to 2016. Panels (A), (B), and (C) show the source of data, the 
successful rate of identification, and the numbers of matching, non-matching, and irrelevant 
analysts respectively. Panel (D) and Panel (E) report the numbers of matching and non-
matching analysts by four-digit-SIC industries and by years respectively.  
Panel (A): Analysts’ identification 
  No. Source 
Firms in the chemical manufacturing industry 1,118 COMPUSTAT 
Codes of analysts in Recommendation file 45,684 I/B/E/S 
Codes of analysts covering chemical manufacturing 
industry 2,028 
COMPUSTAT and 
I/B/E/S 
 
Panel (B): Analysts’ educational degree identification  
Analysts identifying No. Percent 
Fully identified  1,218 60.1% 
Non-US analysts 391 19.3% 
Degree title not specified  98 4.8% 
No university information 92 4.5% 
Unidentified 52 2.6% 
I/B/E/S error 1: same name, different codes 69 3.4% 
I/B/E/S error 2: same code, different names 108 5.3% 
Total 2,028 100.0% 
 
Panel (C): Number of analysts have a matching degree or non-matching degree 
  No. Percent 
Matching analysts 440 36.1% 
Non-matching analysts 703 57.7% 
Irrelevant technological degree 75 6.2% 
Total 1,218   
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Panel (D): Matching and non-matching analysts by four-digit SIC industries 
Firms   Analysts 
SIC 
No. of 
firms 
Total No. of 
analysts 
Total No. of 
identified US 
No. of 
match 
No. of 
non-match 
No. of 
irrelevant 
Match / Total 
identified% 
2800 10 57 26 7 16 3 26.9% 
2810 29 183 133 30 88 15 22.6% 
2820 9 72 52 18 30 4 34.6% 
2821 17 141 97 33 55 9 34.0% 
2833 13 116 82 35 46 1 42.7% 
2834 346 992 584 319 252 13 54.6% 
2835 79 402 304 180 118 6 59.2% 
2836 488 814 539 333 193 13 61.8% 
2840 7 103 49 1 48 0 2.0% 
2842 5 91 70 7 62 1 10.0% 
2844 18 122 74 3 68 3 4.1% 
2851 7 110 65 19 42 4 29.2% 
2860 40 220 142 24 112 6 16.9% 
2870 28 210 114 18 86 10 15.8% 
2890 17 187 148 31 95 22 20.9% 
2891 5 45 35 5 27 3 14.3% 
Total  1,118             
 
Panel (E): Matching and non-matching analysts by years 
Firms   Analysts 
Year 
No. of 
firms 
Total No. 
of analysts 
Total No. of 
identified US 
No. of 
match 
No. of non-
match 
No. of 
irrelevant 
Match / Total 
identified% 
2003 482 491 284 116 152 16 40.8% 
2004 512 531 322 141 162 19 43.8% 
2005 521 565 342 159 163 20 46.5% 
2006 534 579 373 165 182 26 44.2% 
2007 529 581 380 168 188 24 44.2% 
2008 484 589 404 173 206 25 42.8% 
2009 444 535 370 156 188 26 42.2% 
2010 431 572 400 160 217 23 40.0% 
2011 419 552 386 163 206 17 42.2% 
2012 417 525 376 153 204 19 40.7% 
2013 468 522 361 148 199 14 41.0% 
2014 565 554 388 153 219 16 39.4% 
2015 620 561 395 162 217 16 41.0% 
2016 614 578 403 163 225 15 40.4% 
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Table 3.2: Analysts’ industry coverage 
This table presents statistics and results for Hypothesis 1 – matching analysts cover less 
industries than non-matching analysts. Panel (A) presents descriptive statistics for variables 
used in the regression. The dependent variable (NUMIND) is the number of four-digit-SIC 
industries covered by each analyst. MATCH is an indicator variable, equals to one if the analyst 
has a matching technological degree, and zero otherwise. NUMCOM denotes the number of 
firms followed by each analyst within each year. lnNFORE_T is defined as the number of 
forecasts provided by an analyst within the year in the logarithm form.  lnPACY denotes the 
relative accuracy score of an analyst in the previous year in the logarithm form, which is 
calculated in line with Hong and Kubik (2003). lnGEXP is analysts’ general experience in the 
logarithm form, measured as the number of years from when the analyst provides her first 
forecast for any firms to present. lnBRO is the size of the employing brokerage house in the 
logarithm form, calculated as the number of analysts within each brokerage house within each 
year. Panel (B) reports Pearson (below diagonal) and Spearman (above diagonal) correlations. 
The correlations significant at the five percent level are shown in bold.  Panel (C) outlines the 
results. Standard error is clustered at the analyst and the year levels. Robust standard errors 
are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively.  
Panel (A): Descriptive statistics 
MATCH=1                 
Variable N Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Median 0.75 Max 
NUMIND 1,937  4.22 2.83 1 2 3 6 18 
NUMCOM 1,937  14.65 7.15 1 10 14 19 37 
lnNFORE_T 1,937  3.78 0.92 0 3.47 4.03 4.36 5.2 
lnPACY 1,937  3.91 0.31 1.77 3.81 3.96 4.09 4.50 
lnGEXP 1,937  1.86 0.97 0 1.1 1.95 2.64 3.47 
lnBRO 1,937  3.57 1.13 0 2.77 3.66 4.52 5.63 
                  
MATCH=0                 
Variable N Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Median 0.75 Max 
NUMIND 4,659  6.69 3.98 1 4 6 9 18 
NUMCOM 4,659  15.46 7.43 1 11 15 20 37 
lnNFORE_T 4,659  3.87 0.91 0 4 4 4 5 
lnPACY 4,659  3.9 0.31 0.01 3.79 3.94 4.07 4.50 
lnGEXP 4,659  2.21 0.99 0 1.61 2.48 3.04 3.47 
lnBRO 4,659  3.56 1.16 0 2.83 3.64 4.51 5.63 
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Panel (B): Correlation Matrix 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
(1) NUMIND   -0.31 0.52 0.42 -0.02 0.19 -0.06 
(2) MATCH -0.29   -0.05 -0.06 0.04 -0.18 0.00 
(3) NUMCOM 0.54 -0.05   0.83 0.03 0.27 0.12 
(4) lnNFORE_T 0.43 -0.05 0.78   0.08 0.25 0.21 
(5) lnPACY 0.03 0.02 0.10 0.17   -0.01 0.07 
(6) lnGEXP 0.19 -0.16 0.27 0.23 0.04   0.03 
(7) lnBRO -0.06 0.00 0.11 0.19 0.09 0.02   
 
Panel (C): Regression results 
   i ii iii iv 
MATCH -2.316*** -2.231*** -1.748*** -1.755*** 
  (0.240) (0.285) (0.258) (0.261) 
NUMCOM   0.257*** 0.267*** 0.265*** 
    (0.023) (0.020) (0.021) 
lnNFORE_T   0.251** 0.125 0.133 
    (0.123) (0.106) (0.109) 
lnPACY   -0.071 0.050 0.043 
    (0.099) (0.103) (0.102) 
lnGEXP   -0.013 0.106 0.100 
    (0.083) (0.072) (0.073) 
lnBRO   -0.426***     
    (0.070)     
Constant 6.167*** 3.336*** 2.088** 2.113** 
  (0.233) (0.516) (0.945) (0.999) 
No. of Observations 8,943 6,596 6,596 6,596 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.081 0.380 0.512 0.511 
Broker FE No No Yes Yes 
Year FE No No No Yes 
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Table 3.3: Firms’ analysts following 
This table reports statistics and results for Hypothesis 2 – firms’ analyst following by matching 
(non-matching) analysts is positively (negatively) associated with the R&D intensity. Panel 
(A) presents descriptive statistics for variables used in the regression. The dependent variable 
in general is the number of analysts following each firm. Precisely, they are total analyst 
following, regardless of their educational degrees (AF_TOT), the number of analysts having a 
matching educational degree (AF_MA), and the number of analysts not having a matching 
educational degree (AF_nonMA). RD denotes the R&D expense calculated by annual R&D 
expense scaled by total annual operating expense. INTA indicates the percentage of intangible 
assets in the balance sheet scaled by total assets. lnMCAP represents the market value of equity 
in the logarithm form. RETVOL is the stock return volatility. RSQ is the R-squared from the 
market model of the individual stock return. INST denotes the percentage of institutional 
ownership for a firm within a year. BM is the book-to-market ratio and measured by dividing 
the book value of equity by the market value of equity. EFF is analyst effort, calculated as the 
sum of the number of firms followed by all analysts for a firm divided by the number of 
analysts following the firm within a year, and then multiply by -1. Panel (B) reports Pearson 
(below diagonal) and Spearman (above diagonal) correlations. The correlations significant at 
the five percent level are shown in bold.  Panel (C) outlines the results. Standard error is 
clustered at the firm and the year levels. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, 
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
Panel (A): Descriptive statistics 
Variable N Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Median 0.75 Max 
AF_TOT 5,911  6.41 7.80 0 0 4 9 42 
AF_MA 5,911  2.86 4.36 0 0 1 4 32 
AF_nonMA 5,911  1.90 3.00 0 0 1 3 20 
RD 5,911  0.36 0.31 0 0.04 0.30 0.67 1 
INTA 5,911  0.13 0.18 0 0 0.04 0.20 0.74 
lnMCAP 5,911  12.93 2.15 6.82 11.43 12.63 14.12 18.63 
RETVOL 5,911  0.10 0.19 0 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.98 
RSQ 5,911  0.13 0.15 0 0.01 0.07 0.20 0.62 
INST 5,911  0.36 0.34 0 0 0.29 0.66 1 
BM 5,911  0.36 0.41 -0.91 0.14 0.27 0.48 2.47 
EFF 5,911  -10.54 8.70 -31.67 -17.39 -13 0 0 
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Panel (B): Correlation Matrix 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(1) AF_TOT   0.85 0.82 -0.02 0.15 0.65 -0.48 0.51 0.78 -0.14 -0.67 
(2) AF_MA 0.79   0.53 0.26 -0.04 0.47 -0.28 0.34 0.64 -0.18 -0.64 
(3) AF_nonMA 0.77 0.31   -0.24 0.28 0.59 -0.50 0.51 0.69 -0.05 -0.54 
(4) RD -0.07 0.22 -0.30   -0.42 -0.19 0.26 -0.18 -0.13 -0.25 -0.04 
(5) INTA 0.21 0.03 0.33 -0.32   0.35 -0.35 0.29 0.14 0.13 -0.01 
(6) lnMCAP 0.69 0.45 0.61 -0.22 0.35   -0.73 0.69 0.51 -0.19 -0.37 
(7) RETVOL -0.27 -0.20 -0.22 -0.06 -0.07 -0.42   -0.68 -0.42 0.03 0.28 
(8) RSQ 0.45 0.24 0.48 -0.26 0.25 0.61 -0.33   0.47 -0.02 -0.33 
(9) INST 0.66 0.54 0.54 -0.12 0.10 0.47 -0.29 0.45   -0.03 -0.66 
(10) BM -0.17 -0.18 -0.09 -0.19 0.03 -0.24 0.19 -0.03 -0.09   0.06 
(11) EFF -0.50 -0.44 -0.38 -0.02 -0.02 -0.34 0.27 -0.29 -0.63 0.12   
 
Panel (C): Regression results 
  i ii iii 
Dependent variable AF_TOT AF_MA AF_nonMA 
RD 1.781*** 2.821*** -0.822*** 
  (0.482) (0.360) (0.213)    
INTA 0.851 -0.975 1.671*** 
  (0.887) (0.612) (0.411)    
lnMCAP 2.081*** 0.935*** 0.524*** 
  (0.181) (0.127) (0.076)    
RETVOL 4.106*** 2.842*** 0.620**  
  (0.540) (0.428) (0.221)    
RSQ -2.819 -2.691** 0.365    
  (2.105) (1.177) (0.726)    
INST 9.391*** 5.415*** 2.486*** 
  (1.151) (0.689) (0.389)    
BM 0.459* 0.300* 0.007    
  (0.247) (0.162) (0.128)    
EFF -0.085*** -0.045*** -0.025*** 
  (0.018) (0.011) (0.008)    
No. of Observations 5,908 5,908 5,908 
Adj. R-Squared 0.663 0.516 0.545    
Industry × Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 3.4: Forecast accuracy 
This table reports the test results for analysts’ forecast accuracy. Panel (A) presents descriptive 
statistics. FORERR is the dependent variable, which is the analyst forecast error, calculated 
by taking the absolute value of the difference between the one-year-ahead EPS forecast and 
the actual EPS, scaled by the stock price two days before the forecast is provided, then 
multiplied by 100. MATCH is an indicator variable, equals to one if the analyst has a matching 
technological degree, and zero otherwise. RD denotes the R&D expense scaled by total annual 
operating expense. INTA indicates the percentage of intangible assets scaled by total assets. 
LOSS is a dummy variable, equals to one when the actual EPS in previous year is negative, 
and zero otherwise. lnMCAP represents the market value of equity in the logarithm form. INST 
denotes the percentage of institutional investor ownership. BM is the book-to-market ratio and 
measured by dividing the book value of equity by the market value of equity. RETVOL is the 
stock return volatility. lnAF is total analyst following in the logarithm form. lnHOR denotes 
the forecast horizon in the logarithm form. Forecast horizon is the number of days between 
the date when the forecast is provided and the date when the actual EPS is announced. lnBRO 
is the size of the employing brokerage house in the logarithm form, calculated as the number 
of analysts in each brokerage house within each year. lnNUMCOM denotes the number of 
firms followed by each analyst in the logarithm form. lnNUMIND is the number of industries 
(four-digit SIC) covered by an analyst in the logarithm form. lnNFORE_T is defined the 
number of forecasts provided by an analyst within a year in the logarithm form. lnNFORE_F 
is the number of forecasts provided by each analyst for each firm within a year in the logarithm 
form. lnPACY denotes the relative accuracy score of an analyst in the previous year in the 
logarithm form, which is calculated in line with Hong and Kubik (2003). lnFEXP is analysts’ 
coverage history for a specific firm in the logarithm form. Coverage history is measured as 
the number of years since the analyst provided her first forecast for the specific firm to present. 
lnGEXP is analysts’ general experience of being an analyst in the logarithm form. Analysts’ 
general experience is measured as the number of years from when the analyst issued her first 
forecast for any firms to present. Panel (B) reports Pearson (below diagonal) and Spearman 
(above diagonal) correlations. The correlations significant at the five percent level are shown 
in bold. Panel (C) outlines the results. Models (i) and (ii) use the full sample. Models (iii) and 
(iv) use the last forecast provided by each analyst for each firm with each year. Models (v) 
and (vi) use forecasts made in the week following earnings announcement. All the regressions 
are clustered at the analyst level and the year levels. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Panel (A): Descriptive statistics 
MATCH=1                 
Variable N Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Median 0.75 Max 
FORERROR 58,656  1.90 3.49 0 0.17 0.6 1.94 21.43 
RD 58,656  0.42 0.28 0 0.19 0.39 0.69 1.02 
INTA 58,656  0.16 0.20 0 0 0.07 0.29 0.76 
LOSS 58,656  0.51 0.50 0 0 1 1 1 
lnMCAP 58,656  14.81 2.13 8.18 13.21 14.54 16.55 19.1 
INST 58,656  0.63 0.31 0 0.47 0.72 0.87 1 
BM 58,656  0.26 0.23 -0.38 0.11 0.22 0.36 1.23 
RETVOL 58,656  0.04 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.2 
lnAF 58,656  2.63 0.68 0 2.2 2.71 3.18 3.74 
lnHOR 58,656  5.28 0.50 2.83 4.82 5.34 5.69 5.9 
lnBRO 58,656  3.78 1.10 0 3 3.93 4.68 5.63 
lnNUMCOM 58,656  2.81 0.44 0 2.56 2.89 3.09 3.74 
lnNUMIND 58,656  1.18 0.60 0 0.69 1.1 1.39 2.77 
lnNFORE_T 58,656  4.25 0.55 0 3.99 4.33 4.62 5.67 
lnNFORE_F 58,656  1.55 0.53 0 1.39 1.61 1.95 4.44 
lnPACY 58,656  3.93 0.26 1.43 3.84 3.97 4.09 4.61 
lnFEXP 58,656  6.09 1.99 0 5.53 6.54 7.35 9.21 
lnGEXP 58,656  7.89 0.91 3.78 7.33 7.99 8.6 9.41 
                  
MATCH=0                 
Variable N Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Median 0.75 Max 
FORERROR 39,176  1.32 2.84 0 0.09 0.34 1.21 21.43 
RD 39,176  0.19 0.25 0 0.02 0.08 0.28 1.02 
INTA 39,176  0.23 0.20 0 0.05 0.19 0.36 0.76 
LOSS 39,176  0.27 0.44 0 0 0 1 1 
lnMCAP 39,176  15.21 2.08 8.87 13.61 15.23 16.85 19.1 
INST 39,176  0.61 0.30 0 0.51 0.68 0.83 1 
BM 39,176  0.31 0.24 -0.38 0.16 0.26 0.42 1.23 
RETVOL 39,176  0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.2 
lnAF 39,176  2.60 0.69 0 2.08 2.71 3.14 3.74 
lnHOR 39,176  5.26 0.51 3 4.8 5.32 5.68 5.9 
lnBRO 39,176  3.83 1.03 0 3.22 3.97 4.7 5.63 
lnNUMCOM 39,176  2.77 0.46 0 2.56 2.83 3.04 3.74 
lnNUMIND 39,176  1.62 0.73 0 1.1 1.79 2.2 2.77 
lnNFORE_T 39,176  4.22 0.54 0 3.99 4.3 4.57 6.58 
lnNFORE_F 39,176  1.54 0.51 0 1.39 1.61 1.79 4.53 
lnPACY 39,176  3.93 0.24 0.01 3.82 3.96 4.08 4.61 
lnFEXP 39,176  6.42 1.93 0 5.79 6.8 7.64 9.41 
lnGEXP 39,176  8.14 0.94 3.64 7.55 8.34 8.92 9.44 
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Panel (B): Correlation Matrix 
 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
(1) FORERROR   0.28 -0.36 0.14 0.45 -0.56 -0.11 0.05 0.52 -0.41 0.28 -0.13 0.10 -0.14 0.01 -0.07 -0.01 -0.22 -0.11 
(2) RD 0.24   -0.42 0.42 0.60 -0.31 -0.03 -0.26 0.45 -0.09 0.05 -0.09 0.10 -0.57 -0.05 -0.19 0.04 -0.22 -0.16 
(3) INTA -0.21 -0.37   -0.21 -0.52 0.56 0.04 0.23 -0.53 0.37 -0.04 0.12 -0.10 0.14 0.02 0.20 0.00 0.22 0.15 
(4) MATCH 0.09 0.39 -0.16   0.24 -0.10 0.05 -0.11 0.21 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.05 -0.31 0.03 0.02 0.02 -0.10 -0.15 
(5) LOSS 0.31 0.64 -0.40 0.24   -0.60 -0.13 -0.20 0.61 -0.38 0.06 -0.13 0.12 -0.29 -0.02 -0.22 0.02 -0.28 -0.16 
(6) lnMCAP -0.43 -0.35 0.49 -0.09 -0.59   0.11 -0.07 -0.70 0.77 -0.07 0.26 -0.11 0.03 0.05 0.29 0.00 0.35 0.21 
(7) INST -0.17 -0.08 -0.01 0.03 -0.16 0.14   -0.07 -0.11 0.28 -0.01 0.04 -0.09 0.01 -0.04 0.13 0.00 0.09 -0.08 
(8) BM 0.06 -0.21 0.17 -0.11 -0.13 -0.12 -0.07   -0.09 -0.10 -0.01 0.00 -0.04 0.15 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.03 0.03 
(9) RETVOL 0.33 0.33 -0.29 0.13 0.40 -0.48 -0.15 0.00   -0.47 0.06 -0.17 0.14 -0.21 0.00 -0.17 0.01 -0.32 -0.17 
(10) lnAF -0.34 -0.14 0.32 0.02 -0.35 0.74 0.33 -0.14 -0.35   -0.05 0.21 -0.08 -0.11 0.03 0.26 0.00 0.29 0.09 
(11) lnHOR 0.15 0.05 -0.03 0.02 0.06 -0.06 -0.01 0.00 0.03 -0.04   -0.03 0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.04 -0.04 
(12) lnBRO -0.09 -0.05 0.10 -0.02 -0.10 0.24 0.04 -0.03 -0.12 0.21 -0.02   0.01 -0.02 0.20 0.20 0.04 0.09 0.10 
(13) lnNUMCOM 0.07 0.10 -0.07 0.05 0.10 -0.10 -0.09 -0.02 0.08 -0.06 0.02 -0.01   0.28 0.76 -0.05 0.00 0.10 0.25 
(14) lnNUMIND -0.10 -0.50 0.06 -0.31 -0.29 0.02 0.04 0.13 -0.13 -0.10 -0.03 -0.08 0.33   0.26 0.01 -0.07 0.17 0.14 
(15) lnNFORE_T 0.00 -0.04 0.02 0.03 -0.04 0.05 -0.03 0.03 -0.01 0.04 -0.02 0.15 0.79 0.30   0.33 0.03 0.20 0.26 
(16) lnNFORE_F -0.10 -0.19 0.16 0.01 -0.20 0.25 0.11 0.06 -0.14 0.22 0.02 0.17 -0.02 0.02 0.38   0.04 0.24 0.02 
(17) lnPACY -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.08 -0.01 0.14 0.08   0.02 -0.04 
(18) lnFEXP -0.15 -0.20 0.13 -0.08 -0.23 0.29 0.10 0.01 -0.21 0.25 -0.02 0.07 0.09 0.13 0.20 0.35 0.07   0.38 
(19) lnGEXP -0.07 -0.15 0.11 -0.13 -0.15 0.19 -0.06 0.01 -0.11 0.09 -0.05 0.09 0.28 0.14 0.27 0.02 0.01 0.29   
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Panel (C): Regression results  
  All forecasts   Last forecasts   Forecasts after EA 
  i ii   iii iv   v vi 
RD 0.527* 0.847**   0.186 0.524**   0.625** 0.933*** 
  (0.249) (0.286)   (0.222) (0.202)   (0.267) (0.303)    
INTA 0.195 -0.044   0.346** 0.028   0.398** 0.179    
  (0.170) (0.169)   (0.151) (0.115)   (0.179) (0.156)    
MATCH 0.060 0.102   0.112* 0.145   0.082* 0.138    
  (0.043) (0.083)   (0.058) (0.094)   (0.046) (0.093)    
MATCH × RD   -0.430**     -0.453***     -0.416**  
    (0.152)     (0.148)     (0.172)    
MATCH × INTA   0.410     0.562**     0.380    
    (0.234)     (0.229)     (0.239)    
LOSS 0.080 0.083   0.073 0.076   -0.107 -0.106    
  (0.174) (0.175)   (0.188) (0.186)   (0.198) (0.200)    
lnMCAP -0.492*** -0.493***   -0.456*** -0.458***   -0.557*** -0.558*** 
  (0.048) (0.048)   (0.059) (0.059)   (0.057) (0.057)    
INST -0.872*** -0.865***   -1.125*** -1.119***   -0.898*** -0.894*** 
  (0.257) (0.257)   (0.320) (0.318)   (0.276) (0.276)    
BM 0.442** 0.433**   0.320 0.307   0.328* 0.321*   
  (0.177) (0.177)   (0.212) (0.216)   (0.175) (0.177)    
RETVOL 14.370*** 14.378***   12.634*** 12.609***   12.674*** 12.683*** 
  (2.928) (2.917)   (2.559) (2.549)   (2.929) (2.927)    
lnAF -0.205** -0.208**   -0.068 -0.072   -0.093 -0.096    
  (0.088) (0.087)   (0.084) (0.083)   (0.091) (0.090)    
lnHOR 0.788*** 0.788***   0.568*** 0.566***   1.007*** 1.005*** 
  (0.095) (0.095)   (0.105) (0.105)   (0.115) (0.115)    
lnBRO 0.052** 0.058**   0.081*** 0.087***   0.058** 0.065*** 
  (0.019) (0.020)   (0.022) (0.022)   (0.019) (0.020)    
lnNUMCOM 0.378*** 0.385***   0.126 0.135   0.327*** 0.339*** 
  (0.115) (0.115)   (0.119) (0.116)   (0.106) (0.103)    
lnNUMIND -0.275*** -0.266***   -0.239*** -0.230***   -0.252*** -0.242*** 
  (0.058) (0.059)   (0.069) (0.069)   (0.061) (0.060)    
lnNFORE_T -0.149 -0.166   0.084 0.070   -0.130 -0.152*   
 (0.098) (0.099)   (0.096) (0.095)   (0.081) (0.077)    
lnNFORE_F 0.128 0.125   -0.278*** -0.282***   0.125 0.122    
  (0.082) (0.082)   (0.083) (0.083)   (0.078) (0.078)    
lnPACY -0.122* -0.118*   -0.051 -0.048   -0.093 -0.092    
  (0.062) (0.062)   (0.079) (0.078)   (0.077) (0.077)    
lnFEXP -0.018 -0.018   -0.018 -0.018   0.025 0.025    
  (0.013) (0.014)   (0.018) (0.017)   (0.017) (0.017)    
lnGEXP 0.046 0.041   0.056* 0.050   0.032 0.026    
  (0.028) (0.028)   (0.031) (0.031)   (0.030) (0.029)    
Observations 97,831 97,831   26,342 26,342   60,808 60,808 
Adjusted R2 0.257 0.258   0.232 0.233      0.250 0.251    
Industry × Year 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
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Table 3.5: Market reaction to recommendation revisions 
This table reports the results for the test of the market reaction to recommendation revisions. 
Panel (A) presents descriptive statistics. The dependent variable (CAR) in general is 5-day [-
1, 3] cumulative abnormal CRSP value-weighted adjusted return to recommendation revisions 
in the percentage form. CAR_nonD is CAR to all recommendation revisions with an 
adjustment of multiplying market reactions to downward revisions by -1. CAR_UP is CAR to 
upward recommendation revisions only. CAR_DOWN is CAR to downward recommendation 
revisions only. MATCH is an indicator variable, equals to one if the analyst has a matching 
technological degree, and zero otherwise. RD denotes the R&D expense scaled by total annual 
operating expense. lnPACY denotes the relative accuracy score of an analyst in the previous 
year in the natural logarithm form, which is calculated in line with Hong and Kubik (2003). 
lnFEXP is analysts’ coverage history for a specific firm in the logarithm form. Coverage 
history is measured as the number of years since the analyst provided her first forecast for the 
specific firm to present. lnGEXP is analysts’ general experience of being an analyst in the 
logarithm form. Analysts’ general experience is measured as the number of years from when 
the analyst issued her first forecast for any firms to present. lnNUMCOM denotes the number 
of firms followed by each analyst in the logarithm form. lnNUMIND is the number of 
industries (four-digit SIC) covered by an analyst in the logarithm form. INTA indicates the 
percentage of intangible assets scaled by total assets. lnAF is total analyst following in the 
logarithm form. lnMCAP represents the market value of equity in the logarithm form. BM is 
the book-to-market ratio and measured by dividing the book value of equity by the market 
value of equity. RETVOL_PC is the stock return volatility in percentage. INST denotes the 
percentage of institutional investor ownership. EARNANN is the dummy variable with the 
value of one on the earnings announcement day, and zero otherwise. Panel (B) reports Pearson 
(below diagonal) and Spearman (above diagonal) correlations for the sample with the non-
directional dependent variable only. The correlations significant at the five percent level are 
shown in bold. Panel (C) outlines the results. All the regressions are clustered at the firm and 
the year levels. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
Panel (A): Descriptive statistics 
Variable N Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Median 0.75 Max 
CAR_nonD 8,986 5.75 14.68 -26.45 -0.86 2.52 7.92 74.83 
CAR_UP 4,214 4.05 11.31 -64.45 -0.84 2.44 6.95 51.69 
CAR_DOWN 4,772 -6.61 16.42 -64.45 -9.08 -2.64 0.89 51.69 
MATCH 8,986 0.66 0.47 0 0 1 1 1 
RD 8,986 0.26 0.28 0 0.02 0.14 0.44 0.97 
lnPACY 8,986 3.95 0.31 0 3.87 4 4.1 4.62 
lnFEXP 8,986 6.58 1.16 0 5.9 6.67 7.38 9.36 
lnGEXP 8,986 7.89 0.88 3.76 7.45 7.94 8.56 9.4 
lnNUMCOM 8,986 2.90 0.58 0 2.56 2.83 3.26 4.08 
lnNUMIND 8,986 0.91 0.82 0 0 0.69 1.79 3.09 
INTA 8,986 0.17 0.18 0 0 0.1 0.28 0.72 
lnAF 8,986 2.56 0.69 0 2.2 2.64 3.09 3.74 
lnMCAP 8,986 14.86 1.95 8.08 13.51 14.71 16.36 19.03 
BM 8,986 0.33 0.28 -0.39 0.16 0.27 0.45 1.48 
RETVOL_PC 8,986 3.43 2.68 0.61 1.88 2.86 4.12 19.58 
INST 8,986 0.69 0.25 0 0.58 0.74 0.87 1 
EARNANN 8,986 0.05 0.22 0 0 0 0 1 
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Panel (B): Correlation Matrix 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
(1) CAR_nonD   0.04 0.16 0.02 -0.05 -0.01 -0.03 -0.14 -0.18 -0.08 -0.22 -0.03 0.21 -0.02 0.02 
(2) MATCH 0.07   0.16 0.09 -0.08 -0.15 0.23 0.02 -0.21 0.00 -0.04 -0.01 0.18 0.03 -0.01 
(3) RD 0.27 0.19   -0.07 -0.07 -0.15 -0.28 -0.68 -0.25 0.08 -0.23 -0.33 0.21 0.05 0.01 
(4) lnPACY 0.02 0.05 -0.08   0.02 0.01 0.13 0.08 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 0.07 0.09 -0.01 -0.01 
(5) lnFEXP -0.07 -0.09 -0.12 0.07   0.42 0.06 0.06 0.20 0.23 0.29 0.03 -0.27 0.09 0.00 
(6) lnGEXP -0.03 -0.11 -0.17 0.08 0.41   0.12 0.09 0.15 0.13 0.20 0.03 -0.15 -0.05 -0.04 
(7) lnNUMCOM -0.04 0.25 -0.22 0.21 0.03 0.17   0.62 -0.05 -0.13 0.01 0.17 0.13 -0.03 -0.01 
(8) lnNUMIND -0.17 0.02 -0.58 0.13 0.05 0.13 0.65   0.10 -0.23 0.07 0.30 -0.06 -0.05 -0.01 
(9) INTA -0.17 -0.19 -0.25 0.00 0.14 0.11 -0.08 0.00   0.30 0.47 0.19 -0.51 0.10 0.03 
(10) lnAF -0.09 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.23 0.11 -0.12 -0.21 0.27   0.71 -0.17 -0.39 0.27 0.03 
(11) lnMCAP -0.27 -0.05 -0.31 0.02 0.27 0.20 0.00 0.04 0.40 0.65   -0.11 -0.63 0.11 0.05 
(12) BM 0.01 0.01 -0.25 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.19 0.26 0.08 -0.18 -0.17   -0.02 -0.09 -0.01 
(13) RETVOL_PC 0.29 0.10 0.29 0.01 -0.17 -0.12 0.05 -0.08 -0.30 -0.28 -0.47 0.03   -0.11 -0.06 
(14) INST -0.08 0.02 -0.03 0.03 0.10 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 0.08 0.39 0.15 -0.09 -0.14   0.01 
(15) EARNANN 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05 -0.02 -0.05 0.01   
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Panel (C): Regression results 
  Non-directional   Upward revisions   Downward revisions 
  i ii   iii iv   v vi 
RD 3.145 1.598   3.492* 0.404   -0.938 -0.712    
  (1.882) (2.090)   (1.821) (2.407)   (2.547) (2.769)    
MATCH 1.015** 0.487   1.052*** 0.024   -0.958 -0.878    
  (0.378) (0.427)   (0.330) (0.448)   (0.717) (0.636)    
MATCH_RD   2.112*     4.184**     -0.310    
    (1.118)     (1.838)     (2.395)    
lnPACY 2.084** 2.092**   2.122* 2.152*   -1.482 -1.482    
  (0.833) (0.830)   (1.007) (1.010)   (1.079) (1.078)    
lnFEXP 0.008 0.011   0.133 0.133   0.118 0.117    
  (0.129) (0.137)   (0.168) (0.158)   (0.181) (0.182)    
lnGEXP 0.657*** 0.666***   0.426 0.438   -0.773*** -0.775**  
  (0.212) (0.207)   (0.290) (0.290)   (0.253) (0.256)    
lnNUMCOM 0.656 0.745   -0.028 0.166   -1.710** -1.723**  
  (0.647) (0.646)   (0.831) (0.769)   (0.629) (0.613)    
lnNUMIND -0.971* -0.977*   -0.340 -0.360   1.976** 1.977**  
  (0.543) (0.542)   (0.276) (0.284)   (0.903) (0.902)    
INTA -4.444*** -4.461***   -1.546 -1.544   5.607*** 5.612*** 
  (1.324) (1.313)   (1.090) (1.066)   (1.455) (1.461)    
lnAF 2.248** 2.248**   -1.636** -1.636**   -4.803*** -4.803*** 
  (0.884) (0.887)   (0.671) (0.665)   (1.179) (1.179)    
lnMCAP -1.573*** -1.564***   0.138 0.158   2.865*** 2.864*** 
  (0.385) (0.386)   (0.303) (0.310)   (0.435) (0.435)    
BM 4.880 4.923   -2.486*** -2.432***   -7.739 -7.745    
  (3.122) (3.108)   (0.733) (0.770)   (4.409) (4.405)    
RETVOL_PC 1.113*** 1.111***   0.830*** 0.827***   -0.870*** -0.870*** 
  (0.215) (0.211)   (0.172) (0.177)   (0.239) (0.239)    
INST -2.217 -2.218   3.208** 3.172**   5.144* 5.142*   
  (1.823) (1.821)   (1.164) (1.159)   (2.694) (2.693)    
EARNANN 1.303* 1.299*   -0.048 -0.019   -2.326** -2.324**  
  (0.695) (0.704)   (0.697) (0.712)   (0.997) (0.997)    
Observations 8,981     8,981    4,197  4,197      4,757  4,757  
Adjusted R2 0.172 0.173   0.077 0.079   0.230 0.230    
Industry × 
Year FE Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes    
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Table 3.6: Boldness 
This table presents the results for the test of analysts’ boldness, both in the full sample and in 
the sample with pharmaceutical firms only (SIC 2833-2836). Panel (A) presents descriptive 
statistics for the full sample and the pharma sample. The dependent variable is analysts’ 
boldness (BOLD). BOLD is an indicator variable, equal to one if an analyst’s forecast is above 
both her prior forecast and the consensus forecast immediately before her forecast revision, or 
else below both, otherwise zero. The consensus forecast is the mean of forecasts provided by 
all analysts within 90 days prior to the analyst’s forecast. MATCH is an indicator variable, 
equals to one if the analyst has a matching technological degree, and zero otherwise. RD 
denotes the R&D expense scaled by total annual operating expense. lnPACY denotes the 
relative accuracy score of an analyst in the previous year in the natural logarithm form, which 
is calculated in line with Hong and Kubik (2003). lnNUMCOM denotes the number of firms 
followed by each analyst in the logarithm form. lnNUMIND is the number of industries (four-
digit SIC) covered by an analyst in the logarithm form. lnNFORE_T is defined the number of 
forecasts provided by an analyst within a year in the logarithm form. lnNFORE_F is the 
number of forecasts provided by each analyst for each firm within a year in the logarithm 
form. INTA indicates the percentage of intangible assets scaled by total assets. lnAF is total 
analyst following in the logarithm form. lnMCAP represents the market value of equity in the 
logarithm form. INST denotes the percentage of institutional investor ownership. BM is the 
book-to-market ratio and measured by dividing the book value of equity by the market value 
of equity. lnBRO is the size of the employing brokerage house in the logarithm form, 
calculated as the number of analysts in each brokerage house within each year. lnHOR denotes 
the forecast horizon in the logarithm form. Forecast horizon is the number of days between 
the date when the forecast is provided and the date when the actual EPS is announced. lnFEXP 
is analysts’ coverage history for a specific firm in the logarithm form. Coverage history is 
measured as the number of years since the analyst provided her first forecast for the specific 
firm to present. lnGEXP is analysts’ general experience of being an analyst in the logarithm 
form. Analysts’ general experience is measured as the number of years from when the analyst 
issued her first forecast for any firms to present. lnELAPSE is the number of days since last 
forecast made by any analyst in the logarithm form. Panel (B) reports Pearson (below 
diagonal) and Spearman (above diagonal) correlations. The correlations significant at the five 
percent level are shown in bold. Panels (C) and (D) outlines the results for the full sample and 
pharma only sample respectively. The tests are conducted by logistic regressions. All the 
regressions are clustered at the analyst levels. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Panel (A): Descriptive statistics 
Full sample: MATCH=1 
Variable N Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Median 0.75 Max 
BOLD 44,622  0.71 0.45 0 0 1 1 1 
RD 44,622  0.41 0.28 0 0.18 0.37 0.67 0.99 
lnPACY 44,622  3.95 0.29 0 3.86 3.99 4.10 4.62 
lnNUMCOM 44,622  2.82 0.43 0 2.56 2.89 3.09 4.03 
lnNFORE_T 44,622  4.30 0.51 0 4.04 4.36 4.62 5.67 
lnNFORE_F 44,622  1.65 0.45 0 1.39 1.61 1.95 4.44 
lnNUMIND 44,622  1.18 0.61 0 0.69 1.10 1.39 3 
INTA 44,622  0.17 0.20 0 0 0.08 0.31 0.78 
lnAF 44,622  2.68 0.65 0 2.20 2.77 3.18 3.74 
RETVOL 44,622  0.03 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.19 
lnMCAP 44,622  14.92 2.11 8.08 13.34 14.68 16.65 19.11 
INST 44,622  0.64 0.31 0 0.50 0.72 0.87 1 
BM 44,622  0.25 0.35 -13.03 0.11 0.22 0.36 1.15 
lnHOR 44,622  5.18 0.47 2.89 4.77 5.28 5.63 5.86 
lnBRO 44,622  3.81 1.10 0 3.09 3.97 4.71 5.63 
lnFEXP 44,622  6.50 1.26 0.69 5.77 6.64 7.41 8.97 
lnGEXP 44,622  7.91 0.89 3.78 7.36 8 8.61 9.31 
lnELAPSE 44,622  1.48 1.44 0 0 1.10 2.64 4.47 
                  
Full sample: MATCH=0               
Variable N Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Median 0.75 Max 
BOLD 29,677  0.75 0.43 0 0 1 1 1 
RD 29,677  0.19 0.24 0 0.02 0.08 0.27 0.99 
lnPACY 29,677  3.95 0.25 0 3.85 3.99 4.09 4.62 
lnNUMCOM 29,677  2.77 0.45 0 2.56 2.83 3.04 4.32 
lnNFORE_T 29,677  4.25 0.50 0 4.03 4.33 4.58 6.58 
lnNFORE_F 29,677  1.63 0.44 0 1.39 1.61 1.95 4.53 
lnNUMIND 29,677  1.63 0.74 0 1.10 1.79 2.20 3.47 
INTA 29,677  0.23 0.20 0 0.05 0.19 0.36 0.78 
lnAF 29,677  2.62 0.67 0 2.20 2.77 3.18 3.74 
RETVOL 29,677  0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.19 
lnMCAP 29,677  15.27 2.05 8.87 13.71 15.3 16.87 19.11 
INST 29,677  0.61 0.30 0 0.52 0.69 0.83 1 
BM 29,677  0.31 0.26 -11.44 0.16 0.27 0.42 1.15 
lnHOR 29,677  5.15 0.47 3.04 4.73 5.25 5.61 5.86 
lnBRO 29,677  3.87 1.01 0 3.30 4.01 4.72 5.63 
lnFEXP 29,677  6.74 1.29 0.69 5.96 6.88 7.68 8.97 
lnGEXP 29,677  8.15 0.92 3.87 7.56 8.34 8.92 9.31 
lnELAPSE 29,677  1.50 1.41 0 0 1.39 2.64 4.47 
(continued on next page) 
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Table 3.6 Panel (A) (continued) 
Pharma only: MATCH=1 
Variable N Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Median 0.75 Max 
BOLD 38,225  0.70 0.46 0 0 1 1 1 
RD 38,225  0.47 0.25 0 0.27 0.44 0.71 0.99 
lnPACY 38,225  3.95 0.30 0 3.86 3.99 4.11 4.62 
lnNUMCOM 38,225  2.80 0.44 0 2.56 2.83 3.09 4.03 
lnNFORE_T 38,225  4.25 0.49 0 4.03 4.32 4.60 5.35 
lnNFORE_F 38,225  1.63 0.45 0 1.39 1.61 1.95 4.44 
lnNUMIND 38,225  1.01 0.46 0 0.69 1.10 1.10 2.89 
INTA 38,225  0.17 0.21 0 0 0.05 0.32 0.78 
lnAF 38,225  2.68 0.67 0 2.20 2.77 3.22 3.74 
RETVOL 38,225  0.04 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.19 
lnMCAP 38,225  14.80 2.18 8.08 13.18 14.46 16.65 19.11 
INST 38,225  0.63 0.32 0 0.46 0.73 0.89 1 
BM 38,225  0.22 0.37 -13.03 0.10 0.20 0.34 1.15 
lnHOR 38,225  5.19 0.46 3.18 4.78 5.29 5.63 5.86 
lnBRO 38,225  3.84 0.98 0 3.09 3.93 4.67 5.63 
lnFEXP 38,225  6.40 1.24 0.69 5.68 6.55 7.29 8.97 
lnGEXP 38,225  7.82 0.88 3.78 7.28 7.91 8.48 9.31 
lnELAPSE 38,225  1.50 1.47 0 0 1.1 2.71 4.47 
                  
Pharma only: MATCH=0  
Variable N Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Median 0.75 Max 
BOLD 16,317  0.73 0.44 0 0 1 1 1 
RD 16,317  0.33 0.25 0 0.12 0.25 0.48 0.99 
lnPACY 16,317  3.96 0.24 0 3.87 4 4.11 4.62 
lnNUMCOM 16,317  2.77 0.47 0 2.56 2.83 3.04 4.08 
lnNFORE_T 16,317  4.21 0.50 0.69 3.97 4.26 4.53 5.47 
lnNFORE_F 16,317  1.60 0.46 0 1.39 1.61 1.79 4.53 
lnNUMIND 16,317  1.19 0.63 0 0.69 1.10 1.61 3.47 
INTA 16,317  0.23 0.23 0 0.01 0.18 0.38 0.78 
lnAF 16,317  2.63 0.69 0 2.20 2.77 3.18 3.74 
RETVOL 16,317  0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.19 
lnMCAP 16,317  15.08 2.26 8.87 13.33 14.86 17.09 19.11 
INST 16,317  0.60 0.32 0 0.42 0.68 0.85 1 
BM 16,317  0.27 0.25 -11.44 0.15 0.24 0.37 1.15 
lnHOR 16,317  5.18 0.46 3.04 4.75 5.28 5.62 5.86 
lnBRO 16317 3.79 0.95 0 3.04 3.83 4.62 5.63 
lnFEXP 16,317  6.62 1.32 0.69 5.83 6.72 7.55 8.97 
lnGEXP 16,317  8.18 0.91 3.87 7.62 8.36 8.92 9.31 
lnELAPSE 16,317  1.52 1.48 0 0 1.39 2.71 4.47 
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Panel (B): Correlation Matrix 
Full Sample 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
(1) BOLD   -0.04 -0.08 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.05 0.04 0.01 -0.04 0.03 0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.01 
(2) MATCH -0.04   0.41 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.02 -0.30 -0.20 0.04 0.19 -0.08 0.06 -0.11 0.04 -0.01 -0.09 -0.14 -0.01 
(3) RD -0.08 0.38   0.04 0.09 -0.06 -0.20 -0.58 -0.40 -0.06 0.43 -0.28 -0.01 -0.28 0.07 -0.09 -0.20 -0.16 0.06 
(4) lnPACY 0.01 0.00 0.00   0.00 0.02 0.04 -0.07 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.02 -0.04 0.00 
(5) lnNUMCOM -0.01 0.05 0.10 0.09   0.75 -0.08 0.28 -0.10 -0.08 0.14 -0.11 -0.09 -0.05 0.02 0.00 0.11 0.25 0.05 
(6) lnNFORE_T 0.00 0.04 -0.05 0.15 0.79   0.30 0.27 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.05 -0.05 0.03 0.01 0.19 0.20 0.27 0.03 
(7) lnNFORE_F -0.01 0.02 -0.20 0.07 -0.07 0.33   0.00 0.21 0.25 -0.17 0.29 0.11 0.08 0.06 0.20 0.17 0.01 -0.07 
(8) lnNUMIND 0.05 -0.31 -0.50 -0.01 0.34 0.31 0.00   0.12 -0.13 -0.20 0.01 0.00 0.15 -0.06 -0.02 0.16 0.14 0.03 
(9) INTA 0.03 -0.15 -0.35 0.02 -0.08 0.03 0.18 0.04   0.36 -0.52 0.55 0.02 0.24 -0.05 0.12 0.20 0.14 -0.14 
(10) lnAF 0.00 0.04 -0.12 0.01 -0.06 0.04 0.21 -0.11 0.31   -0.46 0.77 0.25 -0.10 -0.07 0.20 0.27 0.09 -0.32 
(11) RETVOL -0.03 0.13 0.33 -0.01 0.09 -0.01 -0.14 -0.13 -0.30 -0.33   -0.69 -0.08 -0.09 0.10 -0.17 -0.31 -0.17 0.16 
(12) lnMCAP 0.03 -0.08 -0.34 0.02 -0.11 0.06 0.27 0.01 0.48 0.73 -0.49   0.07 -0.06 -0.10 0.26 0.34 0.21 -0.27 
(13) INST 0.02 0.04 -0.07 0.01 -0.09 -0.04 0.09 0.03 -0.03 0.30 -0.13 0.11   -0.07 -0.02 0.02 0.07 -0.09 -0.10 
(14) BM 0.01 -0.09 -0.18 0.00 -0.03 0.02 0.07 0.10 0.15 -0.09 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03   0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.01 
(15) lnBRO -0.02 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.06 -0.05 -0.03 -0.06 0.06 -0.09 -0.03 -0.01   -0.02 -0.08 -0.05 0.04 
(16) lnHOR 0.01 -0.03 -0.05 0.06 -0.04 0.13 0.17 -0.08 0.10 0.21 -0.12 0.24 0.03 -0.02 -0.01   0.09 0.10 0.00 
(17) lnFEXP 0.02 -0.09 -0.20 0.09 0.12 0.20 0.18 0.15 0.13 0.26 -0.22 0.32 0.08 0.01 -0.07 0.07   0.39 -0.09 
(18) lnGEXP 0.02 -0.13 -0.14 0.01 0.29 0.28 0.00 0.15 0.11 0.09 -0.11 0.20 -0.07 0.01 -0.06 0.09 0.38   -0.05 
(19) lnELAPSE -0.01 -0.01 0.10 0.00 0.05 0.01 -0.09 0.02 -0.14 -0.36 0.14 -0.30 -0.11 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.08 -0.05   
(continued on next page) 
 
  
 
179 
 
Table 6 Panel (B) (continued) 
Pharma only 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
(1) BOLD   -0.03 -0.06 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.04 0.02 -0.04 0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 
(2) MATCH -0.03   0.28 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.04 -0.13 -0.16 0.03 0.14 -0.06 0.06 -0.10 0.03 0.03 -0.08 -0.20 -0.01 
(3) RD -0.06 0.26   -0.01 0.16 0.08 -0.19 -0.13 -0.49 -0.17 0.44 -0.33 -0.07 -0.22 0.03 -0.07 -0.14 -0.09 0.10 
(4) lnPACY 0.01 -0.02 -0.02   0.00 0.05 0.05 -0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.05 -0.01 0.00 
(5) lnNUMCOM -0.01 0.03 0.17 0.09   0.76 -0.11 0.33 -0.14 -0.13 0.20 -0.16 -0.10 -0.07 0.03 -0.02 0.09 0.22 0.07 
(6) lnNFORE_T -0.02 0.04 0.06 0.16 0.78   0.25 0.18 -0.01 0.01 0.05 0.02 -0.06 -0.02 0.03 0.19 0.17 0.24 0.04 
(7) lnNFORE_F -0.01 0.03 -0.21 0.07 -0.11 0.30   -0.12 0.26 0.32 -0.23 0.35 0.15 0.03 0.06 0.21 0.21 0.01 -0.09 
(8) lnNUMIND 0.02 -0.16 -0.13 0.00 0.37 0.22 -0.10   -0.03 -0.15 0.03 -0.16 0.05 0.01 0.00 -0.08 0.01 -0.03 0.06 
(9) INTA 0.04 -0.14 -0.44 0.02 -0.10 0.02 0.24 -0.03   0.39 -0.55 0.57 0.04 0.29 -0.04 0.12 0.19 0.13 -0.16 
(10) lnAF 0.01 0.03 -0.18 0.02 -0.10 0.03 0.25 -0.17 0.33   -0.53 0.77 0.35 -0.03 -0.08 0.22 0.31 0.08 -0.34 
(11) RETVOL -0.03 0.10 0.29 -0.02 0.12 0.02 -0.16 0.03 -0.30 -0.35   -0.72 -0.18 -0.15 0.09 -0.19 -0.30 -0.13 0.20 
(12) lnMCAP 0.03 -0.06 -0.35 0.03 -0.15 0.03 0.32 -0.17 0.51 0.73 -0.47   0.16 -0.03 -0.10 0.26 0.34 0.18 -0.29 
(13) INST 0.01 0.05 -0.08 0.00 -0.10 -0.06 0.11 0.03 -0.03 0.38 -0.15 0.15   -0.13 -0.03 0.04 0.10 -0.11 -0.13 
(14) BM 0.00 -0.07 -0.12 0.01 -0.05 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.19 -0.03 -0.06 0.01 -0.07   0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02 -0.01 
(15) lnBRO -0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.00 -0.03 -0.06 0.05 -0.08 -0.02 0.00   -0.02 -0.07 -0.04 0.04 
(16) lnHOR 0.01 0.02 -0.06 0.07 -0.02 0.19 0.21 -0.12 0.11 0.22 -0.13 0.26 0.05 0.00 -0.02   0.08 0.08 0.00 
(17) lnFEXP 0.01 -0.08 -0.15 0.10 0.09 0.18 0.20 0.00 0.14 0.29 -0.21 0.33 0.09 -0.01 -0.06 0.08   0.35 -0.10 
(18) lnGEXP 0.01 -0.18 -0.09 0.02 0.26 0.26 0.00 -0.01 0.11 0.07 -0.08 0.18 -0.09 0.00 -0.05 0.10 0.35   -0.03 
(19) lnELAPSE 0.00 -0.01 0.12 0.00 0.07 0.03 -0.11 0.07 -0.17 -0.37 0.14 -0.31 -0.13 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.09 0.03   
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Panel (C): Regression results - Full sample 
  All forecasts   Last forecasts   Forecasts after EA 
  i ii   iii iv   v vi 
RD -0.515*** -0.671***   -0.538*** -0.641***   -0.597*** -0.720*** 
  (0.047) (0.091)   (0.084) (0.128)   (0.060) (0.115)    
MATCH   -0.122***     -0.092     -0.096*   
    (0.047)     (0.071)     (0.055)    
MATCH × RD   0.235**     0.168     0.184    
    (0.101)     (0.141)     (0.122)    
lnPACY 0.096*** 0.098***   0.097* 0.104**   0.100** 0.117*** 
  (0.032) (0.033)   (0.051) (0.051)   (0.044) (0.044)    
lnNUMCOM 0.040 0.038   -0.054 -0.053   0.033 0.031    
  (0.055) (0.056)   (0.093) (0.094)   (0.074) (0.075)    
lnNFORE_T -0.030 -0.020   0.065 0.063   -0.052 -0.050    
 (0.046) (0.047)   (0.073) (0.073)   (0.057) (0.059)    
lnNFORE_F -0.113*** -0.107***   0.115** 0.132**   0.007 0.021    
  (0.035) (0.036)   (0.056) (0.056)   (0.037) (0.038)    
lnNUMIND 0.011 -0.005   -0.046 -0.059   0.012 -0.001    
  (0.029) (0.029)   (0.043) (0.043)   (0.035) (0.035)    
INTA 0.096 0.102   0.199* 0.203*   0.104 0.103    
  (0.065) (0.065)   (0.111) (0.111)   (0.085) (0.085)    
lnAF -0.087*** -0.080***   -0.083* -0.080   -0.082** -0.076**  
  (0.028) (0.029)   (0.050) (0.050)   (0.037) (0.037)    
RETVOL -0.064 0.045   0.363 0.450   -0.047 0.026    
  (0.380) (0.380)   (0.715) (0.725)   (0.468) (0.475)    
lnMCAP 0.023** 0.023**   0.044*** 0.044***   0.066*** 0.065*** 
  (0.009) (0.009)   (0.015) (0.015)   (0.012) (0.012)    
INST 0.085* 0.078   0.174* 0.150*   0.098 0.092    
  (0.048) (0.048)   (0.090) (0.091)   (0.060) (0.060)    
BM -0.029 -0.031   -0.066* -0.069*   -0.058* -0.059*   
  (0.025) (0.025)   (0.036) (0.036)   (0.032) (0.032)    
lnHOR -0.041** -0.041**   0.123*** 0.129***   -0.136*** -0.135*** 
  (0.021) (0.021)   (0.045) (0.045)   (0.031) (0.031)    
lnBRO 0.020 0.014   0.031 0.025   0.011 0.004    
  (0.014) (0.015)   (0.020) (0.021)   (0.013) (0.014)    
lnFEXP 0.002 0.002   -0.043*** -0.040**   -0.027** -0.027**  
  (0.009) (0.009)   (0.016) (0.016)   (0.011) (0.011)    
lnGEXP 0.022 0.020   0.013 0.012   0.019 0.018    
  (0.014) (0.014)   (0.023) (0.023)   (0.016) (0.016)    
lnELAPSE -0.003 -0.004   0.031*** 0.030***   0.066*** 0.064*** 
  (0.008) (0.008)   (0.011) (0.012)   (0.008) (0.008)    
Observations 75707 74294   19202 18753   46392 45555    
Pseudo R2 0.0129 0.0132   0.0258 0.0257   0.0198 0.0199    
Industry × 
Year FE Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes    
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Panel (D): Regression results - Pharma only 
  All forecasts   Last forecasts   Forecasts after EA 
  i ii   iii iv   v vi 
RD -0.492*** -0.760***   -0.507*** -0.756***   -0.548*** -0.827*** 
  (0.048) (0.098)   (0.085) (0.136)   (0.060) (0.125)    
MATCH   -0.223***     -0.234***     -0.239*** 
    (0.053)     (0.083)     (0.066)    
MATCH × RD   0.401***     0.394***     0.415*** 
    (0.107)     (0.150)     (0.136)    
lnPACY 0.092** 0.098***   0.065 0.087   0.106** 0.123**  
  (0.036) (0.038)   (0.057) (0.057)   (0.050) (0.049)    
lnNUMCOM 0.068 0.083   0.011 0.032   0.059 0.067    
  (0.057) (0.059)   (0.102) (0.103)   (0.083) (0.083)    
lnNFORE_T -0.054 -0.051   0.042 0.033   -0.043 -0.037    
 (0.048) (0.049)   (0.084) (0.084)   (0.067) (0.067)    
lnNFORE_F -0.120*** -0.111***   0.134** 0.156**   0.017 0.029    
  (0.039) (0.039)   (0.064) (0.064)   (0.042) (0.042)    
lnNUMIND 0.006 -0.019   -0.076* -0.095**   0.013 -0.010    
  (0.030) (0.030)   (0.044) (0.044)   (0.036) (0.037)    
INTA 0.153** 0.148**   0.220* 0.211*   0.200** 0.181**  
  (0.069) (0.068)   (0.121) (0.122)   (0.090) (0.090)    
lnAF -0.058* -0.052*   -0.067 -0.063   -0.062 -0.054    
  (0.030) (0.031)   (0.055) (0.055)   (0.041) (0.041)    
RETVOL -0.014 0.107   0.121 0.211   -0.058 0.024    
  (0.393) (0.392)   (0.728) (0.738)   (0.487) (0.493)    
lnMCAP 0.030*** 0.030***   0.056*** 0.056***   0.075*** 0.074*** 
  (0.010) (0.010)   (0.016) (0.016)   (0.013) (0.013)    
INST 0.025 0.024   0.149 0.141   0.034 0.029    
  (0.052) (0.052)   (0.099) (0.100)   (0.065) (0.065)    
BM -0.031 -0.031   -0.056 -0.057   -0.068** -0.070**  
  (0.025) (0.025)   (0.036) (0.036)   (0.032) (0.033)    
lnHOR -0.041* -0.038   0.109** 0.125**   -0.185*** -0.181*** 
  (0.024) (0.024)   (0.049) (0.049)   (0.035) (0.036)    
lnBRO 0.005 0.002   -0.018 -0.021   -0.015 -0.018    
  (0.013) (0.013)   (0.023) (0.023)   (0.016) (0.017)    
lnFEXP -0.001 -0.002   -0.043** -0.044**   -0.030** -0.030**  
  (0.010) (0.010)   (0.018) (0.018)   (0.012) (0.012)    
lnGEXP 0.011 0.005   -0.004 -0.007   0.004 -0.002    
  (0.015) (0.016)   (0.025) (0.026)   (0.017) (0.018)    
lnELAPSE 0.013 0.012   0.047*** 0.045***   0.075*** 0.074*** 
  (0.008) (0.008)   (0.012) (0.013)   (0.009) (0.009)    
Observations 55129 54542   14570 14370   34960 34960    
Pseudo R2 0.008 0.008   0.015 0.016   0.015 0.015    
Industry × 
Year FE Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes    
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